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RÉSUMÉ 
L'objectif principal de cette recherche est de déterminer l'approche relationnelle que le client 
préfère utiliser dans sa relation avec son auditeur financier. De connaître cette préférence 
relationnelle est important puisque l'auditeur requiert la coopération de son client afin de 
combler l'asymétrie d'information existant entre les deux parties. De plus, de mieux 
connaître la préférence relationnelle de son client permettrait à l'auditeur d'aligner son 
approche marketing sur celle de son client, lui permettant d'être plus efficient quant à ses 
ressources et de mieux satisfaire les besoins de ce client. L'objectif secondaire est de 
déterminer l'influence de certaines caractéristiques personnelles du client sur sa préférence 
relationnelle avec son auditeur. 
Pour atteindre ces objectifs, nous avons développé une théorie sur la base de modèles 
existant dans la littérature en marketing, mais adaptée au contexte particulier qui est celui de 
l'audit. Conséquemment, nous avons défini les variables permettant de mesurer les relations 
entre les clients (acheteurs) et leurs auditeurs (vendeurs) suivant celles qui, dans la littérature 
en marketing, ont été théoriquement définies et empiriquement validées (Fink et al., 2007; 
Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Paulin et al., 1997; Rokkan et al., 2003). En 
effet, les approches relationnelles sont définies par deux construits: l'approche relationnelle 
(RA) et l'approche transactionnelle (TA). RA est une approche où l'objectif du vendeur est 
d'établir et maintenir des relations, tandis que TA est une approche économique à court 
terme où l'objectif du vendeur est de gagner des clients et d'augmenter sa part du marché 
(Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Paulin et al., 1997). L'hypothèse principale de 
notre étude spécifie que le client préférera davantage une approche relationnelle qu'une 
approche transactionnelle avec son auditeur financier. Trois hypothèses secondaires vérifient 
l'influence de l'aversion au risque, de l'éthique de l'attention et du locus de contrôle du 
client sur sa préférence relationnelle. 
Pour tester les hypothèses nous avons effectué un sondage par questionnaire auprès de 1090 
participants travaillant pour des sociétés privées canadiennes. 306 questionnaires ont été 
complétés et retournés. L'analyse des données indique que l'hypothèse principale, à savoir 
que le client préfère davantage une approche relationnelle (RA) avec leur auditeur qu'une 
approche transactionnelle (TA), est suppol1ée. Les résultats portant sur les facteurs 
individuels des mesures des approches relationnelles confirment que le client préfère la 
coopération et le partage d'information avec son auditeur, de même qu'un haut niveau de 
confiance vis-à-vis de celui-ci, tous des facteurs relatifs à l'approche relationnelle (RA). 
Cependant, nonobstant la préférence du client pour une approche relationnelle avec son 
auditeur, le client préfère également demeurer à une certaine distance de celui-ci (Ann 's 
length). Ce facteur est pourtant relatif à une relation transactionnelle (TA) plutôt que 
relationnelle (RA). Les hypothèses secondaires, quant à elles, ne sont pas supportées. Sur la 
base des résultats, un nouveau modèle conceptuel des relations entre le client et l'auditeur est 
présenté, modèle qui diffère sensiblement de ceux qui existent dans la littérature en 
marketing. 
XI 
Notre étude présente des contributions significatives tant théoriques que pratiques. Cette 
étude permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre le client et son auditeur, selon la 
perspective du client. De fait, un nouveau modèle est présenté afin de mieux comprendre la 
relation entre le client et son auditeur, modèle pouvant servir de base à des recherches 
futures. De plus, d'un point de vue pratique, si l'auditeur peut mieux connaître et 
comprendre les préférences relationnelles de ses clients, il pourrait être à même de mieux 
définir ses stratégies de marketing. 
Mots-dés: approche relationnelle (RA), approche transactionnelle (TA), auditeurs, 
vérificateurs, clients, acheteurs, vendeurs. 
ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this research is to determine the relationship approach that the client 
prefers to have with their financial auditor. lt is important that we deepen our understanding 
of auditor-client relationships from the client perspective since the success of the audit 
service is considered the result of relationship success between auditors and their clients. ln 
addition, client cooperation with the auditor is an important part of the audit service, since 
the client possesses information that the client needs (information asymmetry in favour of 
the client (Beattie et al., 2001). The secondary objective of this research is to determine the 
influence of certain personal characteristics of clients on their relational preference with their 
auditor. 
To achieve these objectives, we developed a theoretical framework based on existing models 
in the relationship marketing literature. We borrowed a multi-item measurement instrument 
that was theoretically defined and empirically validated in the marketing literature (Fink et 
al., 2007; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Paulin et al., 1997; Rokkan et al., 
2003). ln this literature, relationships are described as relational or transactional. The 
relational approach is a long-term approach where the objective is to maintain relationships. 
The transactional approach is a more short-term, economic approach, where the objective is 
limited to the transaction (Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Paulin et al., 1997). 
The main hypothesis of our study is that clients would prefer a more relational approach than 
transactional approach with their fll1ancial auditor. ln addition, three secondary hypotheses 
are used to verify the influence of risk aversion, ethics of care, and locus of control on the 
client's preferred relational approach. 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a mail survey of 1090 participants in Canadian private 
companies. Three hundred and six questionnaires were completed and returned. Data 
analysis lends support to the main hypothesis, that clients prefer a more relational approach 
(RA) over a transactional approach (TA) with their auditor. Moreover, individual item 
analysis conflrms that client's prefer cooperation and the exchange of information as weil as 
a high level of trust with their auditor. However, notwithstanding the client's preference for a 
relational approach, the client also wants to maintain a certain distance with their auditor 
(Arm's length). The secondary hypotheses are not supported. Based on the results of our 
study, a new conceptual model is presented, which is different from buyer-seller models in 
the existing marketing 1iterature. 
Our study presents significant contributions, theoretical as weil as practical. This study 
results in a deeper understanding of the auditor-client relationship from the perspective 
of the client. As a resuJt, a new conceptual framework is developed that could serve as a 
basis for the future research of auditors and their clients. 
Key Words: relationship marketing, relational approach (RA), transactional approach (TA), 
auditors, clients, buyers, sellers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The auditor-client relationship is an impOltant component of a company's year-end financial 
audit process. In fact, sorne researchers consider corporate audited financial statements to be 
the product of negotiations between cl ients and their aud itors (lyer and Rama, 2004). 
ln the auditor-client relationship, in addition to the auditor, the client plays an important role. 
The client's perception of their relative power influences their tactics and strategies in 
negotiations with the auditor (lyer and Rama, 2004). Moreover, client cooperation with their 
auditor is an important part of the audit process, since the client possesses information that 
the auditor needs: information asymmetry in favour of the client (Beattie et al., 2001). 
ln addition to client power and client information asymmetry, there has been concern over 
auditor independence, due to auditor acquiescence towards client demands (Kleinman and 
Pal mon, 2000; Kopp et al., 2003; Shafer et al., 2004). Client acquiescence, by the auditor, 
has also been given as a cause of unethical behaviour (Tsui and Gui, 1996). This has given 
rise to the cali for mandatory rotation by organizations such as the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Arel et al., 2005; George, 2004). 
Therefore, the client's perspective of their relationship with their auditor is important. 
However, very little direct evidence of the audit client's relationship perspective is available 
in the academic literature. Audit-client relationships regarding negotiations have been 
studied from the auditor's perspective (Saltario and Koonce, 1997), and researchers have 
called for additional studies to capture the client perspective (Gibbens et al., 2001; Iyer and 
Rama, 2004). In addition, Beattie et al. (2001) stress the importance of additional research to 
improve our understanding of the audit client's relationship behaviour using marketing and 
psychology theory, given the limitations of economic theory. 
Different theory exists that cou Id hel p better understand the cl ient's reIationship perspective. 
Some theory describes the audit service as routine and non-value added, which does not 
benefit the client (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Green, 2006). In addition, audit services have 
been perceived as a commodity, where clients seek the lowest priee (Kleinman and Palmon, 
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2001; Schmidt and Sanborn, 1987). Moreover, Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) and 
Opportunism explain that the financial external auditor is considered an outsider and the 
auditors' motives are considered suspicious by the client; therefore, the auditor is expected to 
receive little cooperation From the client (Williamson, 1975). 
In contrast, other theory describes the aud it as a value-added service and important to the 
client (Beattie et al., 2000; Eilifsen et al. Knechel, 2001). In addition, agency theory explains 
that the client (agent) has an interest in providing accurate, favourable, and low cost 
information to the third party users (principles) (Wallace, 1980); therefore, the client would 
see value in the audit service. 
Theory from the Marketing literature explains that when clients perceive a service as a 
commodity, with little value, they would prefer not to have a refationship with their service 
provider (Berry, 1995; Gronroos, 1997; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Pels et al., 2000; Sheth 
and Parvatiyar, 2000). However, when a client perceives a service as value added and 
important, they desire a relationship with their service provider (Berry, 1995; Gronroos, 
1997; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Pels et al., 2000; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). 
Based on the differing theories, mentioned above, it could be argued that the audit is 
important to clients, who would prefer a relationship with their auditor. However, a 
contrasting argument could be made that the audit client perceives the audit as a non-value 
added service and does not desire a relationship with their auditor. Therefore, it is not clear, 
from the theory in the academic literature, whether or not the client would prefer to have a 
relationship with their auditor. To the best of our knowledge, there is very 1ittle empirical 
research that provides direct evidence regarding the audit client's relationship preferences. 
Marketing researchers claim that even though there is a good deal of theory regard ing buyer­
seller relationships, there is a need for further empirical work, especially from the client 
perspective (Sorce and Edwards, 2004). Therefore, in response to the need for additional 
research, the objective of this study is to determine, empirically, the audit client's relational 
preference with their financial auditor. 
Drawing on variables from the Relationship Marketing literature, we define and measure a 
relationship approach between a buyer and a seller. Relationship Marketing is a well­
documented part of the academic Marketing literature, where buyer-seller relationship 
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constructs are conceptualized and empirically tested, using multi-dimensional measurement 
instruments. In the Relationship Marketing literature, a relationship between a buyer and 
seller is defined by two relationship approaches: the Relational Approach (RA)l and the 
Transactional Approach (TAf The RA is a long-term approach, where the objective is to 
maintain relationships (Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Paulin et al., 1997). The 
TA is a more short-term, economic approach, where the objective is limited to the 
transaction (Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Paulin et al., 1997). We predicted that the clients 
surveyed wou Id prefer more of a RA than TA with their aud itor. 
We measured the client's relationship approach preference uSlng a multi-dimensional 
measurement instrument, conceptually defined and empirically tested (Fink et al., 2007; 
Kaufman and Dant, 1992; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000; Rokkan and Haugland, 2000). In 
addition, we investigated three personal characteristics that could influence the client's 
preferred relationship approach with their auditor: risk aversion, ethics of care, and locus of 
control. 
After pre-testing several Marketing variables for their relevant use in the audit context, we 
conducted an empirical study in which we surveyed financial professionals from Canadian 
corporations to measure their relationship preferences with their financial auditors. 
The results confirm our hypothesis that Canadian audit clients prefer more of a Relational 
Approach (RA) than a transactional approach (TA), with their financial auditor. Individual 
item results ind icate that aud it cl ients prefer cooperation, trust, and wi Il ingness to continue 
their relationship with their auditor, among other results. However, the audit client also 
respects the auditor's obligation to remain independent by preferring to remain at arm's 
length, a characteristic pertaining to the Transactional Approach (TA). 
Our results contribute theoretically by contradicting power models and resource depelldency 
theory. Audit clients seem to prefer not exercising their power in order to mailltaill a 
relationship with their auditor. Our study also contributes practically, as auditors need to 
1 RA will be further explained in the Marketing Literature Review 
2 TA will be further explained in the Marketing Literature Review 
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know clients' relationship preferences to assure client satisfaction and better manage 
marketing resources. 
We structure our research as follows. We present an Audit and Marketing literature review, 
followed by a conceptual framework, which leads to our hypotheses. We then explain our 
approach to analyze the hypotheses in a methodology chapter. We present the results of our 
survey in two chapters: a preliminary analysis and an analysis of hypotheses. We conclude 
by discussing our overall resu Its, the study's 1im itations, and opportunities for future 
research. 
CHAPTERl 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following chapter includes an Audit literature review and a Marketing literature review. 
The objective of the Audit literature review is to highlight various studies of auditor-client 
relationships to determine the elements of the relationship we understand and the areas 
where we could increase our knowledge. We group the studies into categories containing 
common subjects: auditor tenure, negotiations, relational approach, client dissatisfaction, and 
client cooperation. We conclude the Audit literature review by discussing the need for future 
empirical research with the help of Marketing theory. 
In the Marketing 1iterature review, we explain the Relationship Marketing perspective and 
differentiate two constructs: the Relational approach (RA) and the Transactional approach 
(TA). We present the theory that supports each construct with a brief description of the 
empirica! work that helps define the variables used to measure the constructs. Finally, we 
demonstrate the importance of the client perspective in a buyer-supplier reJationship. 
1.1 AUDITREVIEW 
1.1.1 Auditor Tenure 
Auditor tenure has sparked debate in the audit Jiterature and the results are mixed. Calls for 
mandatory rotation of audit firms have triggered opposing views by the scientific 
community, as weil as by regulators. The central question surrounding the debate is whether 
longer auditor-client relationships (auditor tenure) reduce earnings quality because of client 
acquiescence causing reduced auditor independence (Shafer et al., 2004). The proponents of 
mandatory rotation, such as the Securities and Exchange Committee, believe that pOOl' 
quality earnings are associated with longer auditor tenure due to impaired auditor 
independence (Arel et al., 2005; George, 2004). However, opponents of mandatory rotation, 
such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AlCPA), argue that auditor 
rotation wou Id increase audit start up costs and over reliance on client estimates, since the 
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auditor would not have the time to obtain firm-specific knowledge (George, 2004). The 
AICPA analyzed audit failures and found that fai lures are three times more 1ikely when the 
auditor is conducting its first or second audit (George, 2004). The results are explained by 
the auditor's lack of knowledge of the cl ient's business. This study was in response to 
Section 203 of the Sarbanes Oxley act, which requires a 5-year mandatory rotation for the 
lead audit partner (Cumunale et al., 2003). 
In addition, research has shown that clients in a short-term relationship are more able to 
persuade the auditor to accept the client position (lyer and Rama, 2004). These results are 
justified by the reasoning that in early years the auditors are easier to influence, since they 
are in the process of recuperating costs. The costs for the auditor in the early years are 
described as start-up costs, such as the cost of understanding the client's business and 
starting the aud it process (DeAngelo, 1981). 
Other research has used economic models to measure the association between auditor 
independence and earnings management, which were related to auditor-client tenure. Higher 
earnings quality was found to be associated with longer auditor tenure, showing that longer 
auditor tenure did not negatively affect independence and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Myers et al. 2003). The exp lallation for these resu lts was that longer auditor-cl ient 
relationships resulted in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management 
decisiolls in financial reporting (Myers et al. 2003). 
Arel et al. (2005) add to the auditor tenure debate by arguing that regardless of the length of 
the auditor-client relationship, auditors and management must interact regularly to assure an 
effective audit. In addition, research has shown that regardless of the length of the auditor­
client relationship, high audit quality has been associated with the audit team's positive 
personal experience with the client (Carcello et al., 1992; Craswell and Francis, 1999). 
The literature dealing with auditor tenure highlights conflicting viewpoints. One argument is 
that the auditor that has a long duration with the client becomes too close and less 
independent, resulting in lower earnings quality. However, others argue that being close to 
the customer is important to assure client knowledge and higher audit quality. It is not clear 
in the literature how or why auditor tenure influences audit quaI ity. The auditor tenure 
studies present interesting associations between auditor tenure and earlllngs quality; 
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however, they fail to explain behavioural characteristics of the auditor-client relationship 
(Beattie et al., 2001). 
1.1.2 Negotiations 
There are behavioural studies that investigate the negotiation process between auditors and 
clients (Beattie et al., 2000; 2001; 2004; Gibbens et al., 2001; 2005; Iyer and Rama, 2004; 
Kleinman and Pal mon, 2000; 2001; Trotman et al., 2005). Negotiations between auditors 
and clients are important since financial statements are considered to be the result of auditor­
client negotiations (Gibbens et al., 2005; lyer and Rama, 2004). 
The negotiation literature review highlights conflicting results. Gibbens et al., (2001) 
developed a theoretical model based on contextual features from the accounting literature as 
weil as from interviews of 18 audit practitioners. The framework of the model was based on 
a three-element process: identifying an accounting issue, the auditor-client process, and the 
accounting outcome (Gibbens et al., 200 1). Based on their model, a questionnaire was 
developed and completed by 93 audit partners. The audit partners identified technical issues 
with public-company clients, frequently arising from the interpretation of external standards. 
Examples of these technical issues are income measurement and balance sheet valuation 
(Gibbens et al., 2001). The outcomes of the negotiations were mostly agreements, and the 
partners' perceptions were that both parties desired a mutual agreement. Gibbens et al. 
(2001) only took into account the audit partner perspective and did not consider the client 
perspective. 
Based on the theoretical model developed in Gibbens et al. (200]), Gibbens et al. (2005) 
sent questionnaires to audit partners and chief financial officers (CFOs) to capture both sides 
of the negotiation. Gibbens et al. (2005) found that CFOs and audit p~rtners prefer that the 
negotiation with the audit firm ends with a distributive (win-Iose) outcome, where the parties 
try to convince the other party to accept its position (Gibbens et al., 2005). Gibbens et al. 
(2005) claim that their results are contrary to the negotiation literature, in which most 
partners seek an integrative (win-win) solution. These results are criticized for relying on the 
Gibbens et al. (2001) model as the unique theoretical framework and not referring to a wider 
scope of general negotiation theory (Johnstone, 2005). For example, Gibbens et al. 's (2005) 
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results differ from negotiation theOl-Y, where both parties desire a win-win solution (Fisher 
and Ury, 1991). 
Beattie et al. (2000; 2004) found opposing results to those of Gibbens et al. (2005), where 
audit clients desired a more cooperative relationship during negotiations that resulted in an 
integrative solution (win-win) (Trotman et al., 2005). Cooperative relationships, where both 
parties work to achieve an optimal solution, have been shown to result in long-term 
relationship success (Beattie et al., 2001; 2004; Kleinman and Pal mon, 2000). Beattie et al. 
(2000) conclude, after interviews, that agency theory is inadequate to explain the auditor­
client relationship because the auditor is a source of advice and the audit service is the result 
of cooperative effort from the two parties: client and auditor. 
Most of the auditor-client negotiation studies capture the auditor perspective (Beattie et al., 
2004; Gibbens et al., 2001; 2005; Sa1tario and Koonce, 1997), and there are still requests for 
further empirical investigations of the client's perspective on auditor-client negotiations (Iyer 
and Rama, 2004). In addition, the CFa (Client) perspective is important because it 
influences a company's financial reporting, and the CFa viewpoint is absent in the academic 
literature (Gibbens et al., 2005). The client perspective is considered important, since it will 
influence the way the client negotiates, which affects the result of the negotiation and 
ultimateJy has an impact on the audited financial statements (Gibbens et al., 2001; Iyer and 
Rama, 2004). 
The perspective of the CFa in Gibbens et al. (2005) is studied to determine the type of 
negotiation regarding a certain identified issue. What is missing in Gibbens et al. (2005) is 
the CFa perspective of their desired relationship approach with their auditor. This is 
important because, as we mention above, the auditor needs the cooperation of the client 
(Kopp et al., 2003; Iyer and Rama, 2004; Bame-Aldred and Kida, 2007), and if auditors 
better understand the client's desired relationship approach, they could strategize to help 
clients become more cooperative (a relational approach (RA) includes cooperation). For 
example, Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) found that clients are more flexible than auditors 
are, when faced with a conflict situation. Moreover, future research is requested for a deeper 
understanding of the auditor-client relationship and the effects on the negotiation model 
(Gibbens et al., 2005). 
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In add ition, Gibbens et al. (2005) argue that aud itors shouJd be trained to better understand 
the client's perspective to assure a win-win solution. Negotiation theOl'y shows that 
understanding the opponent's perspective is important to achieve a win-win solution (Neale 
and Bazerman, 1985). 
To summarize, the negotiation research fails to provide results backed up with theory that 
couJd help explain the relationship dynamics between two parties, which is important in 
negotiations (Fisher and Ury, 1991). Moreover, the negotiation literature does not consider 
important elements of business negotiations such as the relationships between buyers and 
sellers, which have been weil documented in the Marketing and Negotiation Jiterature 
(Fisher and Ury, 1991; Gronroos, 2000; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Sheth and Parvitiyar, 1995; 
2000; Ury, 1993). For auditors, knowing the client perspective could help increase client 
cooperation. 
Finally, the negotiation literature is limited to negotiations over disputes of a technical 
nature, mostly related to balance sheet valuation and income measurement; and not other 
strategic issues such as audit planning, audit quality, and audit communications. The 
following section describes the Marketing perspective of the auditor~client relationship. 
1.1.3 Marketing Perspective 
The auditor-client relationship has been studied using a Marketing perspective. Ruyter and 
Wetzels (1999) surveyed clients of a large audit firm to determine their motivation ta 
continue a relationship with their audit firm. The authors drew on the Relationship 
Marketing literature to build a conceptual framework, which was empirically tested by a 
field questionnaire. Basing their conceptual model on the Morgan and Hunt (1994) Trust and 
Commitment model, Ruyter and WetzeJs (1999) determined antecedents and consequences 
of client commitment. The study highlighted the importance of affective (emotional) 
commitment in auditor-client relationships (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). 
The participants of the empirical portion of the Ruyter and WetzeJs (1999) study were clients 
of a Big-Four audit firm from the Netherlands. The service portfolio studied included audit, 
related audit services, tax, and management advisory services. The authors relied on a 1995 
survey conducted by a Netherlands's audit firm, which was used as a practical justification 
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for their research objective. The survey showed that 35% of the clients that switch audit 
firms say the reason is due to dissatisfaction with the quality of the auditor-client relationship 
(Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). I~ addition, when selecting new audit firms, 12% ofrespondents 
said relationship quality was the most important factor; whereas, only 9% of respondents 
claimed price as the most important factor (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). The Netherlands 
audit firm requested academic and in-depth information to investigate what is a quality 
relationship and what influences client commitment. The overall results showed that, based 
on Morgan and Hunt's (1994) Commitment-Trust Theory, service quality, trust, and 
interdependence lead to higher levels of commitment, which increased the clients' 
wi llingness to continue with their audit firm (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). 
The results of Ruyter and Wetzels (1999) also showed that affective (emotional) 
commitment and not calculative commitment was a significant determinant of cooperation, 
which in turn positively influenced the client's willingness to continue with their audit firm. 
The authors stress the importance for audit firms to emphasize activities with their clients 
that promote positive feelings of affiliation, given the importance of affective commitment 
on cooperation and the client's willingness to continue with their audit firm (Ruyter and 
Wetzels, 1999). The audit firm, in this study, wanted to know what motivated their clients' 
desire to cooperate and continue their relationship. The authors stress further client research 
in other geographic markets (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). 
In addition, Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) conducted a field survey of Quebec audit partners to 
investigate their preferred re1ationship approach when dealing with their clients. To 
conceptualize a relationship approach, the authors drew on academic marketing literature 
which categorized buyer-seller relationships as a Relational approach (RA)3 versus a 
Transactional approach (TA)4 developed from theoretical and empirical marketing stud ies. 
Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) hypothesized that audit partners would prefer a RA that would 
result in greater customer loyalty, since it is more costly to look for new clients, rather than 
maintaining existing ones. Conducting a field survey of Quebec audit partners, 259 
questionnaires were answered by audit partners in the greater Montreal area. The hypothesis 
that audit partners would prefer a RA with their clients was Suppol1ed. 
3 RA will be further explained in the Marketing Review (Section 1.2) 
4 TA will be further explained in the Marketing Review (Section 1.2) 
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Based on the same questionnaire survey, Pilote and Elbekkali (2004) found that firm size 
does not significantly influence the partners' marketing approach. ln addition, Pilote and 
Elbekkali (2004) extended the Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) study to investigate the client 
characteristics that cou Id influence the partners' marketing approach. The cl ient 
characteristics studied were clients' business risk, integrity and honesty, personnel 's 
competency, financial situation, size, and growth potential. The results showed that clients' 
business risk and personnel's' competency had no significant influence on the audit partner's 
marketing approacl) (Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004). 
Similarly, Elbekkali and Pilote (2002) studied the influence of risk, economic and ethical 
factors on audit partners' long-term client relationship strategy. The results showed that only 
risk and economic factors influenced the partner's use of a long-term relationship strategy. 
Ethical factors did not show an influence. 
Given the importance of matching auditor and cl ient relational preferences to assure effective 
resource allocation, Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) request future research to investigate if 
clients' perceptions of their willingness to pursue their relationship and their willingness to 
cooperate match partners' perceptions. Additional research shows that clients are dissatisfied 
with their relationships with their auditor. 
1.1.4 Client Dissatisfaction 
Clients find their auditors less helpful as auditors offload work and risk onto the client, yet 
the auditor maintains or increases audit fees, which results in client dissatisfaction (Nixon, 
2005). The relationship is strained and clients do not feel important to auditors (Nixon, 
2005). A survey conducted among audit clients show that auditors score very high in terms 
of trust, personal ethics, integrity, and maintaining independence. However, results show that 
the accounting profession suffers from serious auditor-client relationship issues, which are 
different from the Emon headlines (Taub, 2002). The client does not feel important in the 
eyes of the auditor (Nixon, 2005).The problems with client issues are not related to price or 
quality but rather relationship issues (Aquila and Koltin, 1992). lrrespective of auditor-client 
relationship issues, very little direct empirical evidence exists from the client perspective as 
to what is their desired relationship approach with their auditor. More specifically, little is 
known about the audit client's willingness to cooperate with their auditor. 
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1.1.5 Client Cooperation 
The auditor's relationship with their client is an important part of the overall audit service as 
the auditor relies on the client for shared knowledge and accurate information (Eilifsen et al., 
2001). There is also evidence that the need for cl ient collaboration with their aud it firm is 
increasing in importance due to the audit complexity and need for client invo.lvement 
(Nixon, 2005; ü'Sullivan, 2004; U.S. Chamber, 2006). 
In addition, Dawson (2005) warns about the commoditization of the audit profession because 
the services are provided at arm's length. The only way to avoid that audits become 
commodities is for the auditor to establish cooperative knowledge-based relationships with 
their clients (Dawson, 2005). A close relationship between the auditor and the client results 
in knowledge sharing, which is critical to the audit process (Arel et al., 2005). 
In addition, client cooperation with the auditor is necessary, since the auditor experiences 
information asymmetry during the audit process: the client has more information about the 
company than the auditor does (Kleinman and PaJmon, 2000; Kopp et al., 2003). Evidence 
from the client is considered an important source and a good starting point for audit planning 
and the audit itself (Arens et al., 2007; Kopp et al., 2003); therefore, the auditor is dependent 
on client involvement and cooperation (Arel et al., 2005; Kopp et al., 2003; Rennie et al., 
2006). Client cooperation and management provided evidence have been shown to increase 
audit effectiveness (Comunale et al.. 2003). 
The conflict over the auditor having a close working relationship with the client and 
remaining independent has created what Beattie et al. (2000) refer to as a paradox. The 
paradox is where regulators, who are concerned with issues of auditor independence, add 
complexity to the audit regulatory framework. This complexity then results in the client 
getting closer to the auditor to seek more advice. This paradox is apparent in the literature. 
The auditor needs the client to cooperate and work closely with the auditor, given 
information asymmetry; however, this closeness has given rise to concern over adequate 
auditor independence to assure an objective audit process (Beattie et al., 2000; 2001; 
Kleinman et al., 2000; 2001). 
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1.1.6 Summary of Audit research 
The audit literature review presents auditor-client relationship research from different 
perspectives. Economie perspectives show the impact that the duration of the audit-client 
relationship has had on the auditor's leveJ of independence and audit quality (Arel el al., 
2005; DeAngelo, 1981; George 2004; Iyer and Rama, 2004; Myers el al., 2003) which 
produce conflicting results. In response to regulatory calls for mandatory rotation (George 
2004), longer auditor tenure has not been shown to negatively influence audit quality (Arel et 
al., 2005; Iyer and Rama, 2004). 
The auditor-client relationship has also been studied from a negotiation perspective: how the 
client and auditor resolve issues related to financial statement technical issues (Beattie el al. 
2000; 2001; 2004; Gibbens el al., 2001; 2005; Iyer and Rama, 2004; Kleinman and Palmon 
2000; 2001; 2003; Trotman el al., 2005). The results of negotiation research have been 
conflicting. Some research found non-collaborative outcomes (Gibbens el al., 2001; 2005; 
Trotman el al., 2005), while other concludes collaborative outcomes between the auditor and 
the client (Beattie el al., 2000; 2001; 2004; Kleinman and Palmon, 2000; 2001; 2003). 
The Relational Marketing approach has been used to investigate the auditors perspective of 
their preferred relationship approach with their clients (Elbekali and Pilote, 2004; Pilote and 
Elbekali, 2004) and the antecedents of the audit-client's willingness to cooperate and 
continue with their audit firm (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). These studies stress the need for 
further evidence from the client on their relationship with their auditor. Better understanding 
the client's perspective on their relationship with their auditor is important for both audit 
practioners and audit academics, since the audit-client relationship is becoming more 
complex and requires increasing auditor-client interaction and client invoJvement 
(O'Sullivan, 2004; U.S. Cham ber, 2006). The client perspective is also important due to 
reported increases in cl ient dissatisfaction with their aud it firm (N ixon, 2005). 
Beattie el al. (2000) argue that most research into auditor-client relationships is abstract or 
indirect, which draws inferences from public company information due to the difficulty of 
gaining access to real life information (Beattie el al., 2000; Dye, 1991). Kleinman and 
Palmon (2000) stress the need for further empirical research of the auditor-client relationship 
because the relationship is becoming more intensive and extensive. However, the challenge 
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ln studying auditor-client relationships is determining the appropriate definitions and 
measures of reJationship constructs and variables. Therefore, there is a need to draw on a 
field of study that has defined and operationalized relational variables, which is analyzed in 
the following section. 
1.2 MARKETING REVIEW 
Definitions of relationship constructs and the operational variables used to define these 
constructs have been extensively documented in the Marketing literature. Marketing schoJars 
have defined the study of buyer-seller relationships as Relationship Marketing and we draw 
on this literature to establish a conceptuaJ framework for the auditor-client relationship. 
According to Beattie et al. (2001), " ... by augmenting the economic theory of auditor choice 
with insights from the marketing and psychology disciplines, a more complete understanding 
of auditor choice will be created" (pg 16). Therefore, the objective ofthis research will be to 
investigate the client's relationship preference with their auditor using a Relationship 
Marketing perspective and framework. 
To accomplish this objective, we will reference Relationship Marketing literature. In the 
Relationship Marketing Jiterature, buyer and seller characteristics are theoretically and 
empirically tested. Since economic theory, as weil as the negotiation literature, have shown 
to be limited perspectives, Relationship Marketing has been proposed as a discipline that will 
help to better understand cl ients' relationship preferences (Beattie et al., 2001). 
1.2.1 Relationship Marketing 
Relationship Marketing is a perspective that seeks to improve the understanding of how 
service and product providers, clients, and other parties relate with each other, which has an 
impact on business strategy (Gronroos, 2000). The Relational Approach (RA) is considered 
by marketing scholars to be at the opposing end of the Transactional Approach (TA) (Dwyer 
et al., 1987; Macneil, 1974; 1978; 1980; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000; Pels et al., 2000). In the 
Relational Marketing literature, suppliers have been found to be either transactional or 
relational (Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Paulin et al., 1997). However, other 
perspectives have shown that suppliers can be both transactional and relational depending on 
the needs of the customer (Coviello et al., 1997; 2000; 2002; Pels et al., 2000). 
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Unlike suppliers, clients are in either a relational mode or a transactional mode in a given 
marketing situation (Gronroos, 1991; 1997; 2000; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000). There are 
Relationship Marketing studies that have defined and measured reJationships between buyers 
and sellers where the TA and the RA are not mutually exclusive (Coviello et al., 1997; 2000; 
2002 and Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004); however, these studies are only from the supplier 
perspective. Since the objective of this study is the client perspective, we focus on the theory 
and models that define and measure Relationship Marketing constructs that include the 
buyer. 
Buyer and seller relationships have been conceptualized as either more Relational (RA) or 
more Transactional (TA) based on their position on a continuum, where TA and RA are on 
opposing ends (Macneil, 1974; 1978). The TA and RA are further conceptualized and 
empirically tested showing that buyers and sellers are either more Transactional (TA) or 
more Relational (RA) based on where they are positioned on the TA-RA continuum (Dwyer 
et al., 1987; Ferguson et al., 2005; Fink et al., 2007; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Paulin et al., 
1997; 2000; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Rokkan and Haugland, 2000). TA and RA are on 
opposite ends of a continuum, where the TA is defined by the theory of opportunism, and 
where the RA is defined as a win-win, plus sum game (Gummesson, 1994; 2002; Paulin, 
1997). 
One of the objectives of RA is to differentiate, strategically, a company by maximizing the 
relationship between the buyer and the seller (Gronroos, 1994; Gummesson, 2002; Paulin et 
al., 1997). In addition, for the seller, the goal of RA is to get and keep customers; whereas, 
the main objective of TA is to gain customers, increase market share and maximize shOl1­
term customer profitability (Gronroos, 1994, 2000; Paulin et al., 1997; Perrien and Ricard, 
1995; Ricard, 1995). The RA allows the seller to better understand the customers needs; 
therefore, increasing cross-sel 1ing, increasing revenues, and reducing costs by better 
matching services with appropriate needs (Berry, 1987; Dwyer et al., 1987; Paulin et al., 
1997; Pels et al., 2000). The difference between the two relationship approaches (RA and 
TA) can be further explained as folJows. 
For both buyers and sellers, the RA is a relational exchange that reflects an ongoing process 
(Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994). It is a perspective based on interdependence 
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rather than independence of choice and cooperation rather than competition (Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1995). Cooperation is a key antecedent to a successful long-term relationship. 
Cooperation promotes Relationship Marketing success (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Research 
has shown. that factors such as interdependence, shared values, and trust increase çlient 
cooperation which results in the client's willingness to continue their relationship with the 
supplier (Morgan and Hunt, ]994; Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). In the audit literature review, 
we showed the importance of client cooperation due to information asymmetry in favour of 
the client (Kopp et al., 2003; Ruyter and Wezels, ]999). By knowing the client's relationship 
preference, the auditor could better determine levels of cooperation since higher cooperation 
is prevalent in a RA more so than in a TA (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Communication is also an important element in the RA, where the nature of communication 
is from individuals to individuals (Coviello et al., 1997; 2002). Communication has been 
shown to increase levels of trust between exchange partners (Anderson and Narus, 1990; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994). For communication to be effective for buyers, it needs to be 
meaningful and timely (Anderson and Narus, ]990; Morgan and Hunt, ]994). 
In contrast to the RA, the TA is a discrete transaction approach that has a distinct beginning, 
short duration, and ends by the delivery of performance (Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994). The TA is a perspective based on the premise that competition and self-interest 
results in an arm's length relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This approach is focused on 
the acquisition of new clients and increasing the number of transactions to increase short­
term profits, disregarding the relationship with the client (Gronroos, 1991; 2000). 
Gummeson (2002) and Gronroos (1994; 2000) present the RA and the TAon a relationship 
continuum where TA is the 0 point, and the opposite extreme on the continuum is the RA 
where the" ... customer and a supplier are practically the same organization" (Gummeson, 
2002, pg 17). At the 0 point, there is no relationship between the buyer and seller as it is the 
lowest price that connects the buyer and seller. The 0 point is theorized by micro-economic 
theory, where price is the only detennining factor of a purchase. The 0 point can also contain 
a convenience factor which would put less emphasize on price (Gummeson, 2002). Different 
theory supports the TA and the RA. 
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1.2.2 Theoretical Support 
The TA is based on Williamson's (1975) Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) and the RA is 
explained by Macnei l's (1980) Relational Theory of Contracts. Williamson 's (1975) 
Transactiona! Cost Analysis (TCA) is based on classical contract law and assumes that 
exchange is strictly an economic transaction (Campbell, 2004). TCA assumes that 
individuals are rational, utility maximisers, opportunistic, and self interested. TCA also 
assumes that decisions are made with the objective of minimizing transaction costs. 
Macneil's (1980) Relational Theory of Contracts is argued to be the theoretical framework 
which best explains the RA (Dwyer et al., 1987; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000). Dwyer et al. 
(1987) has been credited for bringing Macneil' s (1980) theory into the Marketing 1iterature 
(Paulin et al., 1997). Paulin et al. (1997) study banking relationships drawing on Macneil's 
theOl'Y. Macneil's (1980) Relational Theory of Contract distinguishes a RA over a TA, where 
RA happens over time with an anticipated future. According to Macneil's (1980) Relational 
Exchange Theory, classical contract law is transactional and is not adequate to explain the 
exchange between two parties because it fails to consider the relational aspects of the 
exchange (Macneil, 1974; 1978; 1980; Paulin et al., 1997). Macneil (1980) claims that 
contract law explains an exchange between two parties as being simply transactional and 
discrete, with no consideration for time (Macneil, 1974; 1978; 1980; Paulin et al., 1997). 
Relational contracts are considered by Macneil (1974; 1980) to be the opposite pole of 
transactional contracts and " ... are characterized by whole person relations, relatively the 
opposite pole to transactional contracts and are characterized by relatively deep and 
extensive communications and significant elements of non-economic personal satisfaction" 
(Macneil, 1974, p. 723 ). According to Macneil 's (1980) theory " ... man is a self-sacrificing 
and social creature as weil as selfish and opportunistic" (Paulin et al., 1997, pg 2); therefore, 
exchange cannot be based on only rationality and utility maximization. Empirical studies 
deepen our understanding of the RA and TA constructs as explained in the following section. 
1.2.3 Empirical Evidence 
In the audit literature, Pilote and Elbekkali (2004) and Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) 
investigate the auditor (seller) relational preference based on theory from Relationship 
18 
Marketing, from the seller perspective. The results show that auditors prefer a more RA with 
their clients. In the Marketing literature, there are studies that conceptualize relational 
variables (Dwyer et al., 1987; Macneil, 1974; 1978; 1980), and empirically test to see if 
buyers and sellers are more transactional or more relational (Coviello et al., 1997; 2000; 
2002; Ferguson et al., 2005; Fink et al., 2007; Kaufman and Dant, 1992; Paulin et al., 1997; 
Paulin et al., 2000; Rokkan et al., 2003) 
For example, multi-dimensional RA and TA variables were developed from a conceptual 
framework (Coviello et al., 1997), and empirically tested (Coviello et al., 2000; 2002). 
Coviello et al. (2000) found that both the TA and RA were relevant marketing approaches 
for both small and large service firms, while Coviello et al. (2002) found, after studying 308 
firms, that suppliers From consumer and goods firms as weil as service firms used a RA, TA, 
and mixed approach. Therefore, their study did not show that different types of firms 
practice more RA than others. They show that a hybrid (mixed TA and RA) approach was 
possible for sellers. Coviello et al. (2002) did not conduct their study to measure client 
relational preferences, and we maintain the argument that clients will prefer either more of a 
TA, or more of a RA preference as presented in the Relationship Marketing literature 
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Gronroos, 1991; 1994; 1997; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000; Pels et al., 
2000). 
From a different perspective, Kaufmann and Dant (1992) were the first to operationalize 
Macneil' s (1980) Relational Exchange Theory and empirically showed the operational 
reliability of the RA and TA constructs using a multidimensional measurement instrument 
applicable within different industries and From both buyers' and sellers' perspectives. 
Contrary to other conceptual frameworks (Gronroos, 1991), a TA approach is evident in non­
consumer goods firms (Coviello et al., 2002). Coviello et al. (2002) study showed that one 
fOlth of business-to-business service firms showed a more TA. However, Coviello et al. 
(2002) conclude that their results support the observations by Day (1992) that trying to 
invest and build close relationships is neither necessary nor appropriate for every type of 
company or customer. Therefore, it is important to know the client's relationship 
perspective. 
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1.2.4 Client Perspective 
It has been argued that the relationship approval strategy is an asymmetrical process, which 
depends mostly on the seller and not the client (Perrien and Ricard, 1995). However, others 
argue that even though the seller initiates the relationship approach the customer needs to 
accept the approach to assure its success. Based on the conceptual framework of Coviello et 
al. (1997), Peis et al. (2000) stress the need to understand the client's relationship 
perspective to assure a proper matching of the supplier's desired relationship approach with 
the customer. Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) also stress the need for client alignment with 
aud itor relationship preferences to assure effective resource allocation. 
The customer perspective is also stressed by Pep pers and Rogers (2005), who daim that 
companies are too focused on short-term results and not on developing relationships with 
their customers. Customers, who were interviewed, regarding their relationships with 
suppliers, complained that many of the relationships were one-way without concern for the 
needs of the customer (Peppers and Rogers, 2005). These authors daim the problem is that 
suppliers still fail to make an effort to take the customer's point of view. Pepper and Rogers 
(2005) argue that understanding the customer's point of view could help deepen a 
relationship and help customers cooperate and even accept pricing that could otherwise be 
considered too high. Even though the client relationship perspective is important, in the 
Marketing literature there is very little empiricaJ evidence measuring buyer-seller 
relationships, particularly from the consumer's point ofview (Sorce and Edwards, 2004) 
1.3 OVERVIEW 
The Audit literature review has shown the importance of better understanding the 
behavioural relationship between the auditor and the client and the lack of direct empirical 
evidence of the client's preferred relationship approach. It is important to know the audit 
cJient's preferred relationship approach with their auditor so that the auditor could improve 
the management of their relationships with their clients. 
For example, it is not always appropriate for a service supplier to develop a RA with 
customers that are not in a relational mode (Gronroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Sheth 
and Parvatiyar, 2000). If customers are not in a relational mode, then it might be more 
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feasible for service providers to create a transactional marketing strategy (Gronroos, 1997; 
Peis et al., 2000), since the RA consumes resources, such as personnel's time (Elbekkali and 
Pilote, 2004; Ganesan, 1994; Pels et al., 2000; Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004; Rokkan et al., 
2003; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). Therefore, it would be important for audit firms to know 
their clients' preferred relationship approach to avoid a mismatched strategy, resulting in a 
misallocation of resources or client dissatisfaction (Dwyer et al., 1987; Elbekkali and Pilote 
2004; Gummesson 2002; Pels et al., 2000). Pels et al. (2000) give an example of two 
mismatches. The first example is a buyer who desires a relational approach based on a 
unique need yet the seller uses a transactionai approach, resuiting in customer dissatisfaction. 
The second example is where the seller implements a relational approach yet the buyer, 
based on a generic need structure, desires a transactional approach, resulting in a 
misai location of resources, and increased costs (Pels et al., 2000). Therefore, it is important 
for the auditor to know the preferred relationship approach of the client, for both customer 
satisfaction and effective resource allocation. 
The Marketing literature review highlights the mall1 components of two constructs that 
describe relationships between buyers and sellers: TA and RA. The marketing literature also 
provides us with empirical studies, based on sound conceptual frameworks with variables 
that define the TA and RA constructs. These frameworks have permitted researchers to 
determine if buyers and sellers are more relational or more transactionaJ. Therefore, the 
objective of this research project is to empirically determine if the client' s preferred 
relational approach with their auditor is more Relational (RA) or more Transactionai (TA). 
In the following chapter, we present a conceptual framework of the auditor-cJient 
relationship with the objective of differentiating it from traditional buyer-seller dyadic 
reJationships as weil as an explanation of the theory that will support our methodology. 
2.1 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
PRINCIPLE HYPOTHESIS (H 1) 
2. J.l Buyer-Seller Relationship 
After an extensive review of the Relationship Marketing literature, to the best of our 
knowledge, most of the traditional buyer-seller relationships, studied in the academic 
marketing literature (Christopher et al., 1991; Dwyer et al., 1987; Gronroos, 1994; 1997; 
2000; Gummesson, 1994; 2002; Heide and John, 1992; Kotler, 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995; 2000) are unlike the audit-client relationship. Figure 2.1 
best represents these traditional buyer-seller relationships. 
Seller Buyer 
(Service provider) (Pays for and uses service) 
Not required, by rules or 
norms, 10 remain al arm's 
length 
Figure 2. J Buyer-seller dyadic relationships (Gummesson, 2002) 
More precisely, classic market relationships are described as Business to Business (B-to-B) 
or Business to Customer (B-to-C), which are considered the classic dyad of marketing which 
is a two-party relationship (Gummesson, 2002). For example, the relationship is between 
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someone who sells something and someone who buys something, where the buyers and 
sellers are considered customers and suppliers who form relationships, two of which are 
described below: 
In a few years Amazon.com became one of the world's largest bookstores. Founder 
Jeff Bezos used the opportunities inherent in the new infrastructural network of the 
Internet to reach globally, create an individual relationship with each customer, and 
effectively interact with customers. As a customer you can not only order books but 
also read book reviews from other readers and write your own reviews. Amazon is a 
learning network which registers which type of books you order and offers you new 
books within your profile (Gummesson, 2002 pg 6). 
Instead of letting a large number of suppliers fight for contracts at lowest priee, 
companies increasingly chose to develop intimate relationships with a limited 
number of suppl iers ....An extreme example is Procter & Gambie, the world's largest 
producer of packaged consumer goods, who has joined forces with Wal-Mart, the 
world's largest l'etai 1er. They have set up an information system which coordinates 
online the production and delivery of the goods with the sales in the stores 
(Gummesson, 2002 pg 6). 
These examples show buyer-seller relationships, which are dyadic relationships where the 
buyer (payer) is the consumer or business user without the presence of a 3'ct party user. The 
auditor-client relationship differs from the buyer-seller relationship as it includes paying 
clients who are not the intended user of the provided service. In addition, the auditor-client 
relationship is heavily regulated where arm's length independence, professional skepticism 
and objectivity are required with set norms (CICA, 2006), which is not the case in the dyadic 
buyer-seller relationships described above. 
2.].2 Audit-Client Relationship 
As a foundation of our conceptual framework we present the audit-client relationship as it 
defined in the audit standards (CICA, 2006 5025.07) (presented in Figure 2.2), with the 
objective of differentiating it from the traditional buyer-seller relationship (presented in 
Figure2.1). 
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Accountability 
Conclusion1
 SUBJECT
 
MATTER
 
Practitioner	 Accountable party 
(Auditor)	 (Management) 
Figure 2.2 Three parties involved in an assurance engagement. (CrCA, 20065025.07) 
Referring ta Figure 2.2, we base our definition of the participants In the auditor-client 
relationship on this CrCA framework. The reason we use this framework as a basis for our 
conceptual framework is that the CrCA framework is a standard that applies ta ail Canadian 
accounting practitioners, performing aud it and review engagements, in private and public 
sectors (CrCA, 2006, 5025.01). The Practitioner is the auditor who has the responsibility for 
the assurance engagement and the issue of the report on the subject matter (crCA, 2006; 
5025.06). The Accountable party is Management (Client). 
rn this study, when we use the ward Client we refer ta the Accountable party and when we 
use the ward Auditor we refer ta the Practitioner as they are presented in this framework 
(crCA, 2006 5025.07). rn addition ta the Auditor and the CI ient, Figure 2.2 shows the 
presence of a User who is a 3rct party that could be shareholders, creditors, customers, the 
board of directors, the audit committee, and the legislators or regulators (CrCA, 2006 
5025.06). There is an accountability relationship between the Client and the User(s), where 
the Client is responsible ta the User (s) (CrCA, 2006 5025.04). rt is the presence of the 
accountability ta a third party User that differentiates the auditor-client relationship from 
other traditional buyer-seller relationships presented in Figure 2.1. The conclusion, in Figure 
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2.2, is defined as a written communication by the practioner where a conclusion is expressed 
concerning a subject matter for which the accountable party is responsible (CrCA, 2006 
5025.03). 
The existence of the 3rd palty User could give rise to non-cooperative behaviour (Beattie et 
al., 200]; Kleinman and Palmon, 2001). For example, the auditor could want to protect the 
3rd party User and assure that financial information is accurate according to regulations and 
standards; whereas, the cl ient' s objective cou Id be to achieve profit and assure the financial 
information is attractive to the 3rd party User. These conflicting objectives are referred to as 
"role strain" (Kleinman and Poleman, 2000; 2001). Therefore, given role strain, these 
authors ask the question: "Given ail these outside interests: What motivates the parties to 
seek accommodation or conflict?" (Kleinman and Poleman, 2000 pg 25). rn other words, 
given the multiple 3rd party Users, why would audit clients want to enter into a cooperative 
relationship (RA) with their auditor? 
This research project encompasses with medium and high levels of assurance, referred to as 
an audit, or audit services (CICA, 2006 5025.0]) and added-value advice defined in the audit 
standards as Derivative Communication, considered a by-product of the financial statement 
audit (crCA, 2006 5750.03). The scope of this research does not include other billable 
services offered by audit firms such as management consulting engagements or taxation 
engagements because these services fall outside of the conceptual framework of this research 
projed. Based on the triadic relationship presented in Figure 2.2 and discussed above, we 
present theory that could help explain the client's preferred relational approach, but first we 
discuss the auditor preference. 
Auditors have been shawn to prefer a RA with their clients (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004; 
Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004). It is important ta highlight that these authors investigated the 
seller (auditor) perspective. Their results are consistent with theoretical and empirical models 
5 Tt is important to note that the definition of a RA includes mu Itiple products or services offered From 
a supplier. However, this research is focused on the client relational preference for assurance services. 
The scope of the research is defined by the conceptual framework based on the model From the Audit 
manual (see Figure 2.2). This model shows that a 3rd party accountability relationship is a prerequisite 
for an assurance engagement. Therefore, other billable management services offered to management 
by auditors are not incJuded in this conceptuaJ framework since such engagements are not assurance 
engagements that involve an accountability relationship between the client-management and user 
(CICA 20065025.15). 
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found in the Relationship Marketing literature, which shows that sellers prefer a relational 
approach with their customers (Gronroos, 1994; 1997; 2000 Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995; 
2000). The benefits for service providers, such as auditors, to enter into a RA with a client 
are increased revenues, increased customer loyalty, and lower overall costs (Elbekkali and 
Pilote, 2004; Gronroos, 2000; Gummesson, 2002; Sheth and Parvitiyar, 2000). Our study, 
however, is focused on client preferences; and the benefits for a client, in either a RA or TA 
with their supplier, differs from the benefits for a supplier. 
The RA will not necessarily benefit the client in the same way as the auditor (service 
provider). Research, in Relationship Marketing, shows that clients and organizational users 
are either transactional (TA) or relational (RA) in a specifie exchange situation (Gronroos, 
1991; 1997; Sheth and Parvitayar, 1995). Therefore, to achieve the research objective of 
determining the client's preferred relational approach, we present theory to help explain why 
an audit client would prefer more of a RA, or TA with their auditor. It is important to 
highlight that the following theory discussed is to explain client behaviour and more 
precisely audit-client behaviour, not seller (auditor) behaviour. 
2. l.3 Transactional Preference Theory 
Berry (1995) argues that services with the following characteristics will benefit from a RA: 
personalJy important, variable in quality, and/or complex and high involvement (e.g. 
medical, banking, insurance and hairstyling). The reason for this is "the heterogeneity of 
labor-intensive services encourages customer 10yaJty when excellent service is experienced" 
(Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000 pg 153). The example of an auto repair service is given where 
the cl ient wou Id prefer a RA with their auto repair service firm given the heterogeneity of the 
service. Also, Pels et al. (2000) propose a dynamic model wbich shows that clients each 
have a specifie need structure and they will be in a relational mode or transactional mode 
based on how they perceive the service offering. If the service offering is perceived as 
unique, the client will prefer a relational approach with their service firm. If the service 
offering is perceived as generic, the client will prefer a transactional approach with their 
service firm (Pels et al., 2000; Ravald and Gronroos, 1996). Therefore, to determine the 
client's relationship preference, it would be important to know how the audit client perceives 
the audit service, routine and generic, or unique and important. 
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2.1.3.1 Transaction Cost Analysis 
In Williamson 's (1975) frequently cited article, in which Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) 
and Opportunism are introduced, the external auditor is considered an outsider and their 
motives are considered suspicious by the client management team. As a result, the auditor is 
expected to receive little cooperation (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Williamson, 1975). Moreover, in 
the economic and audit literature, research has shown audit services to be perceived as a 
routine, commodity-like service, subject to downward priee pressure: " ... the audit has 
become more like a commodity with frrms seeking, in many instances, the lowest priee" 
(Schmidt & Sanborn, 1987 p.286). 
2.1.3.2 Power theory (Resource Dependency) 
Goldman and Barlev (G&B) (1974) argue that the client has power over the auditor, since 
the audit is an easily attainable commodity and perceived as not important, by the client. 
This perception of non-importance gives the client power. Two dimensions explain 
importance, in the G&B power model: 1) the nature of the problem solved and 2) the party 
benefrting from the service (Figure 2.3). This model is also referenced by Kleinman and 
Pal mon (2001), Beattie et al. (2001), Nichols and Priee (1976), Green (2006) and lyer and 
Rama (2004). 
Problem Solved 
Benefrciary .Nonroutine Routine 
Paying cl ients (1) Highest (2) Medium 
Others (3) Law (4) Lawest 
Figure 2.3 The Amount of Power Wielded by Professionals Vis-a-Vis Paying Clients 
(Goldman and Barlev, 1974 pg 336) 
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In their model, Goldman and Barlev (1974) explain how even though the auditor is asked 
time to time to handle non-routine problems, many auclit issues are routine and do not benefit 
the paying party. Because of routine problems solved and the client not benefiting from the 
service, the audit is perceived by the client as not important, and the power of the 
relationship is asymmetric in favour of the client (Goldman and Barlev, 1974). 
Marketing scholars have theorized that services that are not perceived important by the client 
and which are perceived as routine and commodity-like with little added value will result in 
the customer preferring more of a TA over a RA (Berry, 1995; Gronroos, 1995; 2000; 
Gummesson, 2001; Pels et al., 2000; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). Therefore, if the G&B 
(1974) model (Figure 2.3) and the theory of Williamson (1975) are assumed theoretical 
representations of the audit service, the audit client would prefer more of a TA over a RA, 
given that the audit service is considered not important and routine. However, the question 
whether or not the audit is perceived by clients as a routine, non-value added service can be 
further developed. Additional theory explains why an audit client could perceive ,the audit 
service as a valued-added, important service. 
2.104 Relational Preference Theory 
2.104.1 Demand for audit (agency theory) 
Agency Theory provides a framework that explains the relationship between the agent (the 
client) and the principal (the 3rd party User). By better understanding the relationship 
between the client and the 3rd palty User, we see how the auditor-client relationship is 
intluenced, which could advance our understanding of the relationship preference of the 
aud it cl ient. 
By referencing agency models such as the Agency Relationship, Rational Expectations and 
the Monitoring Hypothesis (Wallace, 1980), we first investigate who demands the audit and 
why the audit is demanded. The following paragraphs are based on Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Wallace (1980). 
The Agency Relationship theory explains that agents (clients) and princip les (owners) are 
assumed to maximize their utility, and the agents are assumed to not always act in the best 
interest of the principle. The principle can protect himself by adjusting the price paid for the 
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agent's services. For example, if the princip le has to expend resources to collect accurate 
data, the principle will downwardly adjust the wage paid to the agent. Therefore, the agent 
has an interest in keeping costs of providing this information low. Also, the agent has an 
interest in providing the principle information that is considered favourable by the principle 
because this information is a reflection of the agent's performance. Given the importance of 
information provided to the principle by the agent, the Agency Relationship explains that the 
agent is the source of the audit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wallace, 1980). 
The Rational Expectations theory helps explain why audited financial information is 
demanded and by whom. This theory predicts that people rationally use ail avai lable 
information when making decisions. Rational Expectation explains that the principle will 
downwardly adjust the agent's salary by an amount estimated by the principle (the principle 
estimates the cost of agent activities that do not meet the principle's expectations). Given the 
ability to protect themselves, the principle will not demand an audit. However, the agent will 
want to protect themselves against lower wages and demand an audit. Therefore, Rational 
Expectation theory predicts that the agent and not the principie demands the audit6 (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Wallace, 1980). 
The Monitoring (Stewardship) Hypothesis explains that if the agent provides financial 
statements to the principle yet the principle does not believe the numbers are accurate he will 
downwardly adjust the agent's wage by the amount of the perceived loss. Therefore, the 
agent will need to provide the principle the assurance that the financia! statements are 
accurate by engaging an independent audit (Jensen and Meckling, 19.76; Wallace, !980). 
To summarize, the Agency Relationship explains that the agent is the source of auditing; the 
Rational Expectation theory explains that the agent demands the audit to protect against 
lower wages; and the Monitoring Hypothesis explains that the audit will be provided by 
independent auditors in order to provide the assurance of accuracy (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Wallace 1980). These three agency theories show how the independent audit could be 
perceived by the client as important, unique, and value-added for the client, contrary to the 
theoretical model of G&B (Figure 2.3) and Williamson's (1975) Transaction Cost Analysis 
6 This is only true if there is a market for agents. When there is no market for agents there is no 
possibility ta replace the agent. Therefore, the principal will demand the audit since the principal needs 
ta keep the agent (Padilla 2003). 
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(TCA). rn addition, it is stressed to use agency theory along with complementary social 
constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, we reference Relationship Marketing literature to 
investigate other theoretical explanations, in addition to agency theory, for audit value as 
perceived by the client. 
2.1.4.2 Added-Value audit 
In the Relationship Marketing literature, an added-value service is an important component 
of the relationship approach, which a]lows companies to differentiate themselves from the 
competition and sustain a competitive advantage (Gronroos, 1997).The value of the auditor 
beyond the core audit service is evident by the auditor being a source of support and advice 
for the client, resulting in cooperative efforts as clients increasingly rely on advice from their 
auditors (Beattie et al., 2000). 
Empirically, Beattie et al. (2000) found that companies desire, from their auditor, more than 
auditing services, such as guidance on accounting principles, advice on internai controls and 
general business advice. These authors also found that when auditors did not provide enough 
advice, they were replaced (Beattie et al., 2000). This advice is considered in the "added­
value audie" (Beattie et al., 2000). These authors are careful to distinguish the added-value 
audit from other consulting services offered by an audit firm, such as management 
consulting and tax advice. The added-value audit advice comes from the knowledge gathered 
during the audit process, including compliance, a management letter on procedures, and 
informai generaJ business advice (Beattie et al., 2000). Beattie et al. (2000) stress the 
importance of distinguishing added-value advice from additional billable services such as tax 
services and consulting services, which are subject to certain recent restrictions such as Bill 
198 (2002) in Canada and the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the United States. 
Audit regulations recommend that the auditor's main objective, when conducting an audit, is 
to provide an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole (CrCA 2006 5750.03). 
7 "There is sorne confusion over the term 'added-value'. Audit practitioners use it to mean audits that 
are performed in such a way that the tindings can be interpreted and communicated to the client and 
form part of the business decision taking activity and add real value to the corporate entity (persona! 
communication with Gerry Acher, senior partner in KPMG UK, Chair of the ICAEW Audit Faculty 
and formerly chair ofKPMG's world wide auditing committee). Sorne commentators have however, 
taken the term to mean consultancy-related services" (Beattie et al. 2000 pg 200). 
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However, whi le the auditor is conducting the audit, the auditor "may identifY certain matters 
that may be of interest ta management" (CICA 2006 5750.03). As mentioned above, this 
communication mentioned in paragraph 5750 is considered a by-product of the financial 
statement audit and is considered a derivative communication (CrCA 2006 5750.03-05), 
which is not intended to be used by a third party (CICA 2006 5750.06). It is recommended 
that the auditor communicates matters that are found during the financial statement on a 
timely basis (CICA, 20065750.14). 
The types of matters to be communicated with management are (CICA 2006 5750.01): 
~ Fraud (CICA, 20065135) 
~ Misstatements (CICA 2006 5136) 
~ Understanding the Entity (CICA 2006 5141) 
~ Assessed Risks (CICA, 20065143) 
~ Internai Controls (CICA, 2006 5220) 
In addition, Arens et al. (2007) cite the CICA (2006 5135.95 5136.285405.13 and 5751), 
which requires the auditor to communicate certain matters to the client once the audit is 
complete. Moreover, even though they are not required ta do so, auditors frequently give 
advice to clients ta help improve their business performance (Arens et al., 2007). 
Eilifsen et al. (2001) describe value-added assurance, from the result of a field study, as 
additional information: a by-product of the audit and not as separate services. The field study 
showed that in 1997, 14.5 percent of the engagement time was related to assurance activities 
not directly related to verifYing the financial statements, compared to 7.3 percent in 1996. 
Eilifsen et al. (2001) differentiate value-added services according to the traditional audit 
approach versus the "new" audit approach. The Value-Added Services, described in the 
"new" audit approach, includes a delivered business model, business risk analysis, a 
delivered expanded management letter, and feedback on processes (Eilifsen et al., 2001). 
The added-value audit, which is a by-product of the audit, yet not an additional billable 
service, is an important element of the RA (Gronroos, 1991; 1997; Ravald and Gronroos, 
1996). In the TA, the customer sees value as a basic exchange of the core product or service 
for money (Gronroos, 1997; 2000); whereas, in the RA the role of the core product or service 
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is blurred and the additional services becomes important. ]n the RA, a service offering 
includes the core service along with additional services. These additional services are not 
billable and are considered value-added services (Gronroos, 1997; 2000). With the RA, the 
customer interface is broader and the supplier has the opportunity to offer customers value 
added services such as technology, information, knowledge, social, etc (Dawson, 2005; 
GrQnroos, 1994). ]n addition, according to Sheth and Parvitiyar (2000) and Wilson (1995), 
value-added knowledge gained by a partner in a relationship may be the most important 
outcome of a RA. 
To summarize, the value-added component of the audit has been shown to be important for 
the client (Beattie et al., 2000), and the value-added information is a key component of the 
RA. Therefore, along with agency relationship theory, the added-value source of support and 
advice adds to the argument- of why the audit would be perceived as a non-routine and 
important service by the audit client. 
2.1.4.3 Relational theory 
Additional relational theory demonstrates, from empirical and theoretical studies, why 
forming relationships, with service providers, results in more successful relationships for 
clients. From the Relationship Marketing literature, Social theOl)', developed from Exchange 
theory, explains that individuals need to build on their self interests with the maintenance of 
social relationships (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
SimiJarly, in Feminist Theory the "Ethics of Care" explains the importance of the 
relationship in business exchange. ]nstead of viewing business relationships as competitive 
and contract oriented, relationships are viewed as cooperative and "maternai", where 
cooperation replaces competition in business exchange (Beauchamp and Bowie, 2004; 
Gilligan, 1993). Moreover, according to the ethics of care, business exchanges result in 
success when the exchange is governed by care, needs, and long-term attachment, instead of 
contracts or universal rules (Gilligan, 1983). 
Corroborating Feminist Theory is Macneil's (1980) Relational Contract Theory (Campbell, 
2004; Paulin et al., 1997). Based on Macneil's (1980) Relational Contract Theory, research 
has shown how relationship success resuJts when relational constructs are present (Morgan 
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and Hunt 1994; Paulin et al., 1997). In addition, RA has been shown to result in exchange 
benefits such as trust, commitment and cooperation (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999; Ganessan, 
1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Paulin et al., 1997; Rokkan et al., 2003). Therefore, the client 
will benefit from a more RA versus TA, which should help the client provide pertinent and 
accurate information to the owner (principle), or other 3'ct party Users. 
Auditor-client negotiations could also influence the client's preferred relational approach 
with their auditor. Based on the agency relationship presented above, audit clients should 
prefer that negotiations result in an integrative (win-win) solution, contrary to Gibbins et al. 
(2005) and in favour of Beattie et al. (2004). In the Relationship Marketing and Audit 
literature, one of the principle variables of the RA (as an antecedent and outcome), in 
empirical and theoretical studies, is Cooperation between two parties, which results in long 
term relationship success (Gummesson, 2002; Gronroos, 1997; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). For example, empirical studies by Morgan and Hunt (1994) and 
Ruyter and Wetzels (1999), using the Commitment-Trust model, showed that commitment 
and trust in a relationship lead to higher levels of cooperation, which lead to the willingness 
to continue the relationship between suppliers and customers. Ebdelhaq and Pilote (2004) 
empirically showed the importance of the cooperation variable for the aud itor. 
ln the Relationship Marketing literature, negotiation and cooperation theory support the RA 
approach. According to well-documented negotiation theory, if one side sees the negotiation 
as a win-Iose proposition, they will be determined to beat the other party in the negotiation 
(Fisher and Ury, 1991; Ury, 1993). In addition, cooperation theory shows that successful 
long-term relationships are not a zero-sum game, where there is a winner and a loser, but 
rather a non-zero sum game (win-win) (Axelrod, 1984; 1997). A win-Iose (zero-sum) 
relationship is effective in a short-term relationship (finite game). However, cooperation 
games have shown that if one party loses while the other wins, the loser will retaliate in 
future negotiations and the winner will not continue to receive favourable treatment 
(AxeJrod, 1984; Rokkan et al., 2003). Therefore, to achieve a successful long-term 
relationship with the auditor, the client should prefer a RA with the auditor, which would 
result in auditors acting in the best interest of the client in the long term. 
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Further evidence that the client would prefer a more RA over TA could be determined by 
looking at the impact of power on an exchange between buyers and sellers. The G&B model 
(Figure 2.3) is a power model that shows that the audit client perce ives the audit as not 
important so the balance of pow~r is in the hands of the client, and therefore the auditor is 
dependent on the client. Relationship Marketing models, empirically tested, have shown that 
relationship success between buyers and sellers exists in the absence of power and the 
presence of commitment and trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). In 
addition, models in the retai! sector have shown that when retailers perceive sellers as 
dependent on them, the retailer favours a short-term relationship instead of a long term 
committed relationship (Ganesan, 1994). Therefore, if the audit client uses their power to 
benefit their position and to achieve the auditor's acquiescence, the n," ... the continuing 
exercise of power to gain acquiescence also destroys trust and commitment, which decreases 
cooperation and inhibits long-term success" (Morgan and Hunt, 1994, pg 33). 
2.1.5 Principle Hypothesis Summary 
We began this chapter by explaining how the auditor-client relationship differs from typical 
buyer-seller relationships, primarily due to the accountability to a third party user. The third 
party user creates potential "role strain" between the auditor and the client (Kleinman and 
Palmon, 2000) as the audit client and the auditor could have conflicting objectives with the 
client. In addition, given that the audit client is not the intended user of the audit, but rather 
the third party user, client non-cooperative behaviour could result (Beattie et al., 2001). 
Therefore, the question we ask is: "why would an audit customer desire a relational approach 
with their audit flrm?" 
To answer this question we investigate the theory and empirical research that could help 
explain a relationship preference between the auditor and the client. The Power Model, based 
on Resource Dependency Theory and conceptual ized by Goldman and Barlev (1974), shows 
how the audit client considers the audit service as not important resulting in an asymmetrical 
power relationship in favour of the client. In addition, Williamson (1975), based on 
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA), argues that clients consider the auditor as an outsider, 
which does not encourage client cooperation. 
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Alternative theory, such as the Agency Relationship theory, shows that the audit is 
demanded by the client in order to provide information to the third party user. The client 
requires this information to be accu rate and representative to assure the principle has faith in 
the information. Therefore, the client should prefer a relational approach (RA) with their 
auditor and be willing to cooperate so that the auditor will provide a favourable audit opinion 
(Wallace, 1980). Additional theolY shows that the audit client desires additional information, 
which is included in the new value-added audit. The value-added audit is not billable 
consulting services but rather knowledge gathered during the audit that can help the cl ient 
(Beattie et al., 2000). This shared knowledge is an important component of the relational 
approach (RA). 
Given the existence of conflicting theory, which could either describe the audit service as an 
important, value-added service, or as a non-value added commodity, we argue that there is 
more convincing theory leading towards the perception of the audit service as important and 
value-added. Therefore, if the client perceives the audit service as important and value­
added, according to Relationship Marketing, the client would prefer a more relational 
approach (RA) than transactional approach (TA) with their auditor. 
More precisely, contrary to the G&B model in the audit literature, and Wi Iliamson (1975) in 
the economic literature, the audit client, according to Agency theory, the added-value audit 
and Relational Theory, should prefer a more Relational Approach (RA) with their auditor. 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H 1: The audit client will prefer more a Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional 
Approach (TA) with their financial auditor. 
There are also personal characteristics that could affect the client's relationship. These 
characteristics are described below and presented as secondary hypotheses in our conceptual 
framework. We present three personal characteristics as secondary hypotheses and not part 
of the primalY study because they are not justified by our main theoretical foundation. 
However, we do attempt to see if certain personal characteristics could influence the client's 
relational preference. If so, these influences could provide additional explanations. 
There are several personal characteristics that cou Id potentiaJly influence an individual 's 
relationship preference, and ideally we would like to provide more characteristics;. however, 
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we are restricted by a limited amount of questions in our questionnaire. Our criterion for the 
choice of the following personal characteristics is a theoretical justification from both the 
marketing and accounting literature. 
2.2 SECONDARY HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1 Risk Aversion 
Risk Aversion is defined as "the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous 
situations, and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these" (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1984 pA] 9). Research has shown that risk aversion affects buyer's deeision-making 
(Bao et al., 2003; Shrimp & Bearden, 1982). The expeeted losses for high risk-averse 
consumers are higher than for low risk-averse consumers. To lower the risk of purchasing a 
product or service of lower quality, high risk-averse buyers will buy a higher priee brand 
(Bao et al., 2003). Low price sensitivity is a RA characteristic (Gronroos, 1991; 1994; 2000; 
Paulin et al., 1997). 
Past research has shown that consumers that have high-risk aversIon buy less over the 
telephone (Cox and Rich 1964) and less over the internet (Tan, 1999). These high-risk 
adverse consumers desire to go physically to the store to purchase as they have a desire for 
social contact, which helps them feel more secure and less risky. Clients that have a greater 
risk aversion have been found to have a greater interest in forming a cooperative relationship 
with their supplier (Payne et al., 1995). In consumer behaviour theory, buying behaviour is 
motivated by the reduction of risk (Bauer, 1960; Taylor, 1974 cited by Sheth and Parvatiyar, 
1995). The level of risk aversion is based on the uncertainty and magnitude of outcomes 
(Sheth and Parvatiyar, ]995). To reduce risk, consumers look for ways to increase their self­
confidence regarding the purchase, and they become loyal to brands (Beatty & Smith, 1987; 
Cox, 1967; Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Howard, 1965; Locander & Hermann, ]979 cited by 
Sheth and Parvatiyar, ]995). Self-confidence regard ing purchases has been empirically 
shown to increase as buyers establish on-going interactions with sellers (Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, ]995). In the Relationship Marketing literature, empirical results of buyers and 
sellers have shown that the buyers' risk aversion is positively related with the buyer 
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engaging in a RA with the seller in the consumer markets (Sheth and Pavatiyar, 1995) and in 
mass markets (Bhattacharya el al., 1995). 
Research in accounting has shown that accounting managers with traits of high-risk aversion 
search out security and create greater budget slack (Waller, 1988; Young, 1985 cited by 
Blanchette, 2001). Therefore, clients that are risk-averse desire security and should want to 
reduce the risk related to their audit by forming a relational approach with their auditor. 
Therefore, l hypothesize the following: 
H2: The more audit clienls demonstrale risk aversion, lhe more lhey will prefer a Relalional 
Approach (RA) over a Transaclional Approach (TA) with lheir financial auditor. 
2.2.2 Ethics ofCare 
Moral reasoning should influence the audit client's relational preference, which has been 
theoretically modeled and empirically tested, from two different perspectives: Gilligan's 
(1993) model based on the ethics of care (Reiter, 1996; 1997) and Kohlberg's model based 
on the ethics of justice and rights (Beattie, 2001; Poneman and Gabhart, 1990). Both 
perspectives have been shown to measure levels of moral reasoning. The main difference, 
however, between the Kohlberg and Gilligan model is that Gilligan's (1993) model 
introduces a relationship perspective: the relationship between self and others (Reiter, 1996; 
1997; Pratt el al., 2004). More precisely, Gilligan's model introduces the individual's moral 
reasoning within a relationship context (Table 2.1). 
Gilligan's model describes the importance of social cooperation in relationships based on a 
feminist theory referred to as the "ethics of care". The "ethics of care" describes character 
traits that are present in close personal relationships such as: sympathy, compassion, fidelity, 
love and friendship (Beauchamp and Bowie, 2004). The ethics of care is contrasted with 
Kohlberg's moral reasoning, which is based on justice and rights. Based on the ethics of care 
perspective, service-providers view their responsibilities to their clients, not in terms of 
contracts or universal rules, but rather in terms of care, needs, and long-term relationships 
(Beauchamp and Bowie, 2004). Business relationships are viewed as cooperative and 
materialistic and not only competitive, market-oriented, and contractual (Beauchamp and 
Bowie, 2004). In the Kolhberg mode], as the individual moves from level ] to leveJ 3 they 
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move from self-interest towards universal principles (Poneman and Gabhart, 1990). 
Whereas, as the individual moves from level1 to leveJ 3, in the Gilligan (1993) model, they 
move from self-interest towards interest for self and others (Reiter, 1996). We show the 
differences between both models in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 
The Kohlberg-Gilligan differences 
Kohlberg (Poneman and Gabhart, 1990) Gilligan (Reiter, 1996; 1997) 
151 Level Individual places self-interest above 
society 
Caring for self and ensuring 
survival 
2nd Level Individual conforms to the rules of 
society Care for others, self-sacrifice 
3'd Level Individual conforms to universal moral principles 
Interrelationship between self and 
others 
Gilligan (1993) argued that since Kohlberg's three levels of moral development were 
developed using only male participants, it incorporates a traditional male bias. For example, 
Gilligan (1993) used Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma with the participation of two chi Idren, a boy 
and a girl. Based on Kohlberg's definition of moral reasoning, the girl's moral judgement 
was lower in moral maturity than the boy's (Gillian, 1993). Gillian (1993) argued that the 
girl named Amy did not see the dilemma as a math problem with humans, but rather a series 
of relationships that extend over time. Gilligan claimed that the girl did not have a lower 
moral reasoning than the boy but rather that the girl saw the world as a "world of 
relationships" (Gilligan, 1993, pg 30), and that because Kohlberg's stages of moral 
development are justice oriented they fail to account for a person's view of the world as a 
system of relationships (Gilligan, 1993). 
Overall, Gilligan (1993) found that women scored lower on Kohlberg's model. Her 
explanation of these results was that males are oriented towards autonomy, objectivity and 
universal principles (ethics of rights); whereas, female subjects have a different voice: a 
voice about relationships (ethics of care) (Reiter, 1997). 
Accounting studies' that have included moral reasoning have mostly used the Kohlberg 
model (Beattie et al., 2001; Poneman and Gabhart, 1990; Windsor and Ashkansy, 1995). 
38 
Yet, Reiter (1996; 1997) stresses the importance of using the care perspective ln future 
accounting studies. She argues the care model is not better than the justice model, but rather 
that the models have different perspectives and the care model cou Id offer new insight for 
ethics in accounting. Reiter (1996; 1997) argues that ethics education in accounting is too 
heavily based on individual rights and short-term dilemmas and could benefit from a 
relationship perspective. In addition, accounting studies cou Id benefit from viewing 
professional judgement as set of embedded relationships rather than as a set on independent 
relationships (Reiter, 1997). 
The ethics of care perspective could contribute to the accounting practice by contrasting the 
economic justice perspective, which is associated with individualistic rights (Reiter, 1997). 
Reiter (1996) is careful to point out that the Kohlberg and Gilligan models represent 
different perspectives, and that moral reasoning could be studied from either perspective, 
depending on the objective of the study. 
As described in our literature review and conceptual framework, the objective of our study is 
to measure the relationship preference of the audit client. Our relationship perspective has 
been conceptualized using two relationship contructs: TA and RA, which could be described 
as opposite poles on a continuum (Coviello et al., 1997; 2000; 2002; Paulin et al., 1997; 
2000; Pels et al., 2000). RA is an approach that includes interdependence and cooperation; 
whereas, the TA is an approach that includes independence and competition (Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1995). In addition, RA includes communication between individuals which leads 
to trust (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994); whereas, the TA approach is 
based on the premise that competition and self-interests results in an arm's length 
relationship (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Similarly, in the Gilligan (1993) model, as 
individuaJs moves from level 1 to level 3, they move from a concern for self (level 1) to a 
concern for an interrelationship between self and others (leve13) (Table 2.1). The move from 
level 1 to level 3 in the Gilligan (1993) model is similar to a move on the relationship 
continuum from TA (independent) to RA (interdependent). Therefore, given the relationship 
perspective of our study, the Gilligan model would be more appropriate than the Kohlberg 
model to measure moral reasoning. 
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Gilligan's (1993) ethic of care theory can be used to measure the moral reasoning of male as 
weil as female participants. There should not be observed differences in empirical studies 
between men and women 's moral reasoning using the Gilligan modeJ (Reiter, J996). The 
Ethics of Care Interview (ECI) was used in a longitudinal study of 32 adolescents aged from 
16 to 20 years: 16 girls and 16 boys. There were no gender differences on the ECI for these 
adolescents (Pratt et al., 2004). Other studies using the ECI found no gender differences 
among late adolescents and young adults in North America and Norway (Skoe et al., 1998). 
For example, the ECI was used to study 144 Norwegian men and women, 72 women and 72 
men, from 15 to 48 years old, where no differences between the sexes were observed (Skoe 
and Lippe, 2002). In addition, Vikan et al. (2005) used the ECI to study 120 students from 
Norway, 60 females and 60 males, and 60 students from Brazil, 30 females and 30 males. 
The participants in both groups were in their early twenties. The results of the study using 
the ECI showed no gender differences. 
ln comparison to the levels of ECI, the TA-RA continuum described by Macneil (1974; 
1980) shows that moving from TA to RA is a transition from an individualistic, competitive 
approach, with little cooperation (TA), to a fu Ily cooperative relationship where the focus is 
on the satisfaction of both parties (RA). As we move along the TA-RA continuum from TA 
towards RA we would expect higher levels of ethics of care. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following: 
H3: The more audit clients demonstrate ethics ofcare, the more they will prefer a Relational 
Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their finandal auditor. 
2.2.3 Locus of Control 
Locus of control is a personality factor that represents an individual's belief about their 
ability to control their environment (Bernardi, 1997). Internai locus of control individuals 
believe their own behavior determines the consequences of their life. Whereas, external 
locus of control individuals believe that their behavior does not determine the consequences 
of their life, which they believe is determined by external factors such as others, luck, 
chance, fate, etc. (Rotter 1966). In the audit literature, Tsui & GuI (1996) found that auditors 
with internai locus of control were least likely to accede to unfair client requests. These 
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results are explained by the auditor with internai locus of control being more independent 
and who feels more personally responsible, therefore less likely to accommodate, but rather 
cooperate. Whereas, auditors who are externals would rely more on external factors, such as 
the client; therefore, the client will have an easier time convincing the auditor. Kleinman el 
al. (2003) look at locus of control in the auditor-client relationship. Internais and Externals 
are positioned on the opposite end of the continuum, and since internais are believed to 
control their own destiny, they should be more likely to choose a strategy that IS 
collaborative. Externals should choose a strategy of avoidance or accommodation. 
Collaboration and cooperation are RA traits; whereas, avoidance or accommodation is a TA 
trait. Therefore, individuals that demonstrate internai locus of control characteristics should 
desire a more RA; whereas, individuals that are more external should desire a more TA. 
PsychoJogy research shows the relationship between cooperation behaviour and locus of 
control (Boone el al., 1999). Boone el al. (1999) hypothesized that since cooperation 
depends on the actions of others, cooperative behaviour would be higher for individuals with 
a more external locus of control (Boone el al., 1999). The only theory that was used to 
justify this hypothesis was based on studies investigating children's behaviour. The Boone el 
al. (1999) study presented results contrary to their hypothesis and cooperative behaviour was 
actually more prevalent for internai locus of control individuals in repeated games 
experiments. Boone el al. (1999) explain these contradictory results drawing on the 
prisoner's dilemma theory. In repeat games, cooperation is the winning strategy. Therefore, 
Boone el al. (1999) argue that interna Is are more apt than externals to learn the right strategy 
over time. This is explained by internais being more confident than externals that they can 
control the situation. In addition, internaIs would have more decision capabilities and 
therefore more control of their relationship with others. Therefore, internais can begin to 
cooperate, taking the risk that the other party wi Il reci procate (Boo ne el al., 1999). 
We showed in the audit literature and in the conceptual framework that in negotiations 
clients would desire a cooperative approach to assure the auditor will reciprocate and help 
them obtain a desired result. In addition, agency theory predicts that the client would want 
the audit to be favourable in order to receive a favourable performance evaluation from the 
principle. As we showed in the marketing literature review, cooperation is a characteristic of 
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RA. Drawing on the empirical results of Boone et al. (1999), along with the audit research, 
and the prisoner's dilemma theory, we hypothesize the fol1owing: 
H4: The more audit clients demonstrate internai locus ofcontrol, the more they will prefer a 
Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their financial auditor. 
The following is a summary of the four hypotheses: 
Principle hypothesis: 
Hl: The audit client will prefer more a Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional 
Approach (TA) with their financial auditor. 
Secondary hypothesis:
 
H2: The more audit clients demonstrate risk aversion, the more they will prefer a Relational
 
Approach (RA) over a Transactional approach (TA) with their financial auditor.
 
H3: The more audit clients demonstrate ethics ofcare, the more they will prefer a Relational
 
Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their financial auditor.
 
H4: The more audit clients demonstrate internai locus ofcontrol, the more they will prefer a
 
Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their financial auditor.
 
Based on the auditor-client relationship in Figure 2.2, as a foundation, our conceptual 
framework is represented by the following schema (Figure 2.4), which is the framework for 
the following Methodology chapter. We explain our conceptual framework as follows. The 
foundation is the three party triangle based on the auditing standard 5025.07 and presented in 
Figure 2.2. The focus of our study is the relationship between the cl ient (bottom right hand 
side of the triangle) and the auditor (bottom left hand side of the triangle), from the client 
perspective. The users (top of the triangle) represent the 3rd parties, who are the ultimate 
users of the information certified by the auditors. The client-auditor relationship, at the 
bottom of the triangle, does not exist without the 3'd party. Therefore, to study a client­
3rdaud itor relationship without incorporating the influence of the party would be a 
misrepresentation of the audit-client relationship. In fact, the presence of the 3rd party is why 
it is not clear whether or not the client would want a relational approach (RA) or 
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transactional approach (TA) with their auditor. The auditor certifies the financial information 
of the client for the benefit of the 3rd party user; this results in potential conflict referred to as 
"role strain" (Kleinman and Palmon, 2000). 
We propose, in our model (Figure 2.4), that the client (as an agent) demands the audit to 
provide accu rate, favorable, and low cost information to the third party user, based on 
Agency Theory (represented by the arrow going from the client to the user in Figure 2.4). 
Given the importance of assuring that the audit is favourable, and at a low cost, the client 
would be interested in cooperating and working with the auditor, in a relational mode 
(represented by the arrow going from the client to the auditor in Figure 2.4). This is justified 
by Relational Theory and the Added-Value audit. In addition to the theory that predicts the 
client's relationship approach, personal characteristics have also been modeled as potential 
influencers of the client's preference. Clients that demonstrate more risk aversion, more 
ethics of care, and more internai locus of control should have a preference for a more RA 
than a TA with their auditor. 
Provide accurate, 
favourable, low­ Agency 
cost information Relationship 
to the principle. 
r Î1 
Primary Hypothesis 
Secondary Hypotheses (PersonaLHl: The audit client will prefer 
chàracteristics wllÎch will influence 
a RA over a TA with their 
reLationaL preference)
auditor. 
..
 
H2: Risk Aversion 
Relational Theory H3: Ethics ofCare 
Added-Value audit H4: Locus of Control 
Figure 2.4 Conceptual model: The client's preferred relationship approach 
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3.1 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In the following section, we present the methodology used to validate our research 
hypotheses. Included is our research design, measurement instruments for hypotheses 1-4, 
description of data collection, questionnaire description, and description of our participants. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our objective is to determine the audit client's relationship preference when dealing with 
their audit firm (Hypothesis 1) and to investigate personal characteristics that could influence 
the client's relationship preference (Hypothesis 2-4). Therefore, two research designs, 
described below, have been chosen based on a research approach best able to answer our 
hypotheses. 
The first research design is to test Hypothesis 1 and is designed as a survey, which is an 
appropriate method to test a hypothesis (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; Glatthorn and Joyner, 
2005; Isaac and Michael, 1995; Rudestam and Newton, 2001; Yin, 2003). Surveys are 
primarily used in studies that include individuaJs as the units of analysis (Babbie and 
Benaquisto, 2002). In addition, a survey is the recommended design method to collect 
original data and for measuring attitudes and orientations (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; 
Isaac and Michael, 1995). 
In addition, survey studies are used to describe the characteristics of existing phenomena 
without necessarily a concern for relationships between variables (Babbie and Benaquisto, 
2002; Glatthorn and Joyner, 2005; Issac and Michael, 1995). Our survey study will test to 
see if the audit cJient's preferred marketing approach is more of a relational approach (RA), 
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versus a transactional approach (TA), with their audit firm. Other studies with similar 
research objectives in marketing (Coviello et al., 2000; 2002), and auditing (Elbekkali and 
Pilote, 2004; Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004; Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999) also used a survey 
design. Furthermore, these studies successfully conceptually defined and empirically 
measured both relational (RA) and transactional (TA) constructs. 
To test the data of Hl, we use an interdependence technique since no variables are defined 
as dependent or independent (Hair et al., 2006). Different interdependence techniques are 
suggested to analyse the structure of variables or subjects. If the structure of variables is 
analysed then Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is recommended (Hair et al., 2006). 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992) conducted CFA of relational dimensions using LISREL. 
Reliability, unidimensionality, and validity results were used to summate scale-items in each 
relational dimension and then single measures for each of the seven dimensions were created 
(Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). 
Since the objective of our study is to determine if audit clients prefer a more relational or a 
more transactional approach, using multiple items, we are interested in determining a single 
mean score. Therefore, we chose an interdependent technique, which helps determine the 
unidimentionality of our multiple items. CFA was considered, but it was decided to use 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) for the following reasons. CFA is used to confirm or 
reject preconceived theory. Past research has already used CFA to confirm that Kaufmann 
and Dant's (1992) items reliably represent Macneil's (1980) theoretical constructs (Fink et 
al., 2007; Paulin et al., 1997). In addition, other research used Kaufmann and Dant's (1992) 
items to arrive at a single mean reJational score without using CFA (Rokkan and Hauglan, 
2000). Therefore, since our objective is to arrive at a single mean score to determine if audit 
cl ients are more relational or more transactional, we use EFA with the objective of 
determining unidimentionality of Kaufmann and Dant's (1992) relational items based on the 
theoretical framework of Macneil (J 980). 
In addition, we conduct correlations to test Hypotheses 2-4, where the purpose is to 
determine if the variables used to describe the TA and RA constructs are influenced by 
certain personal characteristics (Table 3.5). This type of research is referred to as an 
explanatory research design, where the objective is to determine a relationship between 
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3.2 
independent and dependent variables (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; Issac and Michael, 
1995; Rudestam and Newton, 2001). 
The following section describes the chosen measurement instruments to measure the 
variables and constructs in Hypothesis 1. 
MEASUREMENT fNSTRUMENT (HYPOTHESIS 1) 
In this section, we explain our measures of the Transactional Approach (TA) and the 
Relational Approach (RA) constructs described in Hypothesis 1. Afterwards, we describe the 
measures of the variables described in Hypotheses 2-4. 
151Our hypothesis, the main hypothesis, includes two constructs: RA and TA. For each 
construct we describe the dimensions (which are the concrete representations of the 
constructs) and the operationalization of each dimension. The constructs, dimensions, and 
reliability coefficients, for Hypothesis l, are highlighted in Table 3.1, which are from 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992). In addition, the operational definition for each item is presented 
in our Relational Preference Questionnaire (Appendix C), which has been slightly modified 
to fit our research context. We explain the reasons for choosing the Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992) measurement instrument, and we present recent empirical studies that have 
referenced the same measures. [n addition, we describe other empirical studies that also use 
multi-dimensional measures to operationalize RA and TA constructs. 
The reason we have chosen to use a previously developed instrument to measure the RA and 
TA constructs in Hypothesis 1 is because it is generally recommended not to develop ones 
own measurement instrument unless the objective of the research project is to design an 
instrument tool, where the validity of the instrument is determined by the analysis of 
relationships with other variables (Rudestam and Newton, 2001). 
Otherwise, when the objective of the study is to measure constructs, as it is in this study, it is 
recommended to use an existing instrument, when one exists (Rudestam and Newton, 2001; 
Roberts, 2004). However, when previously used instruments are used, certain criteria is 
important to determine the appropriateness to another study (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; 
Rudestam and Newton, 2001). These criteria are described as follows: 
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~	 Is the measure appropriate? It is important that the population that was used in the 
past empirieal study is representative of the proposed population in our study. Also, 
the phenomenon that was eoneeptualized by the authors of the borrowed instrument 
needs to be similar to the eoneeptual isation of our phenomenon (Rudestam and 
Newton, 2001). Therefore, we need an instrument that has been tested on buyers 
(clients), preferably in the audit industry, whieh is our targeted population. Also, the 
theory that deseribes the relationship between buyers and sellers in past empirieal 
studies would need to eonceptualize the TA and RA constructs based on a similar 
theoretieal framework as ours to assure there is consistency with our study. 
~	 What are the measurement characteristics of the instrument? The reliability and 
validity of the instrument needs to be analysed. The reliability of a measure is the 
degree to which the measure is free from random error. The validity of a measure is 
the degree that the measure reflects the intended construct without the influence from 
other varying constructs (Hoyle et al., 2002). We present the reliability and validity 
of our borrowed instrument. After we colJect our data we determine our own 
reliability and validity measures for the data collected from our sampJe. 
Based on the above-mentioned criteria, after an extensive literature review, we propose the 
measurement instrument used by Kaufmann and Dant (1992). To the best of our knowledge 
no other measurement instrument meets the above mentioned criteria. Since our objective is 
to determine the relationship approach of the client, which is the buyer of the audit service, 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992) is appropriate for two reasons: it is an instrument that applies to 
both buyers and sellers, and the rneasurement scales are not industry specifie (Kaufmann and 
Dant, ]992; Paulin etai., 1997). 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992) surveyed a convenience sample of 106 sales and purchasing 
personnel chosen from executive seminars. Each palticipant completed a questionnaire by 
referencing one focal relationship across different industry seetors. Theil' study was not 
industry specifie and their results supported the use of industry non-specifie dimensions to 
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describe both buyer and seller relationships (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Paulin et al., 1997). 
Therefore, the Kaufman and Dant (1992) measurement instrument is appropriate for our 
study, since it can apply to various industries such as the audit industry and apply to the 
cl ient of audit services. 
Also, Kaufmann and Dant's (1992) conceptual model contains similar theoretical reasoning 
to ours. Their study is based on the Social Theory developed by Macneil (1980) also known 
as the Relational Exchange Theory. Other relationship scholars used the Macneil framework 
for empirical studies and confirm that the analysis of transactional (TA) and relational (RA) 
norms, along a continuum, where RA and TA are opposite ends of the continuum, is the 
most appropriate way to measure business to business relationships, of either buyers or 
sellers (Fink et al., 2007; Nevin et al., 1993; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000; 2006). 
Relational Exchange Theory, as explained in our conceptual framework differentiates 
between a transactional approach (TA) and a relational approach (RA), where the 
transactional approach (TA) is at one end of a continuum and the relational approach (RA) is 
at the other end of the continuum (opposite poles). Therefore, a buyer or seller is either more 
RA or TA (Kaufman and Dant, 1988; 1992; Macneil, 1974; 1978; 1980). This is consistent 
with the theory that, for a particular marketing situation, a buyer is in either a relational 
mode or transactional mode (Gronroos, 1994; 1997). In addition, this theory supports the 
main objective of our study: to determine whether an audit buyer (client) is more relational 
(RA) or more transactional (TA), where our hypothesis suggests that audit clients will prefer 
a more RA rather than a TA with their auditor. 
Before describing the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) measurement model, we will present and 
critic two other empirical studies from our literature review that also measures RA and TA 
constructs in the same study: Coviello et al. (2002) and Elbekkali and Pilote (2004). These 
studies are impol1ant as they measure the RA and TA constructs using similar multi­
dimensions and scales as Kaufmann and Dant (1992). However, Coviello et al. (2002) and 
Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) investigate the RA and TA constructs from the supplier 
perspective. Therefore, we cannot directly use the measurement instruments from these two 
studies. 
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3.2.1 Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) 
To measure the auditor's relational approach with their customers, Elbekkali and Pilote 
(2004) estabJished a single and multi-dimensional (four dimensions) measure for the RA 
construct which was an improved measurement based on Ricard (1995) and a two­
dimensional measure for the TA construct based on Perrier and Ricard (1995) (Figure 3.1). 
RA Single Measure 
RA Multidimensional measure 
~ Reallength of the relationship 
~ Willingness to continue the relationship 
Perspective from clients 
Perspective from partners 
~ Quantity of multiple services 
~ Cooperation between partners and clients 
Perspective from clients 
Perspective from partners 
TA Multidimensional measure 
~ Acquisition of new clients 
~ Profitabi 1ity 
Figure 3.1 TA and RA Dimensions (ElbekkaJi and Pilote, 2004) 
Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) found that service suppJiers of audit services preferred a more 
relational approach with their customers. Elbek.kali and Pilote (2004) argued that both RA 
and TA are not mutualJy exclusive and that RA includes the TA. For example, RA incJudes 
the acquisition of new clients as weil as the development and management of client 
relationships (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004). Therefore, when RA activities, such as 
communication and cooperation, are not performed by the supplier it is assumed that RA is 
not the approach used. However, if TA activities are used, by suppliers, such as the 
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acquisition of new clients, it cannot be coilcluded that TA is the chosen approach because 
TA activities are included in the RA (not mutually exclusive) (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004). 
Therefore, conclusions on the audit partner's use of TA or RA were based on the high scale 
rating of dimensions of one relational approach and the low scale rating of the dimensions of 
the other relational approach (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004). Their results showed that on 
average the partners chose the RA dimensions (6.31 on a scale of 8.00 for the single RA 
measure and 6.33 on a scale of 8.00 for the multidimensional measure of partner's 
implementation of RA). The TA results were mixed. The acquisition of new clients resulted 
in 5.79 on a scale of 8.00 and the measure of short-term profitability averaged 2.18 on a 
scale on 8.00. The authors conclude that even though the acquisition of new clients showed 
less support for a RA , the fact that RA and TA are not mutually exclusive and RA includes 
TA dimensions, such as the acquisition of new clients, the authors were able to conclude that 
audit partners implement more RA than TA with their clients (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004). 
This measurement approach is based on a seller perspective and, therefore, not appropriate 
for our study (as discussed in the following section). 
3.2.2 Coviello et al. (1997) 
Similarly, Coviello et al. (J 997) coneeptually developed 7 Relational exchange dimensions 
which were operationalized by Coviello et al. (2002) explained in Table 3.1.: 
Table 3.1 
TA and RA Dimensions (Coviello et al., 1997; 2002) 
Dimension Transactional Approach TA Relational Approach RA 
Focus Econom ie transaction Interactive relationships 
Parties involved A firm and buyers 
Individual sellers and 
buyers 
Communication Firm to market 
Individual with 
individuals 
Contact Arm's length Cooperative 
Duration Diserete Continuous 
Fomality Formai Formai and informai 
Balance of power Active seller-passive buyer Independent 
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In Coviello et al. (2002), suppliers were found to practice both transactional and relational 
approaches, which were termed a transactional/relational cluster. SimiJar to the findings of 
Elbekkali and Pilote (2004), business to business (B to B) service firms were found to be 
more relational. However, one-forth of these firms practice the transactional approach and 
the authors concluded that the RA is not appropriate for ail customers given the different 
needs of the customers as weil as the resource requirement of the RA. 
Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) and Coviello et al. (2002) demonstrate important empirical 
results of multi-dimensional measllres of the RA and TA constructs. However, it is evident 
these two models are developed to capture the seller perspective. For example, in Elbekkali 
and Pilote (2004) (Figure 3.1) the TA variables are acquisition and profitability of clients. 
Even though these short term, economic dimensions would be similar for the buyer, we 
could not directly ask clients about client acquisition and profitability, as it would not be 
pertinent from a buyer perspective. 
Similarly, in Coviello et al. (2002) (Table 3.1) the client would not be concerned about the 
seller's communication approach, whether it is firm to market or individual-to-individual. 
However, it would be pertinent to ask clients about the importance of a one to one personal 
relationship with their suppliers. Therefore, the fundamentals of the dimensions of these 
studies are pertinent but by using the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) we not only capture the 
multi-dimensional aspects of RA and TA, we also do so in a way that can be operationalized 
to capture the buyer perspective; in our case, audit clients. 
3.2.3 Kallfmann and Dant (1992) 
The dimensions that Kaufmann and Dant (1992) operationalize are derived from Macneil's 
(1980) Common Contract Norms. The recommended method to determine whether a 
relationship is more transactional (TA) versus more relational (RA) is to use Macneil's 
(1980) common contractual norms (Heide, 1994; MacneiJ, 1980; Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; 
Rokkan and Haugland, 2000), where TA and RA constructs are considered opposite poles on 
a continuum (Dwyer et al., 1987; Fink et al., 2007; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 
1974; 1978; 1980; Rokkan and Haugland, 2000). Nevin (1995) considers that this model 
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provides the most comprehensive conceptual context for understanding business to business 
relationships. The transactional exchange is explained by neoclassical economic theory and 
the relational exchange is explained by relational social theory (Rokkan and Hauglan, 2000). 
Transactional-Relational continuums, based on Macneil's social theory, were also used by 
Paulin et al. (1997; 2000) in their studies of commercial banking relationships. Kaufman and 
Dant (1992) is considered the first study that operationalizes the TA and RA constructs from 
both buyer and seller perspective and which is not industry specifie, showing that it can 
apply to buyers across different industries. These contractual dimensions (Kaufmann and 
Dant, 1992) are described as follows. 
3.2.4 Six Relational Dimensions 
3.2.4.1 Relational focus 
According to Macnei l's (1980) Relational Contract Theory, an exchange relationship is 
described by a relationship continuum with the transactional approach and the relational 
approach being at opposing ends of the continuum. However, even very transactional 
exchanges have a relational component. In other words, there are no purely transactional 
exchanges, as even the most transactional exchanges are embedded in social relationships to 
a certain degree (Macneil, 1980). Therefore, the relationship continuum does not describe 
pure discreteness and pure relational exchanges but rather describes relationships that are 
more relational (RA) versus those relationships which are more transactional (Kaufmann and 
Dant, 1992; Macneil, 1978). A transactional (TA) focus emphasises the necessary economic 
conditions of the service or product exchanged, such as the priee and quality of the service 
rendered. Whereas, the relational (RA) focus emphasizes the importance of the relationship 
with the exchange partner, beyond the economic elements of priee and quality of service 
(Macneil, 1978). The focus of a relational exchange is difficult to monetize, as the future 
value of the relationship between two exchange partners is difficult to measure. The items 
used to measure the Relational Focus dimension as either more transactional (TA) or more 
relational (RA), where the audit client will be asked what is preferred, the importance of the 
exchange relationship (RA) or the individual transaction (TA) with their auditor. 
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3.2.4.2 Solidarity 
Solidarity is the process by which the relationship is established and sustained: what holds 
the relationship together. In the TA, the relationship between exchange partners is held 
together mostly by external sources, and in the RA the relationship is held together by 
internai and external sources. In the TA, external sources hold the relationship together by 
anns-Iength bargaining and the legal enforcement of contracts (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; 
Macneil, 1980). Whereas in the RA, internal sources, such as trust, cooperation, and 
interdependence are used to establish and sustain a relationship in the present as weil as the 
future (Macneil, 1981). Items are used to measure the Sol idarity construct as either more 
transactional (TA) or more relational (RA), where the audit client will be asked what is 
preferred, an arms length relationship or a cooperative relationship. 
3.2.4.3 Mutuality 
Mutuality is the dimension where each exchange partner percelves the evenness of the 
relationship. In the TA, since each transaction is a discrete event, the exchange partners 
monitor each transaction to assure they achieve a positive outcome. Whereas, in the RA 
there is less monitoring of each transaction, since the evenness of the relationship is 
perceived in future events, which is referred to as reciprocity8 (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; 
Macneil, 1980). In a TA, the partners are looki ng for a positive wi nning outcome regardless 
of what the other partner gains, since the transaction is considered the last transaction. The 
exchange partner in a transactional exchange (TA) does not expect future rec iprocity from 
the other exchange partner; therefore, they monitor the performance of each transaction as if 
it was the last without the future reciprocity of the other exchange partner (Kaufmann and 
Dant 1992). 
When one paltner tries to increase his share of the exchange-surplus and pushes for more, 
the other exchange partner will eventually quit, and this approach would be characterized as 
more transactional (TA). Whereas, an exchange partner that works towards evenness in the 
relationships would be characterized as more relational (RA) (Macneil, 1980). 
8 Reciprocity is defined as " ... simp1y stated as the principle of getting something back for something 
given"(Macneil, 1983, pg 347). 
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In this dimension the TA (discrete transaction) approach is where each individual transaction 
is monitored for its success and treated as if it was the last transaction. In the RA (relational 
exchange) the two parties expect reciprocity from the continued relationship. 
The items are used to measure the Mutuality construct as either more transactional (TA) or 
more relational (RA), where the audit client will be asked what is preferred, that the 
performance of each transaction is monitored or that transactional monitoring is not 
necessary, as there will be opportunities in the future for reciprocity in the case of 
relationship unevenness: the principle of getting something back in return for something 
given (Macneil, 1983) 
3.2.4.4 Flexibility 
The Flexibility dimension is found in both the RA and TA approach, but for the TA the 
terms of flexibility are found outside the exchange partnership (Macneil, 1980). Macneil 
(1980) gives the following examples. Given a bank loan, where the cond itions of the loan are 
stipulated on an external legal contract, in the event of a borrower's failure to pay, the 
conditions of the relationship of the two parties would be outlined in the external agreement. 
This is an example of a TA. In contrast, the RA would be a longer term, more relational 
approach between a lender and borrower. If changes were made during the relationship, such 
as financial difficulties, before referring to an external document, the two parties would 
already be engaged in two-way communication, advice, and consultation (Macneil, 1980). 
Modifications in the contract are expected and permitted in the RA; whereas, with the TA 
the conditions of the contract are not negotiable and changes result in new terms of 
agreement in a new contract. The items used to measure the Flexibility construct are either 
more transactional (TA) or more relational (RA). The audit client will be asked ifthey prefer 
changes to the terms of the agreement throughout the relationship or not. 
3.2.4.5 Role integrity 
The more transactional the relationship, the more the roles of each party are perceived and 
expected to be simplistic. The roles are mostly expected to deal with the buying and selling 
of the products or service in the exchange. However, in a RA the roles of each party are 
expected to be complex and multi-dimensional. In a RA the parties of the exchange 
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relationship are expected to be involved in activities beyond the mere buying and selling of 
the exchange product or service (Macneil, 1980). 
The items used to measure the Role integrity construct as either more transactional (TA), or 
more relational (RA) determine if the role of the auditor includes activities that extend 
beyond the delivelY of the audit service and involve a more multi-dimensional role; this 
would be descriptive of a RA. Whereas, if the audit client prefers that the role of the auditor 
be within the specifie role of delivering the audit service, the relational construct would be 
the TA under the Role integrity dimension. 
3.2.4.6 Restraint 
This dimension reflects the degree to which each party exercises its power. In the TA, the 
parties exercise their rights and obligations. When the two parties in an exchange rely on the 
rights and obi igations of their agreements they are in a TA. Whereas, in the RA, the parties 
voluntarily restrain their use of legitimate power (MacneiJ, 1974; 1980). 
The items used to measure the Restraint construct, as either more transactional or more 
relationaJ, are based on the exchange partner's use of power. The client's preference for the 
use of power as a means to get their own way, would describe a TA. Otherwise, if the audit 
client would prefer that the more powerfuJ party voluntari Iy exercises control of their power 
then this would describe a RA. 
3.2.5 Relational Preference measurement (RA and TA) 
Based on the six relational dimensions, presented above, derived from Macneil's (1980) 
Relational Contract theOlY, Kaufmann and Dant (1992) developed multi-dimensional 
measures with the objective of being able to determine if relationships were more 
transactional (TA) or more relational (RA). A subset of questions (items) was developed for 
each dimension and alpha coefficients were calculated to determine the reliability of each 
dimension. The following Table 3.2 shows the six dimensions along with the questionnaire 
location of the corresponding questions (items), with a reliability coefficient for each 
dimension. 
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Table 3.2
 
TA and RA Dimensions (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992)
 
QuestionsDimension TA RA (Appendix C) Cronbach Alpha 
Relational focus Individual transaction 
Ongoing 
exchange 1,2,3, 0,71 
Solidarity Arm's length 
and legal Trust and social 4,5,6,7,8,9 0,73 
Restraint Individual rights 
exercised Power restrained 10,11 0,65 
Role integrity Clearly defined 
roles 
Overlapping 
roles 12,13,14 0,78 
Flexibility Use of "Exit" Renegotiation 15,16,17 0,62 
Mutuality 
Positive 
outcome from 
transactions 
Positive outcome 
from relationship 18,19,20 0,72 
Reliability coefficient alphas are recommended to be the first measure when assessing the 
quality of a measurement instrument (Churchill, 1979). The reliability coefficients in 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992) in Figure 3.2 are considered acceptable, ranging from .62 to .78. 
(Churchill, 1979). In addition, the construct validity for the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) is 
considered adequate, supported by face and content validity, as weil as the above mentioned 
reliability coefficients. Reliability coefficients are considered indirect evidence of validity 
(Churchill, 1979; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). Face validity is confirmed because the 
measurement dimensions are based on the theoretical framework proposed by Macneil 
(1980), considered a framework appropriate to describe the RA and TA between buyers and 
sellers (Dwyer et al., 1987; Nevin, 1995; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000). 
The relationa1 score of each dimension was determined by finding the mean of the item 
sums. Therefore, the different number of items per dimensions did not affect the weight of 
each dimension (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). An important requirement for a summated 
scale is that each dimensional is unidimentional, meaning that the different items are 
correlated and, therefore, represent a single dimension (Hair et al., 2006). Kaufmann and 
Dant (1992) measured the unidimentiona1ity of their summated scales by assessing 1) 
internai and external consistency and 2) factor structure using LISREL. Unidimensionality is 
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confirmed as ail item loadings, within each dimension, were significant (Kaufmann and 
Dant, 1992). 
Recent empirical studies have also used the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) measurement mode l, 
which allowed the authors to measure the level of relationism: either more relational (RA) or 
more transactional (TA). Rokkan and Haugland (2000) measured transactionaJ and relational 
exchange by the contractual norms developed by Kallfmann and Kant (1992). Each 
dimensional score was determined by the scale mean and each dimension was measured for 
a separate analysis of reliability. A final relational score was determined as the average score 
of the seven relational dimension scale means, with acceptable reliability (Rokkan and 
Haugland, 2000) (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 
Relational Dimensions (Rokkan and Hallgland, 2000) 
Dimension Scale range Scale range Scale mean Cronbach Alpha 
Focus 1-7 1,38-6,13 3,20 0,80 
Solidarity 1-7 1,25-7,00 2,58 0,83 
Restraint of power 1-7 1,50-7,00 3,42 0,61 
Role integrity 1-7 1,00-6,00 3,28 0,86 
Conflict resolution 1-7 1,00-3,50 2,03 0,70 
Flexibility 1-7 1,25-6,75 2,89 0,81 
Mutuality 1-7 J,50-7,00 5,21 0,60 
Relational results 1-7 1.99-5.17 3.23 0,65 
Similar to Rokkan and Haugland (2000), Fink et al. (2007) based their study on Kaufmann 
and Dant (1992) and lIsed 6 dimensions, and ail measures were calculated using a five-point 
scale from strongly agree (5) ta strongly disagree (1). Four items were used ta measure each 
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dimension, so a total of 24 questions were used9 . Means were calculated for each dimension, 
and a total single mean was used to determine a final relational score for a single measure of 
relationism with acceptable reliability measures, described in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
ReJational Dimensions (Fink et al., 2007) 
Relational Dimension Conbach alpha 
Relational focus (four items) 0,64 
Restraint on power (four items) 0,68 
Solidarity (four items) 0,68 
Role integrity (four items) 0,61 
Mutuality (four items) 0,70 
Flexibility (four items) 0,77 
Therefore, two empirical studies above show that the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) model 
have been empirically applied and the dimensions have proven to be a reliable measurement 
instrument. By using the Kaufmann and Dant (1992) model we will be able to determine 
audit clients that prefer a more relational approach (RA) versus clients that prefer a more 
transactional approach (TA). Jn addition, given the multi-item measures we will be able to 
determine, for each item, if the audit client is more relational or transactional. 
Since the objective of our study is to measure the relational preference, we will slightly 
mod ify the questions and use the word Prefer, to capture the client preference. In Kaufmann 
and Dant (1992) they use the word Expectation: what the exchange partner expects; whereas, 
we want to measure the preference. In addition, we modify the questions to identify the 
auditor as the exchange partner in each question. 
3.2.6 Visual Analogue scale (VAS) 
Another mod ification we have made to Kaufmann and Dant (1992) is an improvement to the 
7-point Likert ScaJe. The Likert Scale is considered useful in behavioural research because 
9 In Fink el al. (2007) 24 questions were used, yet Kaufmann and Dant (1992) used 33 questions for 
the same 6 dimensions. We incorporated the 33 questions from Kaufmann and Dant (1992). However, 
during our pre-test we eliminated repetitive (non-value added) questions. 
58 
the main advantage of a summated scale is the greater variance obtained (Issac and Michael, 
1995). Scales, such as the Likert scale, measure the intensity of a participant's attitude 
(Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). 
However, the disadvantage of Likert scales is response bias (over-rater or under-rater) (Issac 
and Michael, 1995). Moreover, the problem with questionnaires that use Likert scales for 
investigating an individual's subjective feelings is that the same word in a questionnaire can 
have different meanings for different people; these were the findings in psychiatry studies 
(Kertzman et al., 2002; 2004). A proposed solution has been to use a Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS) (Kertzman et al., 2004). The VAS is a visual scaling method of assessment that is 
intended to overcome the problems associated with responding to subjective questions 
(Kertzman et al., 2004). It was introduced by Hayes and Paterson (1921) and Freyd (1923) 
cited by Kertzman et al. (2004) and is often used in psychological research that investigates 
subjective states. The VAS is used in psychiatry to measure depression where the patient is 
asked to indicate their mood on a 10 cm line with its boundaries clearly defined as the 
extremes of the mood (Kertzman et al., 2004). Therefore, the improvement of the VAS 
versus the Likert Scale is to achieve maximum variance. 
Similar studies in audit (Elbekkali, 1999; Elbekkalj and Pilote, 2004; Pilote and Elbekkali, 
2004) measured auditors' relational preference by basing their measurement of RA and TA 
on Ricard's (1995) measures. However, the scale was modified by using a Visual Analogue 
Scale (VAS) instead of a Likert scale. A scale with the length of 8 cm was used, in the form 
of a line with opposing ends. The respondent was asked to place an X on the part of the 
continuum that best represented their answer, and the respondents answer was reported in 
centimetres (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Visual Analogue Scale (Elbekkali, 1999) 
Therefore, we propose an improvement of the Likert scale by increasing from greater 
variance (Likert) to maximum variance (VAS), by giving the respondent the option to 
respond using a maximum response of either Total1y disagree or Totally agree. The word 
Totally assures the respondent would not have an answer that exceeds the limits of the scale. 
3.2.7 Measurement modifications 
To summarize our modifications, our measurement mode! will be modified to capture the 
client perspective, and we will seek the client's preference and not their expectation. It is 
considered acceptable to modify questions as many current measurement instruments in use 
are borrowed and modified (Hoyle et al., 2002; Rudestam and Newton, 2001). Our 
modifications to the original model should not affect the reliability coefficients and validity 
mentioned above. It will, however, be impoltant to pre-test our questionnaire and determine 
our own reliability and validity measures once data is collected from our specific population. 
Our questionnaire is included in Appendix C, which includes the original questions from 
Kaufmann and Dant (1992) with our above mentioned modifications. 
3.2.8 Response bias 
Order bias and Social Desirability Bias (SDS) was considered before constructing our 
Questionnaire. The order of questionnaires has been shown to affect results; however, the 
impact of the order of questions has not been consistent. For example, less educated 
respondents were more influenced by the order of questions than the more educated 
respondents (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). In addition, it was found that the order of 
questions has little impact on response effects for sexual-behaviour questions (Bradburn et 
al., 1979). Attempts to randomize the order questions have had very little impact on the 
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effect of responses, and a random order is thought to be chaotic and confusing for 
respondents (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). Moreover, it has been stressed to caution 
against putting questions regarding one subject at the beginning and another subject latter in 
the questionnaire, as the first part of the questionnaire will impact the second part (Babbie 
and Benaquisto, 2002). Therefore, our questions in our questionnaire (Appendix C) did not 
follow any particular order, but rather were randomly classified, similar to Kaufmann and 
Dant (1992). In addition, there was no discussion of Order Bias in Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992). 
We also considered the possibility of social desirability bias (SDB). SDB occurs when 
respondents over-report socially desirable behaviour and under-report socially undesirable 
behaviour. Respondents may be biased to respond in a way that coveys a favourable 
impression of themselves or their reference group (Rubbin and Babbie, 2007). Socially 
sensitive questions create SDB in participants' responses, which are considered a systematic 
response error (Hoyle et al., 2002). Socially desirable responses are assumed a function of 
two factors: the individual need for approval as weil as the demands of a particular situation 
(Nancarrow and Brace, 2000). Interview studies that fail to minimize SDB effects run the 
risk of inaccurate theoretical or practical conclusions, and threaten construct validity (Jo, 
2000). Therefore, it is important to control for SDB in our study. 
Other similar relational studies such as CovieiJo et al. (2002), Elbekkali and Pilote (2004), 
Fink et al. (2007) and Kaufmann and Dant (1992), did not control for SDB because they 
collected their data with self-administered questionnaires. A self-administered questionnaire 
is considered the most widely used method to reduce SDB (Bradburn et al., 2004). For 
example, Blanchette (2001) measured individuals' ethical evaluations by asking participants 
if they had created or intended to create budget slack. The method used was a self­
administered questionnaire survey. A face-to-face interview method was also used. The 
results in Blanchette's (2001) interview study showed that 75% of the participants confirm 
that they never had or intended to create budget slack. However, the results of the self­
administered questionnaire survey in Blanchette (2001) showed opposite resuIts: most of the 
managers had created sJack or intended to create slack. With these opposing results the 
author confirmed that SDB was absent in the self-administered questionnaire (Blanchette 
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2001). Therefore, we consider that our use of a mailed self-administered questionnaire will 
help us control for SDB. 
The following is an explanation of how we measure the variables used to test Hypotheses 2­
4. 
3.3 MEASUREMENT Of HYPOTHESES 2-4 
In Table 3.5, we describe the variables that we use to measure the personal characteristics 
constructs for Hypothesis 2-4. In addition, we reference various empirical studies that have 
operationalized variables that measure these constructs. Personal characteristics are 
hypothesized to influence the audit client's relational preference as discussed in the previous 
ConceptuaJ Framework chapter. The following is a brief description of the operational 
definitions of the variables, Risk Aversion, Ethics of Care, and Locus of Control. 
3.3.1 Risk Aversion 
Risk Aversion is measured uSlDg a questionnaire used by Judge (1999) and BJanchette 
(2001) and based on the Siovic (1972) scale (Table 3.5-Hypothesis 2). A questionnaire with 
8 statements is scaled form 0-100 (Appendix D) (0-1585 for measurement purposes). On the 
0-1585 scale, Totally disagree scores 0 and Totally agree scores 1585 points where scores 
that approach 0 indicate low risk aversion; whereas, a score that approaches 1585 represents 
a.high risk aversion. 
3.3.2 Ethics ofCare 
Gilligan's Ethic of Care model has been operationalized by Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview 
(ECI) (Skoe and Lippe, 2002) developed by Skoe (1993) cited by Skoe and Lippe (2002). 
Similar to the Heinz dilemma developed by Kholberg (Gilligan, 1983), the ECI consists of 
one real life dilemma and four standard dilemmas administered using structured interviews. 
However, since we are conducting a survey study and not an interview study, we use the 
only paper and pencil instrument designed to measure the ethics of care: the Measure of 
Moral Orientation (MMO) (Liddell, 1990). The Ethics of Care is measured by the Moral 
Orientation, using a 6-item self-description questionnaire and the analysis of moral 
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dilemmas. Given the length of our questionnaire, we use only the 6-items to measure the 
participant's Ethics of Care (Appendix Ela). We did not consider that by eliminating the 
moral dilemma we would weaken our measure of Ethics of Care since the 6-item scale has 
been shown to correlate significantly with the overall Ethics of Care measure (Liddell, 1998) 
(reliability and validity of the measure also confirms the appropriateness of the six-item 
scale, further discussed in our Preliminary Data Analysis). Similar to past studies of the 
Ethcis of Care variable, we use a scale to measure the strength of the Ethics of Care (Liddell 
and Davis, 1996; Liddell, 1990; Liddell et al., 1992). However, we use a VisuaJ Analogue 
Scale instead of the Likert Scale for the same advantages as explained for the measure of our 
Relational Preference variable. The values of 0 and 100 are indicated on each end of the 
scale; however, for our measurement purposes, each line is measured from 0- J585 units, 
similar to the Relational Preference measure. The greater the audit client demonstrates Ethics 
ofCare, the more they should prefer a RA with their auditor (Table 3.5-Hypothesis 3). 
3.3.3 Locus of Control 
The Locus of Control is a personality factor that represents an individual's belief about their 
ability to control their environment (Bernardi, 1997) (Table 3.5-Hypothesis 4). The InternaI 
Locus of Control is measured using the Social Reaction Inventory (Rotter, J966) adapted 
and used by Blanchette (2001) (Appendix f). The questionnaire includes 17 questions but 
only 14 are pertinent as 3 are questions of diversion. The unit of measure is based on 0-14 
scale with individuals scoring close to 14 are considered to have an external locus of control 
while those that score close to 0 are characterized as having an internai locus of control 
(Blanchette, 2001). 
la 12 items are actually in the questionnaire, because 6 justice items were included, in arder ta 
determine discriminate validity. 
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3.4 
Table 3.5
 
Operational measures of research variables for Hypotheses 2-4
 
Operational References forDefinitions Unit of theoretical and/or Hypothesis Constructs Variables (how to Measure empirical
measure the justification
variable) 
2) The greater the Bao et al. (2003); 
audit clients' risk Blanchette (200 J); 
aversion the more Personal Risk Siovic scale 0- 1585 Hofstede and Bond 
they will prefer a characteristic Aversion (1972) (984); Judge et al. 
RA over TA with (1999); Shrimp and 
their audit firm Bearden (1982 
3) The higher the 
audit clients' 
ethics of care the Personal Ethics of 
more they will MMO 0-1585 Liddell 1990
characteristic Care prefer a RA over 
TA with their 
audit firm 
4) The more Bernardi (1997); 
audit clients Blanchette (2001); demonstrate Social Reaction Personal Locus of Boone deinternai locus of 1nventory 0-14
characteristic Control Brabander (1997); 
control the more (Rotter 1966) Rotter (1996);Tsui they prefer a RA 
and Gui (1996)
over TA with 
their audit firm 
DATA COLLECTION 
A questionnaire can be administered by face-to-face interviews or questionnaires can be sent 
by mail. Both methods offer advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of the mail 
survey are, inexpensive, wide-ranging, self-administering, and anonymous (Hoyle et al., 
2002; Isaac and Michael, 1995). Moreover, the mail survey avoids potential interviewer bias 
(Hoyle et al. 2002). However, the disadvantages of the mail survey are low response rates 
(resulting in possible non-response bias), no assurance the questions were understood, and 
no assurance the addressee was the one who answered (Hoyle et al., 2002; Isaac and Michael 
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1995). The advantages of the face-to-face interview are higher response rates than mail 
surveys (80% to 85%). In addition, the presence of an interviewer decreases the "no 
answers", helps with confusing questions, and can observe respondents and the environment, 
as weil as ask questions (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; Hoyle et al., 2002). After 
considering the advantages and disadvantages offace-to-face interviews and mai] survey, we 
chose a mail survey as our main method for our data collection. The following section 
describes our questionnaire and pretests. 
3.5 PARTICIPANTS 
The objective ofthis study is to obtain information from audit clients about their relationship 
preference with their auditor. The participant of our study is the client of audit services and is 
asked questions regarding different aspects of their relationship with their auditor. Therefore, 
the participant is an individual who is an audit client, responsible for the management of the 
auditor relationship at the client company, so they can answer questions regarding different 
aspects of their relationship with their auditor. The definition of our participants is consistent 
with our conceptual framework, where the audit client is defined as the Accountable party 
who is referred to as Management (CICA, 2006, 5025.06). 
To determine the responsibility for the auditor reJationship, we determine the member of 
management who has the responsibilities on the management of the auditor relationship. 
Beattie et al. (2001) stud ied auditor-client relationships and defined the audit client as simply 
the finance director (FD), yet do not define their responsibilities. Moreover, Gibbens et al. 
(2005) studied auditor-cJient negotiations and deflOed audit clients as the CFa, which were 
defined as the" ... managers responsible for the financial statements used by markets and 
others ... " (Gibbens et al., 2005 pg 387). For the purpose of our study, we do not define the 
audit client using a specific title since titi es in companies can vary and do not accurately 
define job responsibilities consistently among companies. For example, a control 1er in one 
company could be the top financial person, ultimately responsible for the relationship with 
the auditor; whereas, in other companies the same responsibilities could be carried out by a 
CFa or Director of Finance. Therefore, if we limit our study to individual titles we could 
exclude individuals that would have the appropriate responsibility for our study. Therefore, 
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we will detine our participants by their level of responsibility, which could also include the 
owner of the company. 
Similarly, Blanchette (2001) characterized her participants based on responsibilities and not 
job titles. She surveyed tinancial professionals with the objective of determining the 
relationship between the level of moral reasoning and the propensity to create budget 
slacking. Therefore, the participants needed to meet two specific characteristics: the 
participation in the budget process and the responsibility of a budget. Elbekkali and Pilote 
(2004) also used characteristics to determine their sample participants: partner and 
responsibility for managing audit clients' portfolios. 
Given our need for specific characteristics, a random sample approach is inappropriate 
(B lanchette, 2001; Elbekkal i and Pilote, 2004). A nonprobability sampi ing method, referred 
to as purposive sampling is more appropriate (Babbie and Benaquisto, 200 l, Hoyle and 
Harris, 2002). Purposeful sampling has been used by other similar studies in accounting 
(Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004; Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004) and in Marketing (Coviello et al., 
2000; 2002). 
The most appropriate sampling size is based on statistical analysis as weil as convenience 
given our need for participants that meet required criteria (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2001; 
Patton, 2002). Similar studies (Blanchette, 2001; Elbekkali, 1999) based their sample size on 
Hair et al. (1995) who determine an appropriate sample size between a ratio of lOto 20 
times the independent variables. 
The tirst part of this research project does not include independent variables since the 
purpose is not to determine relationships between variables. The second part our research 
consists of 3 independent variables (Locus of Control, Ethics of Care and Risk Aversion). 
These three variables will be correlated with RA and TA variables to determine a 
relationship. However, the three variables are not included in the same model, but rather 
studied individually. Therefore, according to Hair et al. (1995), the minimum required 
number of observations for regression analysis is 10 (10 * 1 independent variable) with a 
maximum being 20 (20 * 1 independent variable). 
The criteria for participants and the type of company, based on the research question, 
research objective and conceptual framework of our study, are described as follows: 
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~ Participants in this study are from Private Companies. Chaney et al. (2004) chose 
private firms for their sample for a few reasons. Firstly, private firms have different 
demand-and-supply functions for audits compared to publicly listed companies 
because they are not forced by regulations to produce audited statements (Chaney et 
al., 2004). Given that public companies must produce audited statements due to the 
required regulation, clients do not value the audit since they do not have a buying 
choice (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). In public companies the audit committee chooses the 
auditor; therefore, it would be difficult to establish the dyadic reJationship (unit of 
analysis) between two individuaIs in a public company. Therefore, since the public 
company has a forced audit and the decision of the firm is the audit committee, it is 
more feasible to only retain private companies in our study. 
~ It has been suggested that audited accounting information IS more important for 
management performance evaluation in private firms rather than public firms, given 
the lack of market measures offirm value (Chaney et al., 2004). 
~ Even though in private firms owners and managers are c10ser than in public firms, 
there are sti 1J agency relationships because management still needs to be monitored 
by owners (Ang et al., 2000; Chaney et al., 2004). Iyer and Rama (2004) also 
surveyed private companies to investigate clients' ability to persuade the auditor to 
accept their position, which was related to auditor tenure. Even though most auditor­
tenure discussions included publicly traded companies, Iyer and Rama (2004) say 
that auditors and regulators believe that regulations similar to those imposed on 
public companies will be imposed on private companies in the future". 
~ Participants need to be from companies large enough for there to be a separation 
between ownership and management to where there is an agency relationship. The 
private company cannot be a firm where the owner owns and manages 100% of the 
company. There needs to be sorne separation of the owner and manager for our 
conceptual framework to apply. Therefore, there must not be zero agency costs. 
However, an agency relationship between management and ownership, along with 
Il We have no documented evidence or reason to believe that there would be a difference in a preferred 
relationship approach with a private versus public company. An important reason for our choice of 
private companies is that we would not be including the audit committee in the decision process, thus 
allowing us to study the individual audit client, ultimately responsible for the management of auditors. 
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agency costs does not require a large company. In the original agency cost theory by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), there is zero agency cost when the firm is owned solely 
bya single owner-manager (Ang et al., 2000). In Jensen and Meckling (1976) at one 
extreme are companies where managers own 100% of the company, therefore have 
zero agency costs. At the other extreme are companies where owners pay managers 
and the managers own no equity in the company. In between these two extremes, 
there are firms where the managers own some but not ail of the firm equity. 
Therefore, in the firms between the two extremes there are agency costs (Ang et al., 
2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, even a small company, where a single 
owner owns 100% of the equity, but who hires an outside manager, will still incur 
agency costs for the very reason that an outside manager is hired. The outside 
manager is hired because the owner cannot manage ail the financial operations. The 
single owner, due to time, or financial knowledge cannot fully understand the 
financial operations of the company, therefore must incur monitoring costs (Ang et 
al., 2000; Jensen and Meckling, J976). Therefore, in our sample we include private 
companies where there is an owner or owners that do not own and manage 100% of 
the company's equity to assure that there exists an agency relationship between the 
manager (agent) and owner (principle). 
~	 Participants must be a member of the client-management team that has the 
hierarchical position that provides the responsibiJity to manage the auditor 
relationship. To assure that the unit of analysis corresponds with our conceptual 
framework the client will be the accountable party who is part of management and 
has an accountability relationship with another party as defined by the CrCA (2006 
5025.04-.06) 
The following is a summary of the criteria for an acceptable participant for our study. The 
individual participant needs to be: 
~ Member of a privately held non-listed company. 
~ Member of a company where the owner does not own and manage 100% of 
the company equity. 
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>- Member of a company that has an audit engagement (medium or high level 
of assurance) with an audit firm. 
>- Member of management. 
>- Responsible for the management of the auditor relationship. 
3.6 SAMPLE SIZE AND DATA LISTS 
To determine the number of appropriate participants (sample size) it is necessary to consider 
the analysis of our hypotheses. Our study includes 4 hypotheses, 1 main hypothesis and 3 
secondary hypotheses. For the main hypothesis we test for unidimentionality by Factor 
Analysis, then we use Paired-Samples T-Tests to determine if the audit client is more 
relational (RA) or more transactional (TA), in respect to the continuum midpoint. For the 3 
secondary hypotheses, we conduct simple correlation analysis to determine relationships 
between the variables of the secondary hypothesis with the variables of the main hypothesis. 
Therefore, we perform 3 analyses: 
1. Factor Analysis. 
2. Paired-Samples T-Tests 
3. Correlation analysis. 
These three analyses determine the number of observations we reqUJre. The number of 
observations required for Factor Analysis depends on the number of constructs and variables. 
Our 1Si hypothesis has 6 constructs with 20 items (variables). It is recommended, as a general 
l'ule, to have a minimum of 5 times as many observations as the number of variables 
analyzed, with JO times being even more appropriate (Hair et al., 2006). Therefore, given 20 
variables, 200 observations (10 times*20 variables) wou Id be adequate. For Paired-Samples 
T-Tests, a minimum of 20 observations is recommended (Hair et al., 2006). As for our 3'd 
analysis, 30 observations is considered acceptable for correlational analysis with a single 
independent variable. Of our 3 analyses, it is the Factor Analysis that requires the larger 
sample of a minimum of 100 observations with a recommended 200 observations. Therefore, 
200 observations is an adequate sample size to conduct our 3 analyses. 
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Based on 200 observations we determine the number of questionnaires to send out. This 
number is based on a minimum response rate. Attempts are made to increase our rate of 
response by following the Total Design Method (TDM) by Dillman (2007). However, given 
the length of our questionnaire and some resistance observed during our 2 pre-tests, our 
response rate was expected to be low. A similar study that sent questionnaires to CFOs in 
private companies had an 18% response rate in which the allthors claim is similar to other 
studies, where respondents are found from membership lists (Iyer and Rama, 2004). Based 
on a response rate of 18% we would need a database of 1111 companies (2001.18). 
To find a database of at least l 1Il companies we needed to respect the criteria that are 
consistent with our conceptual framework such as: 
~ Private companies. 
~ English as a preferred language 
~ Head Office (to avoid subsidiaries of public companies) 
~ Over 100 employees. 
The size of the company was determined by the nllmber of employees and not the sales 
volume, for the folJowing reasons. As we argued in our conceptual framework, to assure that 
there exists an agency relationship between the manager (agent) and the owner (principle), 
the owner or owners should not own and manage 100% of the firm 's equity. Therefore, we 
want to exclude small companies from the database. Statistics Canada defines Small Firms 
as those with fewer than 100 employees (www.ic.gc.ca). 
The number of empJoyees is a better proxy for company size than sales numbers for the 
following reasons. A representative of the company Profile Canada warned about relying on 
sales figures. Firstly, sales figures vary from year to year and are not always a rel iable 
indication of company size. The representative also said that since corporate information is 
sllpplied voluntarily, some companies are hesitant in providing sales figures; whereas, 
employee numbers are less sensitive. Therefore, the number of employees is a more reliable 
number and more stable '2 . 
12 Discussion on October 2Sth 200S with Profile Canada. 
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In addition, other audit research has utilized the nllmber of employees as a proxy for 
company size. In private companies, there is a voluntary demand for an audit in the absence 
of regulatory demand (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). One of the reasons private companies are 
audited in the absence of regulatory demand is to compensate owners for the loss of direct 
supervision and control (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). This is consistent with the Monitoring 
Theory, where the manager (agent) demands an audit to provide accu rate information to the 
owner (princip le) (Wallace, 1980). For this situation to exist there needs to be a separation 
from owners and managers. The proxy used by Abdel-Khalik (1993) for the separation of 
ownership and control is the different administrative levels. The greater the number of 
employees, the more administrative layers an organization will have (Abdel-Khalik, 1993). 
Therefore, the number of employees is a better determinate of company size than sales 
revenue. 
Given the required criteria, we investigated possible lists from Canadian reputable 
companles. We had discussions with 3 companies that have been used in other Canadian 
survey studies: 
l. Scott's 
2. Dunn and Bradsteet 
3. Profile Canada 
Scott's was eliminated because they were unable to separate private and publicJy listed 
companies (see Appendix J). 
Dlinn and Bradstreet did not provide adequate output data. For example, only top-Ievel 
decision makers are available and not the key financial executive, which is our target 
respondent (see Appendix K). 
Profile Canada was able to distinguish between private and public companies and provide 
key executive staff names, including financial executives. In addition, they are able ta 
identify if a company is a head office. This is important since we do not want private 
companies that are subsidiaries of foreign corporations. The decisions for the audits of 
subsidiaries could be decided at the head office. Therefore, we have decided to acquire a Jist 
from Profile Canada based on the following criteria 
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]) Private Company 
2) Head Office 
3) English speaking 
4) 100 plus employees 
Based on this criteria, Profile Canada produced a list with 1,560 Companies in an Exportable 
Excel File (see Appendix L). This number of participants provides an adequate number of 
observations based on the above explanation 
3.7 QUESTIONNAIRE PRE-TESTING 
Our Questionnaire was pre-tested to assure participant understanding and interest. lt is 
recommended to choose pre-test participants that are not be part of the research but that are 
individuals who are representative of potential participants (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002; 
Roberts, 2004). In addition, it is recommended to look for the following characteristics when 
pre-testing an instrument: understandable instructions, clear wording, adequate answers, 
sufficient detail, regional differences, difficult sections, irrelevant questions, length, and 
convenience (Roberts, 2004). It is also recommended to administer the pre-test in the same 
conditions to those of the actual participants and to make appropriate additions, deletions, 
and modifications to the questionnaire (Isaac and Michael, 1995). The results of our two 
rounds of pre-tests are presented in the fol Jowing two sections. 
3.8 QUESTIONNAIRE PRE-TEST (1 ST ROUND) 
In September 2008, we began an initial pre-test with both colleagues and executives (audit 
clients), and we received comments from the following 8 participants: 
~ 5 corporate executives with direct relationships with auditors. 
~ 2 professors from UQAM who are chartered accountants and who have survey 
questionnaire experience. 
~ 1 research assistant from Concordia University working on a Canada-wide survey. 
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We attempted to find participants with experience managing relationships with auditors and 
other participants with experience in survey research studies. We made an initial request to 
10 potential cand idates and received comments from 8. 
In the pre-test, we paid attention to the Tailored Design Method (TOM) developed by 
Dillman (2007); the TDM is a method used to achieve high response rates in mail surveys. 
One of the important eiements of the TDM is to make sure the questionnaire is Respondent­
Friendly: clear and easy to understand with questions that are interesting and impol1ant 
(salient) to the respondent, and a layout that makes it easy for respondents to respond. 
The pre-test participants were asked to read and answer the questions in the questionnaire 
and give any comments that could help improve the instrument; we specifically asked for 
comments to render the questionnaire more Respondent-Friendly. The following are the 
comments from the 8 pal1icipants. We then follow the pre-test comments with recommended 
changes to the questionnaire. 
In general, aIl the candidates found the questionnaire too long. The average time to complete 
the questionnaire was 1 hour, which was frustrating for the pal1icipants because in the cover 
letter we say that the questionnaire will take only 45 minutes. Most of the pal1icipants said 
they would have stopped after 30 minutes and that 30 minutes should be the target time. 
The cover letter was found to be too long, and it took too long to get to the research 
objective. Pre-test participants made suggestions to cut redundancies. For example, in the 
first paragraph, we say the study is part of a joint-program, which includes four universities. 
However, this same information is presented at the end of the cover letter. In addition, the 
objective of the research proj ect needs to be presented earl ier in the cover letter. 
The cover letter only says that our objective is to determine the client's relational approach; 
however, it does not say anything about the personal characteristics. Therefore, when the 
pre-testers arrived at the personal characteristics sections, they were frustrated because they 
did not understand the relevance of the questions with the research objective. 
This is an impol1ant point that is discussed by Dillman (2007) in his TDM; the questions 
need to be consistent with what the respondents have been told in the cover letter. The cover 
letter sets the expectations of the respondent (Dillman, 2007). We only mention the relational 
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preference objective in the cover letter; therefore, we needed to add a part saying that we 
also will be asking personality questions. In addition, it could help to reiterate a brief 
objective at the beginning of each section in order to better manage respondents' 
expectations. 
The pre-test participants questioned the reJevance of certain demographic questions. For 
example, it was questioned why we are asking so many personal questions, such as the level 
of education and the year of birth. They wondered why this was necessary for our research. 
Dillman (2007) stresses the importance of minimizing the requests to obtain personal 
information. Research shows that respondents resist personal questions, unless the questions 
are an important part of the research objective (Dillman, 2007). In addition, Bradburn et al. 
(2004) stress the importance of asking only necessary questions that will lead to testing 
hypotheses; ail other questions should be eliminated to reduce the response time. Moreover, 
each question should have a direct purpose to the research objectives (Bradburn et al., 2004). 
Therefore, we removed the following demographic questions, which were questioned by the 
participants and which will not influence our research objectives. 
~ Birth day 
~ Level of education 
~ Field of study 
~ Number of empJoyees under your responsibility 
~ Number ofyears of experience 
Some of the questions regarding the relational questions were confusing needing further 
explanation and clarification. The terms that needed clarification are the following: 
~ Payoffs 
~ Arm's length 
~ Long-term venture 
~ Cooperative effort 
~ Leverage 
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We incorporated these suggestions and modified the questionnaire. Once the questionnaire 
was modified, we proceeded with a second round of pre-tests. 
3.9 QUESTIONNAIRE PRE-TEST (2ND ROUND) 
ln October 2008, we began a 2nd round of pre-tests with both colleagues and executives 
(audit clients). One of our main objectives of the second round of pre-tests was to obtain a 
maximum diversity among the pre-test participants, which is considered important when pre­
testing a mail survey questionnaire (Bradburn et al., 2004). 
We received comments from 10 participants possessing the following characteristics: 
~ 5 participants who have experience as audit clients (ail 5 have professional 
accounting titles). 
~ 2 professors from UQAM and University of Laval who have professional accounting 
designations and who have survey questionnaire experience. 
~ 1 PhD student with mail survey experience studying in an international business 
program in Belgium. 
~ 1 professor at Trenton University in Toronto with a Post-Doctorate degree and 
extensive international experience with questionnaires and mail surveys. 
~ 1 account executive with extensive corporate client experience in a sales function. 
These pre-test participants were asked to read and answer the questions in the questionnaire 
and give any comments that could help improve the instrument. We asked them to pay 
attention to the clarity and ease of the questionnaire. As in the 1Si round of pre-tests, in the 
2nd round we wanted to pay attention to the Tailored Design Method (TOM) developed by 
Dillman (2007). 
The pre-testers ail thought the questions were interesting and that the questionnaire was weil 
structured. Also, they al! enjoyed the visual analogue scale which was perceived as simple 
and clear. However, they ail found the questionnaire long, and they ail agreed that they 
would only have fiJled out the entire questionnaire given certain changes. The average time 
required to fill out the questionnaire was slightly more than 30 minutes. Modifications were 
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made to reduce the length below the 30 minutes, which is consistent with what we say in our 
coyer letter. 
For the minor grammar or non-significant changes, we modified the questionnaire. For the 
more significant changes, we describe them beJow and modified the questionnaire 
accordingly. 
Similar to the first round of pre-tests, the transition from the main relational questions to the 
personaJity questions caused problems because the expectations were not properly managed. 
Therefore, we added a small explanation at the end of the relational section to manage better 
respondent expectations. Moreover, it was recommended to add titles for each personality 
section which could help the respondent understand the purpose of each section. 
Question 10 and 11 were found to be confusing because of the word Power. Therefore, we 
referred back to the original measures (Kaufman and Dant, 1992) and reformulated the 
questions. 
Bradburn et al. (2004) recommends avoiding the repetition of the same type of question in a 
questionnaire as a measure of reliabiJity. Two reasons are given for this: respondents will get 
frustrated, and they will also perceive an increased importance of the question. Therefore, 
given the objective to reduce the length of the questionnaire, we reduced a few questions that 
were being asked only for reliability checks (where reliabiJity is already being measured). 
For example, as a Jast question, we were going to ask a summary question regarding the 
respondents overall reJational preference. This question was perceived as long and difficult 
by the respondents, and this question took up 1 page of space. There are enough similar 
questions (items) to measure reliability. 
To measure TA or RA we use 6 constructs and each construct is measured using 2 to 5 
questions in each construct. These constructs and questions are derived from past studies that 
have determined a high level of reliability. Therefore, as much as an overall general question 
would be a good reliability check, this extra reliability cornes at too high a cost; the cost 
being almost an extra page to the questionnaire and a question that is perceived as frustrating 
by the pre-testers. Therefore, we removed this question. 
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Dillman (2007) recommends starting the questionnaire with a salient beginning (important 
and interesting), an important factor that increases response rates in mail surveys (Dillman, 
2007). Therefore, since respondents usually do not consider demographic questions 
important or interesting, we have placed them at the end of the study. Question order needs 
to follow what was told in the coyer letter, to establish respondent expectations (Dillman, 
2007). 
3.10 EFFORTS TO lNCREASE RESPONSE RATES 
We sent, by mail, 1090 questionnaires on nov 27lh 2008. To increase the response rate we 
made phone calls the day of the mailing. For the 6 following days we called about 100 
potential respondents across Canada to ask them if they would please fill out the 
questionnaire (Appendix H). 
The main limitation to a mail survey, compared to other data collection methods, is the low 
response rate; mail surveys with response rates over 30% are rare and response rates are 
often 5% to 10% (Alreck and Settle, 1995). Therefore, we made additional efforts to increase 
our response rate. The underlying theory of the TDM is Social Exchange theory: "People are 
more likely to complete and return self-administered questionnaires if they trust that the 
rewards of doing so outweigh the costs they expect to incur" (Dillman, 2007 pg 29). 
There are many different recommendations, using the TDM, to increase response rates and 
the following are the recommendation that we incorporated in our mail survey, which follow 
Social Exchange theory: 
>- Rewards: In the coyer letter we gave the reason why the survey was being done. We 
did not exaggerate the importance of our research, but rather asked for their help in a 
study that is part of a PhD thesis. We also showed appreciation in advance for their 
help. Social Exchange theory shows that the feeling of being asked for assistance and 
being appreciated is a form of reward (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961 cited by Dillman, 
2007). Other forms of rewards are the offereing to share resliits of the survey (Alreck 
and Settle, 1995) (Appendix H). We believe that our most important initiative, which 
helped convince potential respondents to respond, was our phone calls that we made 
ta almost everybody on our sample Jist of 1090 individllals. The day that we sent our 
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questionnaires, we began our phone calls. The sole objective was to tell the people 
they were about to receive a questionnaire that is an important study necessary for the 
completion of a PhD thesis, and that we wanted to thank them in advance for their 
help. 
~	 Sponsorship by legitimate authority: When people know that a credible, authoritative 
organization approves a study and encourages participation, response rates have 
increased (Cialdini, 1984). To assure sponsorship we asked a Vice President of CMA 
Canada to write a letter of endorsement (Appendix B). 
~	 Reduce social costs: Making a questionnaire simple and interesting to fill out is 
important, with few inconveniences. When great physical and mental effort are 
required, social costs are perceived high by respondents (Dillman, 2007). Therefore, 
we explained clearly how to fill out the questionnaire with a detailed example. We 
a\so tried to make our questions interesting for the respondents, and we included a 
preaddressed and prepaid return envelopes, which increases response rates (Alreck 
and Settle, 1995). In add ition, it is stressed to say in the Coyer Letter that the 
Questionnaire is designed to be filled out easily and quickly (Alreck and Settle, 
1995), which we did (Appendix A). 
To calculate response rates, it is advised to reduce the amount sent by the questionnaires that 
were not delivered (Babbie and Benaquisto, 2002). The number of questionnaires that could 
not be delivered due to the wrong address or wrong person is subtracted from the initial 
number of companies, which gives the net sample of questionnaires delivered. The number 
of completed questionnaires is then divided by the net sample. The response rate then 
becomes an indication of our ability to persuade individuals in our sample to respond. 
Therefore, since 100 questions were not delivered, our response rate is 306 divided by 990, 
which equates to a 30,91 % response rate. 
To summarize our methodology chapter, we started by describing how we measure the 
Transactional and Relational Approach constructs in order to test our main hypothesis. We 
then present different measures that have been used in past research and we borrow the 
measurement instrument that is most appropriate to measure an audit client's marketing 
preference. In addition, we describe the measures of our personal characteristics, which are 
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also based on pnor research. We then explain the procedure to collect data and the 
description of our target participants, including the data base From which we chose our 
mailing list. We highlight our pre-tests along with modifications to the original questions 
that we borrowed. We end the chapter with the method we used to assure a satisfactory 
response rate. In the following chapter, we conduct a preliminary data analysis. 
4.1 
CHAPTERIV 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section, we describe our collected data and the variables we use to test the four 
research hypotheses. More precisely, this data analysis section is outlined as follows. We 
describe the contents of our questionnaire and our rating process that we use for each 
question. We describe the personal and corporate information concerning our respondents. 
We analyze the missing data of each section and we describe our approach to replace our 
missing data. We describe the data that measure the four variables we use in our four 
hypotheses, including the analysis of reliability, validity and normality for the data of each 
variable. We test for non-respondent bias. Finally, we test to determine if the corporate and 
personal information of our respondents influence the four variables. At the end of this 
section, we are in a position to test the four hypotheses. 
DATA COLLECTED 
We mailed 1090 questionnaires across Canada at the end of November 2008. We received 
306 completed questionnaires. Since 100 questionnaires were sent back unopened due to 
wrong addresses, our response rate is 30,91% (306 / (1090-100». Other similar survey 
studies have similar response rates which were considered satisfactory levels. Pilote and 
Elbekkali (2004) investigated audit partners' relational preference in the province of Quebec 
using a mail survey and had a response rate of 29,20% with 263 valid questionnaires 
returned. Fink el al. (2007) uses the same relational measurement instrument as the one used 
in the present research. In a mail survey, they received 372 completed questionnaires for a 
response rate of 32,00%. As mentioned in the methodology section, the minimum necessary 
observations were fixed at 200, which is a recommended number to conduct analysis for 
summated scales (Hair el al., 2006). We conservatively predicted a response rate of 18,00% 
which was based on a simi lar study (Iyer and Rama, 2004), where questionnaires were sent 
to the CFOs of private companies. Iyer and Rama's (2004) argue that the 18,00% rate is 
similar to other studies, where respondents were found from membership lists. Since our 
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4.2 
study was also a mail survey sent to CFOs of private companies based on a membership list 
we consider our 30,91% rate to be very good. 
Each questionnaire contains five sections of which four are used to measure the four 
variables and the flfth is used to coJlect persona) and corporate information. Twenty 
questions were used to measure Relational Preferences (relpref 3 Hl) (Appendix C); eight 
questions were lIsed to measure Risk Aversion (risk l4 H2) (Appendix D); twelve questions 
were used to measure Ethics of Care (care lS H3) (Appendix E); seventeen questions were 
used to measure Locus of Control (loc I6H4) (Appendix F); and finally, seven questions were 
used to collect Personal and Corporate Information (Appendix G).. 
The questions for the Relational Preferences, Risk Aversion, and Ethics of Care questions 
were measured using a Visual Analogue Sca!e (V AS). The Locus of Control questions 
included two statements, where respondents were asked to choose the statement that they 
perceived as truer among two; each answer was coded as °or 1. The Persona! and Corporate 
Information questions were comprised of seven demographic questions: numericaJ and 
descriptive. 
RATING PROCEDURE OF SECTION A, BAND C IN QUESTIONNAIRE. 
Because of the visual ana log scales lIsed, a rating procedure was applied to insure accuracy 
of the response value used in the analyses of the related hypotheses. Where appropriate, ail 
the answers in each questionnaire were rated by individuals (raters) that were given clear 
instructions on how to measure each response accurately and consistently. A first rater 
measured the answers in the questionnaire and assigned numbers on a separate piece of 
paper. A second rater re-measured the answers and the numbers were written directly on 
each questionnaire. To verify the work of the two raters there was an evaluation bya third 
rater to see if the two raters had the saine measure. Measures that were different were re­
measured by the third rater to obtain an accurate measure. After each measure of ail 
questions was verified three times, the data was entered into SPSS by a fourth individual and 
verification was done by a fifth individual to assure the data was properlyentered. 
Il This variable is a single mean score of the indi'vidual items listed in the SPSS database described further in the text. 
l' See note 14, above 
15 See note 14, above 
16 See note 14, above 
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For the questions with VAS lines, the raters used a ruler to assign a number for each answer. 
We had asked the respondents to indicate their answer by marking an X anywhere on the 
VAS line, which was represented with two extremes: TataUy disagree on the extreme left 
hand side of the line and TataUy agree on the extreme right hand side of the line, as shown in 
Figure4.1 17 . 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
Figure 4.1 Relational scale 
The rulers used for the VAS line were identical for each rater and had small lines 
representing mi llimetres. With the purpose of obtaining an absolute number for each YAS 
line with the largest variance possible, we decided that each millimetre (each line on the 
ruler) would represent 10 units. Therefore, 1 centimetre, which is 10 lines on the ru 1er, 
represented 100 units (la lines X 10 units). The total units for each YAS line on the 
questionnaire were 1585 units and the level of precision was as low as 5 units. If an X fell on 
a line, on the ruler, the measurement score would be a multiple of la units. If an X was put 
in between two lines on the ruler, we accounted for 5 units. For example, if the X was in 
between the beginning of the ruler (0) and the 1st line, we would indicate 5 units. If the X 
was in between the Ist and 2"d line we would indicate 10 + 5 = 15 units and so forth. To 
determine where exactly the X was located, we used a straight edge and drew a short line 
across and perpendicular to the VAS 1ine. The distance of this short line was then measured 
from the beginning of the VAS line by a ruler to indicate a number between 0 (the minimum) 
and 1585 units (the maximum). 
To summarize our Questionnaire, each of the sections represents one variable and each 
variable represents an individual hypothesis (with the exception of the Personal and 
Corporate information), as described in Table 4.1. 
17 This line is only an example and not as precise as the VAS lines on our questionnaire. 
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Table 4.1
 
Questionnaire Description
 
Variable name Variable description in SPSS Location Scale Hypothesis 
Relational Preference Relpref Appendix C 0-1585 Hypothesis 1 (H 1) 
Risk Aversion Risk Appendix D 0-1585 Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
Ethics of Care Care Appendix E 0-1585 Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
Locus of Control Loc Appendix F 0-14 Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
Personal and 
Corporate 
information 
7 Various 
names 
Appendix G Demographie Data 
No Hypothesis 
(Control 
Variables) 
4.3 DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE 
In our Questionnaire, the Personal and Corporate information sheet was used to obtain 
demographic information from respondents: their gender, the number of years of experience, 
the name of their audit firm, the length of time with their audit firm, the type of service, and 
the percentage of fees for audit services versus other services. A total of 306 questionnaires 
were completed, but the Personal and Corporate information was not filled out by 5 
respondents. Therefore, the total number of questionnaires for the Personal and Corporate 
information is 301 as shown in Table 4.2. 
Even though 301 respondents filled out the Personal and Corporate information not ail the 
questions were filled out. This explains why the number of Participants (N) varies according 
to each question (Table 4.2). For the experience in the area of work question, 2 of the 301 
respondents did not answer, resulting in 299 completed responses for this question. For the 
audit firm description question, 30 of the 301 respondents did not answer, for a total of 271 
completed responses. We expected this question to be the most sensitive as not everyone is 
comfortable divulging the name of their service supplier. For the time spent with the audit 
firm question, 9 of 30 1 respondents failed to respond, for a total of 292 completed responses. 
For the percentage of fees for audit services question, 2 of 301 respondents did not answer 
resulting in a total of 299 completed responses, and 6 of 301 respondents did not indicate a 
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percentage of fees for other services, for a total of 295 completed responses for this question. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of our Personal and Corporate information. 
Table 4.2
 
Personal and Corporate information
 
Participants N % Mean Std-Dev Med Min Max 
Gender 
Male 209 69,40 
Female 92 30,60 
Total 301 
Exp. Position (years) 301 11,50 9,34 9,00 0,25 55,00 
Exp. Area of work 299 24,84 8,75 25,00 5,00 55,00 
(years) 
Firm 
Big4 119 43,90 
Non-Big 4 152 56,10 
Total 271 
Time with audit firm 292 11,27 8,51 9,50 0,08 40,00 
~ 
Services 
Audit- Review 296 98,30 
Notice 5 1,70 
Total 301 
% fees-audit (rev) 299 87,77% 16,79% 95,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
%fees -other 295 12,33% 16,85% 5,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
services 
Date of reception 
Dec 2008 236 77,10 
Jan-mar 2009 70 22,90 
Total 306 
From Table 4.2 we see that 69,40 % of respondents are male (men) and 30,60% are female 
(women). The average number of years in the actual (current) position of respondents is 
1J,50 years (9,34 SD), ranging from 0,25 year to a maximum of 55,00 years l8 . In the area of 
work, years vary from a low of 5,00 years to a maximum of 55,00 years with a mean of 
24,84 years (8,75 SD). Among the respondents who provided the name of their audit firm, 
43,90% dealt with Big-4 firms and 56,10% of respondents dealt with Non-Big 4 firms. The 
,. The maximum number of years for both the experience in the respondents' position and area of work was disclosed at 55 
years. We verified the questionnaire to see if there might have been an error but this was the number indicated. It is possible that 
an employee who started very young in a company could still be in the samc company aCter 55 years, especially in the case ofan 
owner/manager. Therefore we will keep the extreme value as the maximum (given that we have no evidence showing this 
number to be an error or a misrepresentation). 
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time spent with these firms varied from one month to 40 years with an average of 1],27 
years (8,51 SD). Of the total respondents who provided their service, 89,30% received an 
Audit service; 9,00% had a Review Engagement, and 1,70% had a Notice to Reader. 
Consistent with these findings, the percentage of fees paid for Audit and Review 
engagements was on average 87,77 % (16.79% SD), while the remaining percentage 
(12,33%) was for other billable services. We received questionnaire responses from 
December 2008 to March 2009; 77,10% of the questionnaires were received in December 
and the remainder (22,90%) arrived in January-March 2009. These finding were used to 
estimate the non-respondent bias. 
4.4 MISSING DATA 
In some of our questionnaires, there is missing data. Most data that is collected in mail 
survey studies have missing data (Boslaugh and Watters, 2008). Various reasons could 
explain missing data. Because anonymity was insured, we could not cali back respondents to 
inquire as to why there were some questions left blank. Therefore, there is no certain 
explanation that could be given to expJain the reason for missing data in our study. We do 
not attempt to explain the missing data but rather to determine if the amount is important and 
what to do with the missing data. Various solutions are recommended which depend on the 
significance in the number of missing answers. It is also important to observe to see if the 
missing answers seem random or if many of the same answers are left blank. If the missing 
data seems simply random and not centered on the same questions, it can be assumed that no 
question caused any particular problem. In terms of the amount of acceptable missing data, 
less than 10,00% can be ignored or the series mean can be used to replace the missing data 
(Hair et al. 2006); both methods give the same results. Less than 5,00% of the questions for 
each variable is considered a divergence from randomness, and therefore can be ignored or 
replaced with the series mean (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). We have a small amount of 
missing data; the percentage of missing data is under 5,00% for each question with a 
minimum of 0,00% to a maximum of 3,30%. We present the percentages of missing data in 
Tables 4.3 to 4.6. Therefore, we replace our missing data with the series mean for ail 
participants. 
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Table 4.3 
Relational Preference (Percentage of missing data) 
Variables (Questions) Total N Missing DATA Percentage % 
Focprefl 306 6 2,00 
Focpref2 306 5 1,60 
FocprefJ 306 6 2,00 
Solprefl 306 4 1,30 
Solpref2 306 7 2,30 
SolprefJ 306 9 2,90 
Solpref4 306 2 0,70 
Solpref5 306 2 0,70 
Solpref6 306 5 1,60 
Powprefl 306 7 2,30 
Powpref2 306 6 2,00 
Rolprefl 306 4 l,3O 
Rolpref2 306 6 2,00 
RolprefJ 306 5 1,60 
Fleprefl 306 4 1,30 
Flepref2 306 5 1,60 
FleprefJ 306 3 1,00 
Mutprefl 306 1 0,30 
Mutpref2 306 2 0,70 
MutprefJ 306 2 0,70 
Table 4.4 
Risk Aversion (Percentage of missing data) 
Variables (Questions) Total N Missing DTA Percentage % 
Riskl 306 1 0,30 
Risk2 306 1 0,30 
Risk3 306 1 0,30 
Risk4 306 4 1,30 
Risk5 306 
° 
0,00 
Risk6 306 
° 
0,00 
Risk7 306 
° 
0,00 
Risk8 306 
° 
0,00 
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Table 4.5 
Ethics of Care (Percentage of missing data) 
Variables (Questions) Total N Missing DTA Percentage % 
Care 1 306 0 0,00 
Care 2 306 0 0,00 
Care 3 306 0 0,00 
Care 4 306 0 0,00 
Care 5 306 3 1,00 
Care 6 306 3 1,00 
Care 7 306 3 1,00 
Care 8 306 4 1,30 
Care 9 306 4 1,30 
Care 10 306 2 0,70 
Care II 306 2 0,70 
Care 12 306 2 0,70 . 
Table 4.6 
Locus of Control (Percentage of missing data) 
Variables (Questions) Total N Missing DTA Percentage % 
Locus 1 306 5 1,60 
Locus2 302 6 2,00 
Locus3 306 4 1,30 
Locus4 306 3 1,00 
Locus5 306 5 1,60 
Locus6 306 5 1,60 
Locus7 306 5 1,60 
Locus8 306 6 2,00 
Locus9 306 7 2,30 
Locus 10 306 10 3,30 
Locusll 306 7 2,30 
Locusl2 306 9 2,90 
Locus13 306 5 1,60 
Locusl4 306 7 2,30 
Locus15 306 6 2,00 
Locus16 306 5 1,60 
Locusl7 306 6 2,00 
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4.5
 SUMMATED SCALE, RELIABILITY, VALIDITY OF THE RELATIONAL 
PREFERENCE VARlABLE 
Our main hypothesis (H 1) is The audit client will prefer a more Relational Approach (RA) 
over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their auditor. To test HI we needed a measure 
able to quantify an audit client's relational preference and determine whether the preference 
is more relational (RA) or more transactional (TA). 
The measure we used in our survey to test the audit client's relationship preference was 
based on a multi-dimensional measurement instrument developed by Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992). These authors based their measurement model on the theoretical framework of 
Macneil (1980). The measurement instrument was subsequently operationalized by Ferguson 
et al. (2005), Fink et al. (2007), Paulin et al. (1997; 2000), and Rokkan et al. (2003), in 
various industries. Even though the measurement instrument was conceptualized as a 
multidimensional measure, it was operationalized as a unidimensional scale. The scale 
dimensions were summated into a single mean score, enabling the researchers to determine a 
level of relationlism: high scores determined a relational approach (RA) (also referred to as 
high relationalism) and low scores determined a transactional approach (TA) (also referred 
to as a discrete relationship or low relationalism) (Ferguson et al., 2005; Fink et al., 2007; 
Heide, 1994; Heide and John, 1992; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000; Rokkan et al., 2003). In ail of 
these studies, the multiple dimensions were compressed into the single construct: 
relationalism. This single construct was theoretically justified by the work ofMacneil (1980) 
and was statistically justified using Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Similar to these studies, 
our objective is also to determine a single mean score by summating items in our 
measurement instrument. Even though these previously mentioned studies show theoretical 
and statistical justification for summing their multi-item scales into a single score, we test 
our variables to meet the four conditions for a summated scale suggested by Hair et al. 
(2006): 
1) The items in the summated scale need theoretical justification (pg 139). 
2) The summated scale needs to be assessed for unidimensionality by factory analysis (pg 
139). 
3) The reliability of the scale needs to be assessed by the Cronback Alpha (pg 139). 
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4)
 Validity should be assessed (Construct Validity is assessed by theoretical justification) 
(pg 139). 
We followed these four recommendations to assure we meet the conditions of a summated 
scale for our Relational Preference (relpref) variable. The first condition of theoretical 
justification is met as the 20 questions (items) to measure the client's relational preference 
were derived from six dimensions based on the conceptual framework of MacneiJ (1980) and 
further conceptualized and empirically tested in published research, in the above mentioned 
literature. 
To test the second condition for a summated scale, we assessed the unidimentionality of our 
20 re1ational preference items using exploratory factor analysis (FA), in SPSS. The Rotated 
Component Matrix in our FA (Table 4.7) did not indicate high item loadings under any of 
the six conceptually designed dimensions: Focus, Solidarity, Power, Role, Flexibility, and 
Mutuality. For the dimensions with moderately high item loadings, the inter-item correlation 
was not high enough to justify multiple dimensions. 
We are not surprised that the items in our study did not load under factors simiJar to the 
studies from where we borrowed our measures (Fink et al., 2007; Kaufman and Dant, 1992; 
Rokkan et al., 2003). The respondents in these studies were from different industries and 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds; these differences can easily result in different 
FA results (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). More importantly, the individu al factors 
(dimensions) are less important for our study as we are not interested in a multi-dimensional 
measurement but rather a single measure to quantify a re1ational (RA) or transactional (TA) 
approach. Therefore, what is important to conclude from our FAis that no particular factor 
structure, with highly correlated items under any one factor (dimension), are present. In the 
absence of a clear factor structure, it is then recommended to study the measurement 
instrument as a multi-item scale to measure unidimensiona1ity (Hoyle et al., 2002). 
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Table 4.7
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (FA)
 
Rotated Component Matrix
 
Component
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FOCPREFI 0,430 0,333 
FOCPREF2 0,876 
FOCPREF3 0,369 0,662 
SOLPREFI 0,738 
SOLPREF2 0,687 
SOLPREF3 0,839 
SOLPREF4 0,491 0,412 
SOLPREF5 0,311 0,751 
SOLPREF6 0,478 0,365 
POWPREFI 0,436 -0,413 
POWPREF2 0,709 
ROLPREFI 0,810 
ROLPREF2 0,826 
ROLPREF3 0,648 0,347 
FLEPREFI 0,731 
FLEPREF2 0,694 
FLEPREF3 0,646 
MUTPREFI -0,548 
MUTPREF2 0,492 -0,362 
MUTPREF3 0,741 
To fU11her our analysis of unidimensionality, we analyze our twenty items, individually, and 
test the correlations of the individual items with the total score (Corrected item-total corr.) 
Among our 20 items, 18 are positively correlated, while one item approaches °(solpref3 
item to total corr. = 0,0085), and one item is negatively correlated (mutpre3 item to total 
corr. = -0,0539) (Table 4.8). 
8 
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Table 4.8
 
Relational Preference (20 items)
 
Corrected StandardizedItem ValidN Scale Range Scale Mean Item-total 
19 Apha20 
corr. 
Focpref 1 306 0-1585 961,39 0,3346 
Focpref2 306 0-1585 836,47 0,1393 
FocprefJ 306 0-1585 807,01 0,4162 
Solpref! 306 0-1585 1238,24 0,2985 
Solpref2 306 0-1585 1389,26 0,3081 
SolprefJ 306 0-1585 246,37 0,0085 
Solpref4 306 0-1585 1231,44 0,3847 
Solpref5 306 0-1585 1291,60 0,2786 
Solpref6 306 0-1585 1298,53 0,1950 
Powprefl 306 0-1585 1255,21 0,2095 
Powpref2 306 0-1585 1087,68 0,0982 
Rolprefl 306 0-1585 1111,93 0,4561 
Rolpref2 306 0-1585 1055,64 0,4996 
RolprefJ 306 0-1585 830,52 0,4331 
Fleprefl 306 0-1585 1244,93 0,3728 
Flepref2 306 0-1585 1132,58 0,1731 
FleprefJ 306 0-1585 1131,99 0,2251 
Mutpref! 306 0-1585 970,39 0,1835 
Mutpref2 306 0-1585 1076,29 0,2026 
MutprefJ 306 0-1585 549,44 -0,0539 
Relpre20 306 0-1585 1037,3521 0,6851 
\9 SPss uses four decimal points for the Corrected \tem- lOtal corr. scores 
2U We use the standardized alpha since our item scores are summed to form a scale score (Cortina, 1993). 
21 This score is a mean of the 20 variables. 
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Removing the variables that approach 0, or negatively correlated, increases the reliability of 
a scale (Churchill, 1979). In addition to the quantitative reasons for removing solprefJ and 
mutprefJ, we also provide contextual justification for their removal. The solprefJ item 
measures the client's preference for an arm's length relationship. This is a reverse item; high 
scores represent a transactional preference and low scores represent a relational preference. 
An arm's Iength relationship, in the Relational Marketing literature has been shown to be 
present in a transactional relationship between buyers and sellers (Gronroos, 1991; 1994). 
However, in the audit industry certain regulations characterize the audit-client relationship, 
which is different From other typical buyer-seller relationships (CICA, 2006) (as explained in 
the Conceptual Framework). The auditor has the responsibility of maintaining a certain level 
of independence with their client, and the client is encouraged by the auditor to respect this 
responsibility (CICA, 2006). Therefore, it is contextually and statistically justified that a low 
score for this arm length item is not necessarily indicative of a transactional preference but 
rather a unique characteristic of the client-audit relationship. Accordingly, we will remove 
this item from the scale. 
The second problematic item, mutprefJ, is negatively correlated with the total score. This 
item measures how intensely the client prefers monitoring the auditor. In the Relationship 
Marketing literature when a buyer monitors their supplier, they are showing more of a 
transactional than relational approach with their supplier (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995). 
However, in the audit industry the client's management team monitors their financial 
functions, including their internai controls. ln addition, they monitor their year-end financial 
audit to assure that controls are operating as intended (Arens et al., 2007). Unlike the more 
typical buyer-seller relationships, where supplier monitoring represents Jow trust and 
therefore a transactional approach, monitoring of the auditor by the client is part of the 
client's financia! function. Therefore, it is contextually and statistically justified to remove 
this item from the overall scale. 
With the removal of two items, we determine a new 18 item scale (see Table 4.9). The single 
mean score of this 18-item scale is our Relational Preference variable defined as relpref 
which is used to test our main hypothesis (H 1). The relpref is the variable we use to test for 
associations with our secondary variables (H2, H3 and H4). The 18 items have positive item 
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to total correlations and a total Cronbach Alpha of 0,7208, with a single summated mean of 
1108,40 on a scale of 0-1585 (Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9
 
Relational Preference (18 items: solprefJ and mutprefJ are removed)
 
Variable ValidN 
Focpref 1 306 
Focpref2 306 
FocprefJ 306 
Solprefl 306 
Solpref2 306 
Solpref4 306 
Solpref5 306 
Solpref6 306 
Powprefl 306 
Powpref2 306 
Rolprefl 306 
Rolpref2 306 
RolprefJ 306 
Fleprefl 306 
Flepref2 306 
FleprefJ 306 
Mutprefl 306 
Mutpref2 306 
Relpref 306 
Scale Range 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
0-1585 
Scale Mean 
Corrected 
Item-total 
corr. 
Standardized 
Apha 
961,39 0,3173 
836,47 0,1372 
807,01 0,3883 
1238,24 0,3055 
1389,26 0,3342 
1231,44 0,3914 
1291,60 0,3000 
1298,53 0,1939 
1255,21 0,2388 
1087,68 0,1316 
1111,93 0,4883 
1055,64 0,5167 
830,52 0,4171 
1244,93 0,3909 
1132,58 0,1722 
1131,99 0,2525 
970,39 0,1686 
1076,29 0,2141 
1108,40 0,7208 
To justify the summation of our ]8-item scale (Table 4.9), we review the four conditions for 
summation by Hair et al. (2006). Firstly, each of our items was developed based on the 
conceptual framework of Macneil (1980) and further developed and operationalized in 
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various literature, as mentioned above. Secondly, we conclude, after running exploratory FA, 
that our individual items are not measuring other constructs and could be assumed 
unidimensional. We also show the unidimensionality of 18 of the 20 items with item to total 
correlations, which are positively contributing to the overall single relational score. Thirdly, 
our Cronbach Alpha of the 18 items scale is 0,7208 which is a satisfactory level of reliability 
(Boslaugh and Watters, 2008; Hair et al., 2006). Fourthly, similar to our first condition, we 
show Construct Validity by using a scale where the items are derived from a conceptual 
framework that has been operationalized and further developed by published research. 
Further empirical evidence in the Relationship Marketing literature confirms that our 
summation of relational items, derived from Macneil's (1980), is consistent with other 
studies. For example, Paulin et al. (1997) based her measurement of relationalism on four of 
Macnei l' s (1980) relational dimensions: Role integrity (1 2 items), Communication (10 
items), Flexibility (10 items) and Solidarity (10 items); and she used the arithmetic mean for 
these 42 questions to arrive at a single mean score. Fink et al. (2007) used the same six 
dimensions as in our study: Focus, Power, Solidarity, Role, Flexibility, and Mutuality. With 
four items within each of their six dimensions, Fink et al. (2007) derived a relational score 
from the arithmetic mean of the 24 items. In addition, RoHan and Haugland (2000) argue 
that Macneil's relational dimensions originate from a single construct referred to as 
relationliasm, which was supported by the work of Noordewier et al. (1990) and Heide 
(1994). 
With these studies, we show, along with our statistical analysis, that the 18 items, making up 
the six Relational Preference dimensions, measure different parts of the relationship 
preference construct. By summing together ail the items that make up the six dimensions we 
cancel out error components of each item whi le strengthening the true construct component 
of each item (Hoyle et al., 2004). Therefore, our measure of the client's Relational 
Preference (relpref) is the arithmetic mean of 18 items which gives a single mean score of 
1108.40 on a scale of 0-1585 for 306 observations (Table 4.9). 
ln addition, we further test for the nomological validity of our reJationship preference 
construct. Nomological validity determines if a measure represents what it should measure, 
based on prior theory, or prior empirical research (Hair et al., 2006.). Two methods are 
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recommended. Firstly, variables within the research mode l, that theoretically should 
correlate together, are tested. Secondly, the correlation of variables, outside of the model, 
based on theoretical justification, is tested (if possible) (Hair et al., 2006). 
The 18 items, making up our Relational Preference measure, are derived from dimensions 
theoretically developed by Macneil (1974; 1978; 1980; 1981; 1983). These Relational 
Preference dimensions are further conceptualized on a Transactional-Relational continuum 
by Dwyer et al. (1987) and empirically tested by Ferguson et al.(2005); Fink et al. (2007); 
Kaufman and Dant (1992), Paulin et al. (1997; 2000); Rokkan and Haugland (2000). This 
Transactional-Relational continuum is considered the most comprehensive conceptual model 
to understand relational exchange (Nevin, 1995 cited by Paulin et al., 2000). 
Macneil's (1978; 1980; 1981; 1983) six relational dimensions have been conceptualized to 
move in the same direction (correlated). Therefore, we test the six dimensions (Solidarity, 
Role, Focus, Power, Mutuality, and Flexibility) from which our individual items are derived. 
The results are presented in Table 4.10. Using the Pearson Correlation, the matrix shows that 
most of the dimensions are significantly correlated. Out of a possible 15 different 
associations, only 3 are not significantly correlated (MUTPREF-POWPREF, FOCPREF­
POWPREF, FLEFPREF-POWPREF). Kaufman and Dant (1992) had similar results with 
dimension correlations. The authors claim the correlations support Macneil's (1980) 
Relational Exchange Theory. Therefore, we confirm that the items we are using to measure 
relational preference show strong nomologicaJ validity. In addition, the positive inter­
dimension correlations (Figure 4.10) strengthen the internai consistency and further supports 
the reliability of our relational preference (relpref) measurement. 
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Table 4.10 
Dimension Correlations 
SOLPREF ROLPREF FOCPREF POWPREF MUTPREF FLEPREF 
Pearson Correlation 1 0,358(**) 0,204(**) 0,255(**) 0,272(**) 0,329(**) 
SOLPREF Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Pearson Correlation 0,358(**) 1 0,335(**) 0,194(**) 0,128(*) 0,217(**) 
ROLPREF Sig. (2-tai led) 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,025 0,000 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Pearson Correlation 0,204(**) 0,335(**) 1 0,065 0,162(**) 0,120(*) 
FOCPREF Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,260 0,005 0,036 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Pearson Correlation 0,255(* *) 0,194(**) 0,065 1 -0,037 0,096 
POWPREF Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,001 0,260 0,522 0,094 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Pearson Correlation 0,272(**) 0,128(*) 0,162(**) -0,037 1 0,339(**) 
MUTPREF Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,025 0,005 0,522 0,000 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Pearson Correlation 0,329(**) 0,217(**) 0,120(*) 0,096 0,339(**) 1 
FLEPREF Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,000 0,036 0,094 0,000 
N 306 306 306 306 306 306 
*>1< Correlation is signi ficant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
96 
4.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF SECONDARY VARIABLES 
Our secondary variables (Risk Aversion, Ethics of Care and Locus of Control) are used to 
test our three secondary hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4). 
We tested for the reliability of the secondary variables, using the Cronbach Alpha. The Risk 
Aversion (risk) variable has an Alpha of 0,8224, the Ethics of Care (care) variable has an 
Alpha of 0,7033, and the Locus of Control (loc) variable has an Alpha of 0,6458 (Table 
4.11). The Cronbach alphas for the three variables are considered satisfactory (Hair et al. 
2006). 
Table 4.11
 
Reliability ofthree Secondary Variables
 
Variable Participants Number Scale Cronbach Alpha 
(N) of items 
Risk Aversion (risk) (H2) 306 8 0-1585 0,8224
 
Eth ics of Care(care) (H3) 306 6 0-1585 0,7033
 
Locus ofControl(loc) (H4) 306 14 0-14 0,6458
 
Validity assures that a scale measures the construct ofinterest. One form ofValidity is Face or 
Construct val id ity, which depends on the theoretical representation of each construct (Hair et 
al., 2006). The validity of our secondary variables is demonstrated by the fact that Risk 
Aversion, Ethics of Care and Locus of Control have been borrowed from other empiricaJ and 
conceptual work and have not been modified in this study (Liddell, 1990; Rotter, 1966; Siovic, 
1972). The three personal characteristic variables were also tested for nomological validity. 
The Risk Aversion measure includes 8 items, which show high internai consistency with 
significant inter~item correlations as predicted by the original theory (Rotter, 1966). Other data 
collected in our study, outside of our main model, correJate with the Risk Aversion construct. 
When the Risk Aversion construct is correlated against the demographic data, there are 
significant correlations with the years of experience in both the respondents' position (RISK­
EXPPOS, r = 0.219, P = 0,000) and the respondents' area ofwork (RISK-EXPWORK, 
r = 0,183, P = 0.001) (Table 4.12). 
97
 
Table 4.12
 
Correlations of secondary variables with demographics
 
GENDER IEXPPOS EXPWORK FIRM LGTH SERVICE FEEAUD DATE RISK CARE LOC 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 0,\01 0,091 0,007 0,074 -0,027 0,087 0,002 -0,074 -0,036 -0,053 
, 
GENDER Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,082 0,115 0,909 0,204 0,646 0,139 0,979 0,202 0,536 0,355 
1 N 301 301 299 271 292 301 294 301 301 301 30\ 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,101 1 0,837(**) -0,029 0,194(**) 0,006 -0,039 0,076 0,219(**) 0,201(**) 0,010 
, 
EXPPOS Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,082 0,000 0,636 0,00\ 0,915 0,507 0,190 0,000 0,000 0,866 
1 N 301 301 299 271 292 30\ 294 30\ 301 301 301 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,091 0,837(**) 1 -0,093 0,045 -0,019 -0,024 0,120(*) 0,183(**) 0,213(**) 0,049 
•EXPWORK. Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,115 0,000 0,126 0,449 0,748 0,684 0,038 0,001 0,000 0,396 
N 299 299 299 270 290 299 292 299 299 299 299 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,007 -0,029 -0,093 1 0,012 0,121(*) 0,079 -0,025 0,042 0,032 0,027 
: 
FIRM Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,909 0,636 0,126 0,841 0,046 0,199 0,677 0,493 0,598 0,655 
1 
1 N 271 271 270 271 265 271 264 271 271 271 271 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,074 0,194(**) 0,045 0,012 1 -0,036 -0,086 0,060 0,089 0,089 -0,038 
, 
LGTH Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,204 0,001 0,449 0,841 0,545 0,\48 0,310 0,131 0,128 0,518 
N 292 292 290 265 292 292 285 292 292 292 292 
1 
Pearson 
Correlation -0,027 0,006 -0,019 0,121 (*) -0,036 1 0,033 -0,071 0,019 -0,019 -0,013 
, 
Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,646 0,915 0,748 0,046 0,545 0,578 0,220 0,738 0,748 0,829 
SERVICE 
1 
N 301 301 299 271 292 301 294 301 301 301 301 
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GENDER EXPPOS EXPWORK FIRM LGTH SERVICE FEEAUD DATE RISK CARE LOC 
, 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,087 -0,039 -0,024 0,079 -0,086 0,033 1 0,068 0,025 -0,009 0,053 
1 
FEEAUD Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,139 0,507 0,684 0,199 0,148 0,578 0,242 0,663 0,876 0,363 
N 294 294 292 264 285 294 299 299 299 299 299 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,002 0,076 0,120(*) -0,025 0,060 -0,071 0,068 1 -0,052 0,030 -0,005 
DATE Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,979 0,190 0,038 0,677 0,310 0,220 0,242 0,361 0,601 0,934 
N 301 301 299 271 292 301 299 306 306 306 306 
Pearson 
Correlation -0,074 0,219(**) 0,183(**) 0,042 0,089 0,019 0,025 -0,052 1 0,176(**) 0,140(*) 
, 
RISK 
, 
Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,202 0,000 0,001 0,493 0,131 0,738 0,663 0,361 0,002 0,014 
N 301 301 299 271 292 301 299 306 306 306 306 
Pearson 
Correlation -0,036 0,201 (* *) 0,213(**) 0,032 0,089 -0,019 -0,009 0,ü30 0,176(* *) 1 0,139(*) 
1 
CARE 
, 
Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,536 0,000 0,000 0,598 0,128 0,748 0,876 0,601 0,002 0,015 
N 301 301 299 271 292 301 299 306 306 306 306 
Pearson 
Correlation -0,053 0,010 0,049 0,027 -0,038 -0,013 0,053 -0,005 0,140(*) 0,139(*) 1 
. 
LOC Sig. (2­
tailed) 0,355 . 0,866 0,396 0,655 0,518 0,829 0,363 0,934 0,014 0,015 
1 
N 301 301 299 271 292 301 299 306 306 306 306 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Studies in economics and finance have shown that inexperienced managers take higher risks 
and that risk aversion increases with increases in experience (Graham, 1999; Li, 2002; 
Menkholf et al., 2006). Therefore, the significant correlation of our Risk Aversion construct 
with the experience of our candidates is consistent with prior studies, which lends support to 
the nomological validity of the Risk Aversion construct. 
The Ethics of Care variable does not correJate significantly with the overall relational 
preference measure (r = -0,003; p = 0,957); however, it does correlate significantly with tv'Io 
measurement items in the overall reJationaJ preference measure: Focprefl (r = 0,164, 
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p = 0,004) and Solpref4 (r = 0,132, p = 0,021) (see Table 5.11, following chapter). Focprefl 
measures the audit client's preference for the relationship to be more important than the 
actual audit service; and Solpref4 measures the audit c1ient's preference for along-term 
relationship. The Ethics of Care variable is a measure of Moral Reasoning with a focus on 
the importance of long-term relationships over contracts and universal rules (Gilligan, 1993). 
Therefore, the correlation of the Ethics of Care variable with two Relational Preference items 
lends support to the nomological validity of the Ethics of Care variable. 
In addition to nomological validity, we tested for discriminate validity by correlating the six 
Ethics of Care items with the six Justice items. More precisely, we measured the audit 
client's Ethics of Care with a 12-item questionnaire (Appendix E); six of these twelve 
questions measured care, while the other six questions justice. We followed the same method 
as Liddell (1990) using the pen and pencil MMO method to measure the Ethics of Care. The 
six justice items were not theoretically expected to correlate with the six care items. Similar 
to Liddell (1990) the correlation analysis between the summed six-item care measure and 
summed six-item justice measure did not show positive correlation, lending support to 
discriminate validity (r= -0,454, p = 0,000)( Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13 
Care-Justice corre lations 
CARENEW JUST 
1Pearson Correlation ] -0,454(**) 
CARENEW Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 
N 306 306 
Pearson Correlation -0,454(**) ] 
JUST Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 
N 306 306 
1 ** Correlation is signific~nt at the 0.01 level (2-tai led). 
The results of the Locus of Control variable show our study's participants with an internai 
locus of control (significantly different from the midpoint; 4,84, which is 2,16 units below 
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the scale midpoint of 7,00). Past research has investigated managers' level of locus of 
control, and there is some evidence of higher-Ievel employees showing internaI locus of 
control (Forte, 2005). The explanation for this relationship is that individuals with high self­
esteem and desire for job satisfaction (internai versus externat) are more likely to be 
promoted to higher-level positions (Forte, 2005). We directed our survey to managers who 
manage their auditor relationships. The exact wording in our cover letter is "If you are not 
responsible for managing the relationship with your company's auditor would you kindly 
transfer this document to the individual that has this responsibility" (see Appendix A). In our 
demographic data questions, we did not ask for the exact position of our respondents. 
However, for a participant to manage a relationship with their auditor, their position would 
have to be high-Ievel. The results of our study, showing respondents with an internaI rather 
than external Locus of Control could be explained by the high-Ievel position of our 
respondents, which is consistent with prior research (Forte, 2005), adding to the nomological 
validity of the Locus of Control variable. 
To show additional nomolgical validity support, in Section 5.4, we present psychological 
tests that have shown positive correlations between an individual 's Locus of Control and 
their level of Risk Aversion (Ekelund et al. 2005). The Locus of Control and Risk Aversion 
variables are positively correlated (r = 0,143 and p = 0,012) (further discussed in Section 
5.4). 
4.7
 NORMALITY OF RELATIONAL PREFERENCE VARIABLE AND THE 
SECONDARY VARlABLES 
We tested for the normality of our 18-item scale. Our single dimension scale (relpref) is 
normally distributed (K-S = 0,046, P = 0,200). In addition, we tested to see if our secondary 
data set fits a normal distribution. The results of our test ofNormality show that aIl variables 
are normally distributed (Risk: K-S = 0,031, P = 0,200) (Care: K-S = 0,046, P = 0,200) 
except for the Locus of Control variable (K-S = 0,115, P = 0,000) (Table 4.14). We wi Il use 
the parametric T-test to test the two normally distributed variables (Risk Aversion and Ethics 
of Care) and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum to test non-normally distributed 
variable (Locus of Control) recommended by Boslaugh and Watters (2008) and Field (2005). 
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4.8 
Table 4.14
 
Tests ofNormality
 
Kolmogorov Shapiro­
-Smirnov Wilk 
Statistic d Sig. Statistic d Sig. 
RlSK 0,031 285 0,20C 0,994 285 0,301 
CARE 0,046 285 0,20C 0,992 285 0,155 
LOC 0,115 285 o,ooe 0,966 285 0,000 
* This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
NüN-RESPüNDENT BIAS 
Non-response bias is measured in different ways. Determining whether there is non-response 
rate bias is to determine how the overall results would have been different ifnon-respondents 
would have responded (Creswell, 2003). Celtain methods to verify non-respondent bias were 
not possible such as contacting the non-respondents to determine if their answers were 
different from the respondents. Since respondents were assured anonymity, wedo not know 
who responded and who did not respond. Another widely used method is based on the 
assumption that those who respond the latest are almost non-respondents (Creswell, 2003). 
Therefore, we have analyzed our data monthly, over a four-month period to see if there is a 
difference in the results. Since the majority of the questionnaires arrived in December 2008, 
we have separated our respondents in two groups: one group for December 2008 (77, J0%) 
and a second group for January-March, 2009 (22, 90%). To compare the means of the two 
groups we first tested to determine if the distribution of the reception of questionnaires was 
normally distributed. The distribution of questionnaires received over the period of 
December through March was not normally distributed with the majority of questionnaires 
received in December. We conducted the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, wh.ich was highJy 
significant, indicating that the distribution is not normal. Therefore, to test to see if the 
respondents in the first group (December) had significantly different results from the second 
group (January-March) we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We compare the 
results of our four variables of interest. For each of the four variables the means of the two 
groups are not significantly different: Relational Preference (l = -1,753, P = 0,080), Risk 
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Aversion (Z = -0,0850, P = 0,395), Ethics of Care (Z = -0,291, P = 0,779), and Locus of 
Control (Z = -0,060, p = 0,952) (see Table 4.15). Therefore, we conclude that there is no 
late-response bias and therefore no non-response bias. 
Table 4.15 
Non-parametric test for non-response bias 
RELPREF RISK CARE LOC 
Mann-Whitney U 7120,500 7707,500 8077,500 8221,000 
Wilcoxon W 35086,500 10192,500 36043,500 10706,000 
Z -1,753 -0,850 -0,281 -0,060 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed 0,080 0,395 0,779 0,952 
A Groupll1g Variable: DATE 
4.9
 INFLUENCE OF CORPORATE AND PERSONAL INFORMATION ON MAIN 
VARIABLES 
The Corporate and Personal information (demographic information) was separated into 
groups based on logical pre-established groups such as male (men)/female (women) for 
gender and big-four/non-big four for the audit firm. Other data were divided according to the 
median presented in Table 4.2. Other similar studies determined the influence of 
demographic data on their principle variables of interest by diving demographic data in 
groups separated by the median (Blanchette, 2001; Paulin et al., 1997; 2000). 
4.9.1
 Gender 
Basing their studies on Feminist theory, researchers have argued and empirically shown that 
gender influences the type of relationship between two individuals (Gilligan, 1993). 
However, empirical relational studies have shown no differences among female and male 
participants in regards to being relational or justice oriented (Pratt et al., 2004; Skoe et al., 
1998; Skoe and Lippe, 2002). Therefore, we have controlled for gender by determining if 
there is a gender influence on the four variables of interest. The results are presented in Table 
4.16. Consistent with past research, we did not find significant differences in the mean scores 
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controlled for gender. On a scale ofO-1585, the means for the Relational Preference (relpref) 
were 1098,30 for females and 1110,13 for males (t = -0,602, P = 0,548); the means for Risk 
Aversion (risk) were 650,91 for females and 613,79 for males (t = l,280, P = 0,202); the 
means for Ethics of Care (care) were 563,38 for females and 549,80 for males (t = 0,619, 
p = 0,536); and finally, on a scale of 0-14, the means for the Locus of Control (loc) were 
157,32 for females and 148,22 for males (Z = -0,842, P = 0,400). Therefore, we can conclude 
that gender does not influence our four variables of interest. 
4.9.2 Experience in Position, Experience in Area ofwork and Time with Firm 
The element of time is a critical factor in determining relational exchanges and transactiona1 
exchanges. Therefore, we collected data regarding the time duration that cl ients were in their 
current position, in their area of work, and the time they have been doing business with their 
audit firms. These three time control variables are shown in Table 4.16 and defined as 
Exp.Position (years), Exp.Area of wark (years) and Time with firm (years). We measured ta 
see if these three demographic variables significantly influence our four variables of interest. 
The influence of the number of years of experience in the area of work on our four variables 
was insignificant: for relpref: t = 0,154, P = 0,878; for risk: t = 0,315, P = 0,753; for care: 
t = 0,719, P = 0,783; and far loc: Z = -0,949, p = 0,342. The influence of the amount of time 
spent with their audit firm on the four variables was also insignificant: for relpref: t = -0,957, 
P = 0,339; for risk: t = -1,514, P = 0,131; for care: t = -1,528, P = 0,128; and for loc: 
Z= -0,254, P = 0,799. 
The amount of time spent in the respondent's actual position had a slightly significant 
influence on the respondent's level of Risk Aversion. Respondents that have more than nine 
years of experience have a slightly higher level of Risk Aversion (mean = 647,74, scale 0­
1585) versus the level of Risk Aversion for respondents that have less than nine years of 
experience (mean = 594,73, scale 0-1585). The difference between these two means is 
slightly significant (t = -2,016, P = 0,045). When differences are slightly significant using the 
T-test, it is recommended to calculate the effect size to see is the effect is important. To 
determine an effect size, the t-statistic is converted into a correlation coefficient (l'), where 
l' = 0.10 is a small effect, l' = 0,30 is a medium effect, and l' = 0,50 is a large effect (Field, 
2005). The effect size of the influence of amount of time spent in the respondent's position 
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on Risk Aversion is r = 0,0135. The respondents years spent in their position explains 1,35% 
of the total Risk Aversion variable. Since the effect size is less than 10% it is considered a 
small effect (Field 2005); therefore, we will not control for this demographic variable. 
4.9.3 Services 
Relationship Marketing research has shown that customers that prefer relationships will tend 
to buy more services (Gronroos, 1997; 2000). Therefore, we separate our respondents into 
those that pay their auditor for mostly audit services (audit fees over 95%) and respondents 
that pay for other services (audit fees less than 95%) (Table 4.16). The reason we chose 95% 
to separate the particiapants was because 95% is the median percentage. Since we want to 
determine if there is an influence of services on our four variables of interest, the median 
provided a fairly equal number of participants in two groups. The percentage of fees paid to 
the auditor did not significantly influence our four variables: p values for relpref= 0,345; 
risk = 0,663; care = 0,876 and loc = 0,197. We asked respondents to indicate if they also 
used the Notice to Reader service instead of the Audit or Review Engagement service (Table 
4.16). There were very few respondents (5/306=1,63%) and there were no significant 
difference in the results between the participants that used Notice to Reader services versus 
those participants who use the Audit or Review Engagement services: p values for 
relpref= 0,256; risk = 0,738; care = 0,748 and loc = 0,697. 
4.9.4 Size of audit firm 
Research in Relationship Marketing show that smaller suppliers are. more relational, and 
larger suppliers are more transactional (Gummesson, 2002). Therefore, we have separated 
our respondents into big-four and non-big four firms (see Table 4.16). The type of firm did 
not significantly influence our four variables: p values for relpref= 0,535; risk = 0,493; 
care = 0,598; loc = 0,879. 
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Table 4.16
 
Comparison of the means of variables separated in function of demograph ic data.
 
Demographie Variable	 relpref Risk care LOc22 
Gender 
Female N= 92 mean 1098,30 650,91 563,38 157.32 
MaleN=209 mean 1110,13 613,79 549,80 148.22 
Test t = -0,602	 t = 1,280 t = 0,619 Z=-0,842 
Significance p = 0,548 p = 0,202 P = 0,536 p=0,400 
Exp.Position (years) 
0-8 yrs N= 147 mean 1097,89 594,73 545,46 154.12 
9 + yrs N=152 mean 1116,13 647,74 556,53 146.01 
Test t = -1,002 t = -2,016 1= 0,558 Z = 0,,812 
Significance p = 0,317 p = 0,045 p = 0,577 P =0,414 
Exp.Area ofwork (years) 
0-24 yrsN=135 mean 1107,12 627,40 553,98 143,86 
25 + yrs N=162	 mean 1104,31 619,01 548,45 153,29 
Test (=0,154 t= 0,315 t=0,719 Z=-O,949 
Significance p=0,878 p=0,753 p=0,783 p=0,342 
Time with firm (years)
 
0-9 yrs N= 136 Mean 1097,92 603,51 538,14 147,83
 
9.5 + yrs N=156 Mean 1115,52 644,84 569,59 145,34 
Test (=-0,957 (=-1,514 (=-1,528 Z=-0,254 
Significance p=0,339 p=0,131 p=0,128 p=0,799 
Type of firm 
Big4 N=119 Mean 1104,20 617.38 550,08 135,19 
Non-Big 4 N= 152 Mean J 115,92 637.29 561,59 136,63 
Test t=-0,621	 t=-0,687 1=-0,528 Z=-0,152 
Significance p=0,535 p=0,493 P=0,598 p=0,879 
Service 
Audit-Review N=296 Mean 1105,18 624.55 554,37 151,25 
Notice N=5 Mean 1185,72 659,63 528.92 136,10 
Test t=-1,138	 t=-0,335 t=O,322 Z=-0,389 
Significance p=0,256 p=0,738 p=0,748 p=0,697 
Fees Audit (Rev) 
0-95% audit (rev) N=155 Mean 1115,90 621,68 553,00 143,83 
95% plus audit (rev) N= 144 Mean 1098,86 633,47 549,81 156,65 
T Value t=0,945 (=-0,437 t=0,157 Z=-1,291 
Significance p=0,345 p=0,663 p=0,876 p=0,197 
To summarize, we tested the criteria necessary to summate a multi-item scale. The results of 
our analysis justified the summation of 18 items to arrive at a single mean score for the 
variable used to test Hl: Relational Preference (relpref). Our measurement is consistent with 
other published research using similar relational dimensions, derived from the same 
conceptual framework. Our main variable (relpref) is normally distributed and meets the 
"The Locus ofConirol variable has a non -normal distribution therefore the Wilcoxon test was used to lest for significant 
di fferences. 
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criteria for reliability and validity. Our three secondary variables are drawn from pnor 
studies and have not been modified in our study. The levels of reliability and validity are 
satisfactolY for ail three variables. Risk Aversion and Ethics of Care are normally distributed 
but the Locus of Control variable is not. Therefore, we use a non-parametric test when 
testing the Locus of Control hypothesis. In addition, none of the Corporate and Personal 
information had any significant influence on the four variables of interest; therefore, we do 
not control for them in the following section. 
5.1 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, we test our main hypothesis (Hl) and our secondary hypotheses (H2, H3 and 
H4). 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
The main hypothesis of the study is that the audit client will prefer a more relational (RA) 
than transactional (TA) approach with their auditor (H 1). The first 20 questions of our 
questionnaire were used to determine the respondent's relational preference. From the 
analysis conducted in the previous Chapter IV, we determined that 18 of the 20 questions are 
retained to test the main hypothesis and that the 18 items would be summated into a single 
mean score defined as the Relational Preference variable (relpref). 
In addition, in the previous section, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, we detennined that 
the distribution of our Relational Preference variable (relpref) was normal. Therefore, to 
verify Hl we use a dependent t-test (parametric test). In addition, to validate further our 
hypothesis we use the Wilcoxon signed rank test (the non-parametric equivalent of the 
dependent t-test). Even when data is normally distributed, when responses are measured 
using ordinal scales, the Wilcoxon test is recommended (Boslaugh and Watters, 2008; Field, 
2005). 
The scale used for the relational preference items has a range of 0 (Transactional) to 1585 
(Relational), with a midpoint of 792,50. Therefore, for levels significantly greater than the 
792,50 mid-point we conclude that the audit client's preference is more relational (RA) than 
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transactional (TA). For levels significantly less than the 792,50 midpoint we conclude that 
the audit client's preference is more transactional (TA) than relational (RA). 
Other similar studies used scale midpoints as a point of reference for determining Relational 
(RA) or Transactional (TA) relationships. Elbekkali and Pilote (2004) investigated the 
auditor's relational preference with their clients and used a VAS scale mid-point to 
determine if the auditor used a more relational (RA) or transactionaJ (TA) approach. 
Significant differences between respondent average scores and the scale midpoint were 
found using a T-test and a P-test. In addition, other studies that used similar relational 
measures used the scale midpoint to determine high or low levels of relational ism (Paulin et 
al., 1997; 2000). 
In 306 cases the single mean Relational Preference (relpref) score is 1108,40 units (on a 
scale of 0-1585). The minimum mean score is 559,44 units and the maximum mean score is 
1553,61 units with a standard deviation of 156,56 units. Therefore, with a midpoint of 
792,50 units and a mean score of 1108,40, we conduct a parametric paired-sample T-test to 
see if there is a significant difference between the mean single score and the midpoint on our 
VAS relational scale. The results of the test show that the Relational Preference mean score 
(1108,40) is significantly higher than the midpoint (792,50) (t = 35,297, P = 0,000). 
We also conduct the non-parametric equivalent of the Paired Samples T-test using the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (SPSS). In 298 cases (out of a total of 306 cases) the relational 
preference mean score exceeded the relational preference midpoint (relpref > prefmid); and 
in 8 cases the relational preference mean score was below the relational preference 
(relpref < prefmid). The results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank shows that the Relational 
Preference variable (relpref) is signifïcantly higher than the scaJe midpoint (relmid) (Z = ­
15,020 and p = 0,000). 
The parametric and non-parametric tests show the audit client signifïcantly prefers a more 
relational (RA) than transactional (TA) approach with their auditor (HI). We further test 
Hypothesis 1 by looking at the number of respondents which are above the scale midpoint 
(792,50) versus the number of respondents which are below the scale midpoint, as weIl as 
the number of participants which are very close to the scale midpoint (neither above nor 
below the midpoint). To determine the cases that are neither above nor below the midpoint 
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we calculate the precision interval: a method used in Auditing when determining the degree 
of precision in sampling (Cormier, 2003). The interval between two points is derived from 
the Poisson distribution (Boslaugh and Watters, 2008) using the following formula: 
Precision interval = (Total units of measure*Degree of Precision) / Confidence factor 
(Cormier, 2003, pg 65). The degree of precision is a pre-established level, which represents a 
presumption of sampling errors. In audit, sampling errors are set between 0% and 5%, with 
the maximum not usually exceeding 5%. We use the maximum 5% as the degree of 
precision in our calculation to be conservative. And 5% is often used as an approximation 
criterion for Jevels of significance, such as the Fisher's criterion (Field 2005; Hair et al., 
2006). We set the confidence factor at 95%, which is the typical level set in statistical 
analysis (Field, 2005). A confidence factor of 95% results in a confidence factor of 3 
(Cormier, 2003). Using the formula for the Precision interval presented above, we determine 
the following precision interval: Precision intervaJ= (1585 units >;< 5%)/3 = 26,42 units. 
Therefore, respondents that fall within the range of plus or minus 26,42 units from the 
midpoint (792,50) are considered neither relational (RA) nor transactional (TA) 
(792,50 ± 26,42). More precisely, respondents within the range of 766,08 - 818,92 are 
neither relational (RA) nor transactional (TA). The total mean scores of each of the 306 
participants are shown in Appendix 1. 
Table 5.1 23
 
Classification of Relationship Preferences
 
Relational Preference Mean (relpref) Frequency (N) Percentage % 
TransactionaJ (559.44 -766,08) 7 2.29% 
Neither TA nor RA (766,08 - 818,92) 5 1,63% 
ReJational (818,92-1553.61) 294 96.08% 
Total 306 100,00% 
The results of the classification in Table 5.1 show that the vast majority of respondents fall 
into the category of clients who prefer a more Relational Approach (RA) with their auditor 
23 This classification is Ilot meant to show statistical significance since the study's objective is not a cluster analysis; however, it 
is used to further support the parametric and non-parametric lests for HI. 
110 
(294/306 = 96,08%). The number of respondents who prefer a more Transactional approach 
with their auditor (TA) account for 2,29% (7/306) of the total sample; the respondents that 
are neither Relational (RA) nor Transactional (TA) account for 5 participants, 1,63% of the 
total sample (Table 5.1). To determine a statistical difference between the groups in respect 
to the number of participants, we test for significant differences among the three groups. We 
take the number of participants in each group and assign dichotomous data using 0-1 coding 
where participants are assigned the code 1, a method recommended by Boslaugh and Watters 
(2008). Therefore, we are able to calculate a group mean which is equivaJent to the 
percentage of participants which fall in each group. The frequency percentages in Table 5.1 
are equivalent to the means presented in Table 5.2. For the Transactional (TA) group there 
are 7 out of 306 respondents for a percentage of 2,29% (Table 5.1); therefore, a mean of 
0,0229 (Table 5.2). For the Neither Transactional (TA) nor Relational (RA) group there are 5 
out of 306 respondents for a percentage of 1,63% (Table 5.1); therefore, a mean of 0,0163 
(Table 5.2). For the Relational group there are 294 out of 306 respondents for a percentage 
of96,08% (Table 5.1), therefore a mean ofO,9608 (Table 5.2). We then compared the means 
of the three groups and the means were significantly different in ail three, with the highest 
significance in the Relational group (RA): for TA, t = 2,672, P = 0,008; for Neither TA nor 
RA, t = 2,251, P = 0,025 ; and for RA, t = 86,444, P = 0,000 (Table 5,3). 
Table 5.2
 
One-Sam pIe Statistics
 
Std. Std. Error N Mean 
.Deviation Mean 
TA 306 0,0229 0,14975 0,00856 
NüTTARA 306 0,0163 0,12699 0,00726 
RA 306 0,9608 0,19443 0,01 J Il 
III 
Table 5.3
 
One-Sample Test
 
Test Value 
=0 
95% 
Sig. (2- Mean Confidence 
t df tailed) Difference Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
TA 2,672 305 0,008 0,0229 0,0060 0,0397 
NOTTARA 2,251 305 0,025 0,0163 0,0021 0,0306 
RA 86,444 305 0,000 0,9608 0,9389 0,9827 
These results show that the Relational (RA) group, with 294 of 306 participants, IS 
significantly different than the Transactional (TA) group and the Neither Transactional nor 
Relational (NOTTARA) group. This analysis adds support to the parametric and non­
parametric tests that confirm that the audit client prefers a more Relational Approach (RA) 
over a TransactionaJ Approach (TA) with their auditor (Hl). 
Based on the parametric test (T-Test), the non-parametric test (WiJcoxon signed-rank) and 
the highly significant percentage of participants preferring a more Relational Approach (RA) 
with their auditor, we conclude that the audit client significantly prefers a more relational 
approach (RA) than a transactional approach (TA) with their auditor. Therefore, the main 
hypothesis (H 1) is sllpported. 
To understand fllrther the clients' preferences for the relational approach we test the 18 
individllal factors of our Relational preference variable (relpref) to identify the different 
levels of each factor and to see if ail factors are statistically different from the scale midpoint 
(relmid). The Paired Sample Tests of the 18 factors that make up the overall Relational 
Preference variable show factors that are statistically different from the midpoint. Of the 18 
factors, three factors (Focpref2, FocprefJ and RolprefJ) are not significantly different from 
the midpoint (Focpref2, t = 1,766, P= 0,078) (FocprefJ, t = 0,589, p = 0,556) (RolprefJ, 
t = 1,283, P = 0,200) (Table 5.4). The remaining 15 factors are significantly higher than the 
midpoint, ail p = 0,000 (Table 5.4). These three factors, which are not significantly different 
from the scale midpoint will be discussed in the following Chaptre VI, Discussion. In 
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addition, in Table 5.5, the scale mean of each of the 18 factors along with a brief 
characteristic definition of each factor is presented. The individual factors, which warrant 
further discussion will be do ne so in the following Chapter VI, Discussion. The distributions 
of the 15 factors, which are significantly higher than the midpoint, are presented in Table 
5.6. 
The individual item, solprefJ (Arm's Length), was dropped from the single mean score 
because it did meet the correlation requirements for a summated scale, as presented in the 
previous chapter. However, since the results of this item are relevant to the audit industry, 
we test its statistical significance in respect to the scale midpoint. The results show that the 
item, solprefJ, has a mean score of 246, 37, which is significantly lower than the scale 
midpoint (792, 50) (t = -28,564, P = 0,000). The results of solprefJ will be discussed further 
in the following section Chapter VI, Discussion. 
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Table 5.4 
Paired Samples Test (18 Items versus Midpoint) 
Paired 
Differences t Of 
Sig. (2­
tailed) 
95% 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Confidence 
Interval of 
the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 FOCPREF1 -RELMID 168,8889 386,20679 22,07797 125,4445 212,3333 7,650 30S 0,000 
Pair 2 FOCPREF2 -RELMID 43,9706 435,54578 24,89849 -S,0240 92,9652 1,766 30S 0,078 
Pair 3 FOCPREF3 ­RELMID 14,S098 430,S9391 24,61S42 -33,9277 62,9473 0,S89 305 0,SS6 
Pair 4 SOLPREF1 -RELMlD 445,7353 326,92706 18,68918 408,9593 482,5113 23,850 30S 0,000 
Pair S SOLPREF2 -RELMID S96,7647 177,SI942 10,14811 S76,7955 616,7339 S8,806 30S 0,000 
Pair 6 SOLPREF4 ­RELMID 438,9379 32S,I6839 18,S8864 402,3S97 47S,S161 23,613 30S 0,000 
Pair 7 SOLPREF5­RELMID 499,1013 339,62523 19,41508 460,8968 537,3058 25,707 30S 0,000 
Pair 8 SOLPREF6 ­RELMID 506,0294 262,33153 14,99650 476,5197 535,5391 33,743 30S 0,000 
Pair 9 POWPREFI -RELMID 462,7124 386,58302 22,09948 419,2257 506,1992 20,938 305 0,000 
Pair 10 POWPREF2 ­RELMID 295,1797 472,83606 27,03024 241,9904 348,3691 10,920 30S 0,000 
Pair Il ROLPREFI -RELMID 319,4281 442,13959 25,27544 269,6918 369,1644 12,638 30S 0,000 
Pair 12 ROLPREF2 -RELMID 263,1373 457,35035 26,14498 211,6899 314,5846 10,065 30S 0,000 
Pair 13 ROLPREF3 -RELMID 38,0229 518,24283 29,62597 -20,2743 96,3200 1,283 305 0,200 
Pair 14 FLEPREFI -RELMID 452,4346 289,41602 16,54481 419,8782 484,9911 27,346 30S 0,000 
Pair 15 FLEPREF2 ­RELMID 340;0817 411,04609 23,49794 293,8431 386,3203 l4,473 305 0,000 
Pair 16 FLEPREF3 -RELMID 339,4935 349,10017 19,95673 300,2232 378,7638 17,011 30S 0,000 
Pair 17 MUTPREFI -RELMID 177,8922 335,74484 19,19326 140,1242 215,6601 9,268 305 0,000 
Pair 18 MUTPR.EF2 -RELMID 283,7908 340,60874 19,47131 245,4758 322,1059 14,575 30S 0,000 
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Table 5.5
 
Re1ational Preference (18 item score)
 
Variable (item) ValidN Scale Range Scale Mean Characteristic 
Focpref 1 306 0-1585 961,39 Audit service 
Focpref2 306 0-1585 836,47 Audit service 
Focpref3 306 0-1585 807,01 Audit service 
Solprefl 306 0-1585 1238,24 Information sharing 
Solpref2 306 0-1585 1389,26 Trust 
Solpref4 306 0-1585 123 1,44 Long-term relationship 
Solpref5 306 0-1585 1291,60 One-shot dealings 
Solpref6 306 0-1585 1298,53 Cooperation 
Powprefl 306 0-1585 1255,21 Pressure tactics 
Powpref2 306 0-1585 1087,68 Pressure tactics 
Rolprefl 306 0-1585 1111,93 Expectations beyond audit 
Rolpref2 306 0-1585 1055,64 Non-audit issues 
RoJpref3 306 0-1585 830,52 Expectations audit service 
Fleprefl 306 0-1585 1244,93 Mod ifications 
Flepref2 306 0-1585 1132,58 Renegotiab le 
Flepref3 306 0-1585 1131,99 Give and take 
Mutprefl 306 0-1585 970,39 Help my auditor 
Mutpref2 306 0-1585 1076,29 Costs and benefits 
Relpref 306 0-1585 1108,40 
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Table 5.6 
Distribution of 15 factors significantly higher than midpoint. 
Variable (item) Valid N Scale Range Scale Mean Characteristic 
Focpref 1 306 0-1585 961,39 Audit service 
Solprefl 306 0-1585 1238,24 Information sharing 
Solpref2 306 0-1585 1389,26 Trust 
Solpref4 306 0-1585 1231,44 Long-term relationship 
Solpref5 306 0-1585 1291,60 One-shot dealings 
Solpref6 306 0-1585 1298,53 Cooperation 
Powprefl 306 0-1585 1255,21 Pressure tactics 
Powpref2 306 0-1585 1087,68 Pressure tactics 
Rolprefl 306 0-1585 1111,93 Expectations beyond audit 
Rolpref2 306 0-1585 1055,64 Non-audit issues 
Fleprefl 306 0-1585 1244,93 Modifications 
Flepref2 306 0-1585 1132,58 Renegotiable 
Flepref3 306 0-1585 1131,99 Give and take 
Mutprefl 306 ·0-1585 970,39 Help my auditor 
Mutpref2 306 0-1585 1076,29 Costs and benefits 
When we look at the distribution of the individual factors that are significantly higher than 
the scale midpoint (presented in Table 5.6) there are items that require further investigation. 
For example, from an initial observation, the individual mean scores in the Solidarity 
dimension (Solprefl, Solpref2, Solpref4, Solpref5 and Solpref6) seem to be higher than other 
items that make up the other five dimensions. Therefore, by grouping the individual factors 
(items) into their predetermined dimensions, we notice certain differences worth noting. 
Other studies that used similar dimensions to arrive at a single mean score also calculated 
average scores at the dimension level (Rokkan et al., 2003; Fink et al., 2007). We present the 
distribution results of the six dimensions. When the 18 items are separated into their 
respective dimensions, each dimensional mean score is significantly higher than the 
midpoint (p = 0,000) (Table 5.7). 
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Table S.7
 
Paired Samples Test (6 Dimensions versus Midpoint)
 
Paired 
Differences T Df 
Sig. (2­
tailed) 
95% 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Errol' Confidence IntervaJ ofMean the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair J SOLPREF 
- RELMID 497,3137 165,69006 9,47187 478,6752 515,9522 52,504 305 0,000 
Pair 2 ROLPREF 
- RE LM ID 206,8627 381,97793 21,83623 163,8940 249,8315 9,473 305 0,000 
Pair 3 FOCPREF 
- RELMlD 75,7898 294,88073 16,85721 42,6186 108,9609 4,496 305 0,000 
Pair 4 POWPREF 
- RELMlD 378,9461 329,71568 18,84859 341,8563 416,0358 20,105 305 0,000 
Pair 5 MUTPREF 
- RELMID 230,8415 240,21977 13,73245 203,8192 257,8638 16,810 305 0,000 
Pair 6 FLEPREF­RELMID 377,3366 236,68827 13,53057 350,7115 403,9617 27,888 305 0,000 
However, the dimensions vary ln range. The Solidarity dimension, which represents 
cooperation, trust and information sharing lS the highest dimension score 
(Scale Mean = 1289,81) (Table S.9). In addition, the Focus dimensions which represents the 
importance of the relationship over service is the lowest score dimension (Table S.9). 
AJthough each dimension is significantly greater than the midpoint, the different dimension 
scores indicate different client preferences based on different characteristics of the aud it­
cl ient relationsh ip. 
In addition, we tested for the differences between each dimension. The resuJts are presented 
in Table S.8. Ail the dimensions were significantly different with the expection of Role with 
Mutuality (t = -0,989, p = 0,324) and Power with Flexibility (t = 0,073, P = 0,942). 
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Table 5.8
 
Paired Samples Test (6 Dimensions versus Midpoint)
 
Paired 
Differences 
t Of Sig. (2-tailed) 
95% 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 SOLPREF ­ROLPREF 290,4510 357,74717 20,45\04 250,2080 330,6940 14,202 305 0,000 
Pair 2 SOLPREF ­FOCPREF 421,5240 307,41408 17,57369 386,9429 456,1050 23,986 305 0,000 
Pair 3 SOLPREF­POWPREF 118,3676 329,07496 18,81196 81,3500 155,3853 6,292 305 0,000 
Pair 4 SOLPREF­MUTPREF 266,4722 252,02698 14,40742 238,1217 294,8228 18,495 305 0,000 
Pair 5 SOLPREF­FLEPREF 119,977\ 240,20018 13,73133 92,9570 146,9973 8,737 305 0,000 
Pair 6 ROLPREF -FOCPREF 131,0730 396,78944 22,68294 86,4381 175,7079 5,778 305 0,000 
Pair 7 ROLPREF­POWPREF -172,0833 453,72733 25,93787 -223,1231 -121,0435 -6,634 305 0,000 
Pair 8 ROLPREF -MUTPREF -23,9788 424,32868 24,25726 -71,7115 23,7540 -0,989 305 0,324 
Pair 9 ROLPREF­FLEPREF -170,4739 403,25360 23,05247 -215,8359 -125,1118 -7,395 305 0,000 
Pair 10 FOCPREF­POWPREF -303,1563 427,91036 24,46201 -351,2920 -255,0207 -12,393 305 0,000 
Pair Il FOCPREF ­MUTPREF -155,0517 348,87657 19,94395 -194,2969 -115,8066 -7,774 305 0,000 
Pair 12 FOCPREF­FLEPREF -301,5468 355,31546 20,31203 -341,5163 -261,5774 -14,846 305 0,000 
Pair 13 POWPREF ­MUTPREF 148,1046 415,01027 23,72456 101,4200 194,7891 6,243 305 0,000 
Pair 14 POWPREF ­FLEPREF 1,6095 387,00961 22,12387 -41,9253 45,1442 0,073 305 0,942 
Pair 15 MUTPREF­
FLEPREF -146,4951 274, Il 057 15,66986 -177,3298 -115,6604 -9,349 305 0,000 
Referring to Tables 5.7 and 5.8, the SoJidarity item is significantly higher than the midpoint 
and significantly higher than the other five dimensions. On the other extreme, the Focus 
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dimension is significantly higher than the midpoint, yet it is significantly lower than the 
other five dimensions. Similarly, two pairs of dimensions that were not significantly 
different were Role-Mutuality and Power-Flexibility. It is not surprising to find similarity 
between the Power and Flexibility dimensions, since their definitions are similar. For 
example, in the Power dimension, items measured the c1ient's willingness to exert pressure 
on the auditor; whereas, the items in the Flexibility dimension measured the client's 
willingness to be flexible with the auditor. The Focus dimension measures the auditor's 
preference to put the relationship with the auditor ahead of the actual audit service. These 
different dimensions scores will be further discussed in the following Chapter VI. 
Table 5.9
 
Dimension scores
 
Dimension ValidN Scale Range Scale Mean Characteristic 
Focus 306 0-1585 868,29 Relationship versus Service 
Solidarity 306 0-1585 1289,81 Cooperation, Trust, and 
Information sharing 
Power 306 0-1585 1171,45 Pressure tactics 
Role 306 0-1585 999,36 Expectations beyond audit 
Flexibility 306 0-1585 J 169,84 Renegotiable 
Mutuality 306 0-1585 1023,34 Costs and Benefits 
Unlike Hypothesis l, where we use an interdependent t-test and Wilcoxon test, for 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 we are interested in determining a relationship between the three 
secondary variables (risk, care, loc) with the Relational Preference variable (relpref). The 
type of test to determine relationships depends on the distribution of the variable. The 
variables (risk, care), used to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, are normally distributed, 
therefore we use Pearson's correlation to test for a significant relationship. The variable 
(loc), used to test Hypothesis 4, is not normally distributed; therefore, we use the Spearman 
correlation coefficient, which is non-parametric statistic, recommended when data is non­
normally distributed (Field, 2005). For Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 we will present correlation 
coefficients. Values of ±O, 10 are considered a small effect; values of ±O,30 are considered a 
medium effect; and values of ±0,50 are considered a large effect (Field, 2005; Haïr et al., 
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2006). We also test the three secondary variables (risk aversion, care, and locus) on each of 
the 18 individual factors of the Relational Preference variable. 
In addition, for cel1ain correlated variables, we extend our analysis to use multiple regression 
to test for predictive value, where theoretical justification exists. The multiple regression of 
variables is recommended as an extension to correlation anaJysis, but only to the extent that 
can be justified by theory or past research. Field (2005) warns against randomly putting 
collected data in regression analysis, looking for predictors and outcomes without theoretical 
justification. 
5.2 HYPOTHESIS 2 
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that the greater the audit client's Risk Aversion, the more they 
will prefer a Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their 
auditor. The Risk Aversion of the questionnaire contained eight questions that were used to 
determine the respondent's level of Risk Aversion (risk). The respondent's Risk Aversion 
was measured on a scale of 0-1585 units. Respondents with scores that approach °units 
show low Risk Aversion; whereas, respondent's with score's that approach 1585 units show 
high Risk Aversion. The results show that out of 306 responses, the maximum score is 
1322,50 units and the minimum score is 51,25 units with a mean of 626,98 units. With a 
scale midpoint of 792,50 units, the respondents with a mean score of 626,98 units (165,52 
units below the scale midpoint) show significantly less than average Risk Aversion 
(t = -12,365, P = 0,000). 
To test Hypothesis 2, we use the Pearson Correlation and the correlation between the client's 
Risk Aversion (risk) and the client's Relationship Preference (relpref) show a slightly 
negative relationship (r = -0,104). The correlation coefficient value of r = -0,104 represents a 
small effect; however, the results are not statisticaJly significant at 0.05 (p = 0,070). It was 
hypothesized that clients with higher risk aversion would show a higher relational preference 
with their auditor. Therefore, the correlation results do not support Hypothesis 2 and, as a 
result, is rejected. 
We also analyze the correlations of the Risk Aversion (risk) variable with each of the 
individual 18 Relational Preference factors. 
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Table 5.10
 
Risk aversion correlation with Relational Preference factors
 
Variables Pearson Correlation Significance 
Focpref I-Risk -0,109 0,056 
Focpref2-Risk -0,096 0,093 
Focpref3-Risk -0,072 0,210 
Solprefl-Risk 0,031 0,583 
Solpref2-Risk -0,104 0,069 
Solpref4-Risk -0,016 0,776 
Solpref5-Risk -0,088 0,126 
Solpref6-Risk -0,065 0,258 
Powprefl-Risk 0,051 0,377 
Powpref2-Risk 0,090 0,114 
Rolprefl-Risk -0,049 0,396 
Rolpref2-Risk -0,070 0,220 
RolpreD-Risk -0,090 0,115 
Fleprefl-Risk 0,002 0,973
 
Flepref2-Risk -0,072 0,209
 
Flepref3-Risk -0,053 0,355
 
Mutprefl-Risk -0,064 0,262
 
Mutpref2-Risk -0,029 0,615
 
Among the 18 factors that are correlated with the Risk Aversion variab le, none is significant. 
In addition, even though we had predicted that Risk Aversion should be positively related to 
relational preference variables, 14 of the individual factors are negatively correlated, and 
four are positively correlated (Table 5.10). 
When we tested the nomological validity of the Risk Aversion variable, we theoretical 
justified that risk aversion would be higher for employees that have spent more time in their 
position and their area of work (section 4.6). Therefore, using multiple regression, we test 
the predictive values of the experience ofwork and position on the outcome ofrisk aversion: 
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5.3 
Equation 1: risk (i) = b (0) +b (1) exppos + b (2) expwork (Table 5.15)
 
where:
 
risk = risk aversion
 
expwork = length of time in the area of work (years)
 
exppos = length of time in the position (years)
 
The results show that the experience in years in both the audit client's position and area of 
work are small, yet significant predictors of risk aversion (r = 0,219, P = 0,000). 
HYPOTHESIS 3 
In Hypothesis 3, we predict that the greater the audit client's Ethics of Care, the more they 
will prefer a Relational Approach (RA) over a Transactional Approach (TA) with their 
auditor. The questionnaire contained twelve questions, which were used to determine the 
respondent's level of Ethics of Care (care). Similar to the Relational Preference and Risk 
Aversion variables, the respondent's Ethics ofCare was measured on a scale ofO-1585 units. 
Respondents with scores that approach ° units show low Ethics of Care; whereas, 
respondents with scores that approach 1585 units show high Ethics of Care. The resu Its show 
that out of 306 responses, the maximum score is 1196,67 units and the minimum score is 
99,58 units with a mean of 551,39 units. With a scale midpoint of 792,50 units, the 
respondents with a mean score of551,39 units (241,11 units below the scale midpoint) show 
significantly less than average Ethics of Care (t = -23,959, p = 0,000). 
To test Hypothesis 3, we use the Pearson Correlation and the correlation between the c1ient's 
Ethics of Care (care) and the client's Relationship Preference (relpref) show a very smaJ\ 
correlation coefficient (r = -0,003), and the results are not statistically significant at 0,05 
(p = 0,957). It was hypothesized that audit clients with a higher ethics of care would have a 
higher relational preference with their auditor. Therefore, the correlation results do not 
support Hypothesis 3 and, as a result, is rejected. 
We also analyze the correlations of the Ethics of Care (care) variable with each of the 
individual 18 Relational Preference factors. 
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Table 5.11
 
Ethics of Care correlation with Relational Preference factors
 
Variables Pearson Correlation Significance 
Focpref 1-Care 0,164* 0,004 
Focpref2-Care -0,038 0,506 
FocpreD-Care -0,038 0,513 
So\prefl-Care -0,013 0,816 
Solpref2-Care -0,063 0,273 
Solpref4-Care 0,132** 0,021 
Solpref5-Care -0,112** 0,050 
Solpref6-Care -0,009 0,874 
Powprefl-Care -0,045 0,433 
Powpref2-Care 0,023 0,685 
Rolprefl-Care -0,022 0,697 
Rolpref2-Care 0,020 0,725 
RolpreD-Care 0,018 0,755 
Fleprefl-Care -0,008 0,886 
Flepref2-Care 0,004 0,945 
FlepreD-Care -0,044 0,442 
Mutpref1-Care -0,053 0,359 
Mutpref2-Care 0,015 0,788 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
When the 18 Relational Preference factors are correlated with the Ethics of Care variable 
three of the 18 factors significantly correlate: Focprefl and Care are positiveJy correlated 
(r = 0,164, p.= 0,004); Solpref4 and Care are positively correlated (r = 0,132, P = 0,021), and 
Solpref5 and Care are negatively correlated (r = -0,112, P = °,050). The remaining 15 
factors are consistent with the overall Hypothesis 3 results: the individual correlations are not 
significant (Table 5.11). 
When we tested the nomological validity of the Ethics of Care variable, we theoretical 
justified that individuals with higher ethics of care would prefer a relationship over actual 
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service and would also prefer a willingness to pursue a long-term relationship (section 4.6).
 
Therefore, we use simple regression to test the predictive values of ethics of care on the
 
outcome of the two items: relationship focus and willingness to continue the relationship.
 
Equation 2: focpref1(i) = b(O) + b(l)care (Table 5.15)
 
where:
 
focprefl = relationship focus preference
 
care = ethics of care variable
 
Equation 3: solpref4(i) = b(O) + b( 1)care (Table 5.15) 
where:
 
solpref4 = willingness to continue the relationship
 
care = ethics of care variable 
The results show that the ethics of care slightly, yet significantly, predicts the audit client's 
preference for a relationship over the service (r = 0,175; P = 0,002) (Table 5.15) and the 
ctient's willingness to continue their relationship (r = 0,129; P= 0,024) (Table 5.15). 
5.4 HYPOTHESIS 4 
In Hypothesis 4, we predict that the more the audit client demonstrates internai Locus of 
Control, the more they will prefer a Relational Approach (RA) over a TransactionaI 
Approach (TA) with their auditor. The questionnaire contained seventeen questions, which 
were used to determine whether the respondent showed more of an internat or external Locus 
of Control (Ioc). The respondent's Locus of Control was measured as a score ranging from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 14 points. Higher scores represent more external Locus of 
Control; whereas, lower scores represent more internai Locus of Control. The results show 
that out of306 responses, the maximum score is 14 points and the minimum score is 0 points 
with a mean of 4,84 points. With a scale midpoint of 7 points, the respondents, with a mean 
score of 4,84 points (2,16 Points below the scale midpoint) show a significantJy internai 
Locus of Control (t = -14,794, P= 0,000). 
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Since the distribution of Locus of Control was not normal, we use the Spearman's 
Correlation for the analysis. The results of the correlation between the client's Locus of 
Control (Ioc) and the client's Relationship Preference (relpref) show a very small correlation 
(r = 0,013), and the results are not statistically significant (p = 0,815). It was hypothesized 
that clients showing a more internai Locus of Control would have a higber Relational 
Preference with their auditor. Therefore, the correlation results do not support Hypothesis 4 
and, as a result, is rejected. 
We also analyze the correlations of the Locus of Control (loc) variable with each of the 
individual 18 Relational Preference factors. 
Table 5.12 
Locus of Control correlation with Relational Preference factors 
Variables Pearson Correlation Significance 
Focpref l-Loc 0,019 0,741 
Focpref2-Loc 0,098 0,086 
FocprefJ-Loc -0,008 0,893 
Solprefl-Loc 0,016 0,780
 
Solpref2-Loc 0,052 0,368
 
Solpref4-Loc 0,029 0,613
 
Solpref5-Loc 0,009 0,870
 
So1pref6-Loc 0,099 0,084
 
Powprefl-Loc 0,046 0,426
 
Powpref2-Loc -0,073 0,203
 
Rolprefl-Loc -0,043 0,449
 
Rolpref2-Loc 0,001 0,988
 
RolprefJ-Loc -0,037 0,525
 
Fleprefl-Loc 0,125* 0,.028
 
Flepref2-Loc 0,000 0,994
 
FleprefJ -Loc -0,045 0,435
 
Mutprefl -Loc 0,001 0,985
 
Mutpref2-Loc 0,060 0,293
 
*Correlatlon lS slgmficant at the 0.01 leveJ (2-talled) 
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When the 18 Relational Preference factors are correlated with the Locus of Control variable, 
one of the 18 factors significantly correlate: Flepref! and Loc are positively correlated 
(r = 0,125, P = 0,028) (Table 5.12). The remaining 17 factors are consistent with the overall 
Hypothesis 4 results: the individual correlations are not significant (Table 5.12). We test for 
one more relationship with the Locus of Control variable that was not presented as a 
hypothesis24 . Sorne psychological tests have shown a positive correlation between Locus of 
Control and Risk Aversion (Ekelund et al., 2005). The justification for this relationship is 
that individuals who are very aware of their own actions on outcomes (internai Locus of 
Control) might be more willing to accept risk (Iow Risk Aversion) (Ekelund et al., 2005). 
Therefore, we tested for the relationship between Locus of Control and Risk Aversion; and 
the Spearman test results are significant (r = 0,143; p = 0,012). Respondents with a more 
external Locus of Control demonstrate higher Risk Aversion (or respondents with a more 
internaI Locus of Control demonstrate lower Risk Aversion). This also supports nomological 
validity for both variables, as we demonstrated in Section 4.6. 
Therefore, based on the correlations of the Risk Aversion variable with Locus of Control 
(r = 0,143; P = 0,012) and between Risk Aversion and the length of time in the client's 
position (r = 0,219; P = 0,000) and between Risk Aversion and the Jength of time in the area 
of work (r = 0,183; p = 0,001), we present a mu Itiple regression model that is consistent with 
theory and past research. 
Individuals that show an internai locus of control will tend to have lower levels of risk 
aversion. Therefore, individuals with an external locus of control should have higher levels 
of risk aversion. Moreover, individuals that have more experience in their employment 
should be more risk averse. Setting Risk Aversion Ùisk) as the outcome variable and Locus 
of Control variable along with the length of time in both the position and the area of work as 
the predictor variables, we establish the following regression model: 
H We did not present the relationship between Locus ofConlTol and Risk Aversion as a hypothesis due to the limited theoretical 
justification in the academic Iiterature, with the exception of Ekelund el al., 2005. . 
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Equation 4: risk(i) = b(O) + b( 1)locus of control + b(2)expwork + b(3)exppos (Table 5.15)
 
where:
 
risk = risk aversion
 
locus of control = internai or externallocus of control
 
expwork = length oftime in the area ofwork (years)
 
exppos = length oftime in the position (years)
 
Consistent with past research, our results show that the more the audit client demonstrates an
 
external locus of control along with higher levels of experience in both work and position,
 
the more thay will be risk averse (1'= 0,263; P = 0,000).
 
We summarize the validation of the four hypotheses: Hypothesis l, 2, 3 and 4. Both the
 
parametric and non-parametric tests showed significant support for the principle hypothesis
 
(H 1): audit client's s prefer a more relational approach (RA) over a transactional approach
 
(TA) with their auditor. We add support for HI by showing that the vast majority of the
 
participants had mean scores significantly greater than the scale midpoint, and the number of
 
participants in the Relational Approach (RA) group was significantly higher than the number
 
of participants in the Transactional (TA) group and the Neither Relational nor Transactional
 
group.
 
The results of the parametric correlation tests did not show significant SUPPOlt for the
 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. The Risk Aversion and Ethics of Care variables do not
 
significantly relate to the audit client's Relational Preference. Similarly, the results of the
 
non-parametric correlation test did not show support for Hypothesis 4. The Locus of Control
 
variable does not significantly relate to the audit cJient's Relational Preference.
 
Certain relationships with theoretical justification were analysed by correlation and
 
regression analysis. The results of the simple and multiple regressions indicate three
 
relationships, which extend beyond our four hypotheses. Firstly, clients' risk aversion
 
increases as their years of experience (experience in their position and in their area of work)
 
increase. Secondly, as an audit client demonstrates higher levels of ethics of care, they have
 
a greater preference for a relationship and a higher willingness to continue their relationship.
 
Thirdly, the locus of control and risk aversion variables showed small, yet significant
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correlation. Past research has shown that individuals with an external locus of control will be 
more risk averse. Since the years of experience also correlated with risk aversion and 
justified with theOl-Y, we tested a multiple regression, where the predicting variables were 
locus of control, the length of experience in position, and the length of experience in area of 
work. The outcome variable is set as risk aversion. The results show that locus of control and 
the years of experience in position and area of work positively influence risk aversion. 
The summary of the results are presented in Table 5.13, Table 5.14, and Table 5.15.ln the 
following section, we present a discussion of the results. 
Table 5.13 
Mean Comparison for Primary Hypothesis (H 1) 
Method Statistic Significance (p) Result 
Paired T-Test t = 35,297 P = 0,000 Accept 
Wilcoxon Rank Test Z = - 15,020 P = 0,000 Accept 
Table 5.14 
Correlation summary for Secondary Hypotheses (H2-H4) 
Hypothesis Inde pendent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient (1') 
Significance 
(p) Results 
H2 Risk Aversion Relational Pref 
Pearson 
1'=-0,104 p= 0,070 Reject 
H3 Ethics ofCare Relational Pref 
Pearson 
1'= -0,003 p= 0,957 Reiect 
H4 Locus of Control 
Relational 
Pref 
Spearman 
1'= -0,013 p= 0,815 Reject 
Additional Locus of Risk Spearman 
correlation Control Aversion r= 0,143 p= 0.012 
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Table 5.15 
Simple and multiple regressions 
Equations Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variables 
Corr. 
Coeff. Sign. Results 
(1) Exppos + Expwork Risk Aversion r = 0,219 P = 0,000 Sign. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4 ) 
Ethics of care 
Ethics of care 
Locus of Control + 
Expwork + Exppos 
Relationship pref. 
Willingness to 
continue 
Risk Aversion 
r = 0,175 
r = 0,129 
r = 0,263 
P = 0,002 
p = 0,024 
P = 0,000 
Sign. 
Sign. 
Sign. 
6.1 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents a summary of the study and important conclusions of the data we 
presented in the previous Chapter V. We present our findings with reference to our review of 
literature and conceptual framework to determine theoretical and practical implications. 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is an initial attempt at operationalysing Relationship Marketing 
variables in order to measure the audit client's relationship preference with their financial 
auditors. It is important to know the client's preferred relationship approach as the auditor 
needs the cooperation of the client who provides important information for the year-end 
audit. In addition, the auditor needs to know the client's preferred relationship approach to 
align their Relationship Marketing strategy. Our secondary objective is to see the influences 
of three personality characteristics on the audit client's relational preferences with their 
auditor. 
To achieve our study's objectives we reference the Marketing literature and we borrow 
variables, which allow us to measure the auditor-cl ient relationship. The relationship 
between buyers and sellers has been theoretically defined and empirically tested in the 
Relationship Marketing literature (Fink et al., 2007; Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 
1980; Paulin et al., 1997; Rokkan et al., 2003). 
We mailed a survey to I090 private Canadian companies that had head offices in Canada 
with over 100 employees. Our survey questionnaire contained sixty-four questions that 
measured four multi-item variables: twenty questions were used to measure the client's 
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Relational Preference; eight questions were used to measure the client's Risk Aversion; 
twelve questions were used to measure the client's Ethics of Care; seventeen questions were 
used to measure the client's Locus of Control, and seven questions were used to measure the 
client's personal and corporate information. We received 306 completed returns, and the 
following is a summary of our findings. 
When a buyer and seller are at arm's length, in a two-party relationship, there is typically an 
absence of trust, cooperation, sharing of information, and willingness to continue the 
relationship (Coviello et al., 2000; Dwyer et al., 1987; Gronroos, 1994; Gummeson, 2002; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994). However, the findings in our survey lend support to a conceptual 
model that highlights the co-existence of an arm's length relationship along with trust, 
willingness to continue, cooperation, and information sharing which contradicts theory in the 
Relationship Marketing literature (see Figure 6.1) 
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Final Conceotual Model: The client's oreferred relational aooroach 
Auditor 
rilD!u~Qthesis: (Relati9ill'1 Preference) 
Hl: The audit client will preJer a RA over a TA with their 
auditor. SUPPORTED 
Relp"ef=1108,40>792,50 (l=35,297, p=O,OOO) 
Sign Churl1clerisli" 
Focprefl= %1,39 YES SERVICE 
Focpref2= 836,47 NO SERVICE 
Focpref3= 807,01 NO SERVICE 
Solprefl= 1238,24 l'ES INFORMATION 
Solpref2= 1389,26 YES TRUST 
Solpref4= 1231,44 YES LONG-TERM 
Solpref5= 1291,60 YES NOT ONE-SHOT 
Solpref6= 1298,53 YES COOPERATION 
Powprefl= 1255,21 YES PRESSURE 
Powpref2= 1087,68 YES PRESSURE 
Rolprefl= 1111,93 YES BEYOND AUDIT 
Rolpref2= 1055,64 YES NON-AUDIT 
Rolpref3= 830,52 NO EXPECTATIONS 
Fleprefl= 1244,93 YES MODIF1CATlONS 
Flepref2= 1132,58 YES RENEGOTIABLE 
Flepref3= 1131,99 YES GIVE AND TAKE 
Mutprefl= 970,39 YES HELP AUDITOR 
Mutpref2= 1076,29 YES COSTIBENEf1T 
TOTAL MEAN SCORE -1108,40 
: Agency 
Relat ionshi p 
Client
 
(Agent)
 
Secondary H)'Qotheses 
(Personal characteristics of the client) 
Significant COlT. 
H2: Risk Aversion No 
H3: Ethics oJCare No, e;\cept for 
(focprefl,solpref4&5) 
H4: Locus oJControl No. e;\cepl for 
(fleprefl ) 
Am1's Length Variable 
Solpref3=274,46 
Significanlly lower than midpoint 
lndicates client's preference to remain at AIm's Length 
Figure 6.1 Final Conceptual Model: The client's preferred relational approach 
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6.2 RELATIONAL PREFERENCE FJNDJNGS (HYPOTHESIS 1) 
We measured the audit client's relational preference using a multi-item measure (18 items). 
Each item is an individual characteristic of the overall Relational Preference construct, and 
each item partly defines the overall relational score. In this section, we discuss the results of 
the different items to be able to situate our results in the academic literature and in our 
conceptual framework25 . To increase clarity for the reader, we re-present the results of our 
eighteen items, with a definition beside each item name, along with the significance of each 
individual item score (Table 6.1). 
Each one of our items that make up the total score has an average relational score on a scale 
from 0-1585. Scores closer to 1585 show a more Relational preference and scores closer to 0 
show a more Transactional preference. Therefore, in our discussion, when we link our results 
with other research and theory we indicate the score on the 0-1585 scale in parenthesis, next 
to the name of the item (variable). This is done to help the reader follow our discussion. 
25 Other similar Relational studies discuss lheir individual item results Ulat make up the overall relalional scale to situate lindings 
in published Iiterature and concepl\lal frameworks (Ferguson el al., 2005; Paulin el al., 1997). 
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Table 6.1 
Relational Preference (18 item score) 
Variable 
(item) 
Valid 
N Scale Range 
Scale 
Mean Characteristic Result 
Focpref 1 306 0-1585 961,39 Audit service Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Focpref2 306 0-1585 836,47 Audit service Not signiftcantly higher than midooint 
Focpref3 306 0-1585 807,01 Audit service Not significantly higher than midooint 
Solprefl 306 0-1585 1238,24 Information sharing Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Solpref2 306 0-1585 1389,26 Trust Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Signiflcantly lower than 
Solpref3 306 0-1585 246,3i6 Arm's Length. midpoint. Not retained in 
overa/l score because oflow 
correlation 
Solpref4 306 0-1585 1231,44 Long-term 
relationship 
Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Solpref5 306 0-1585 1291,60 Not one-shot dea1ings 
Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Solpref6 306 0-1585 1298,53 Cooperation Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Powprefl 306 0-1585 1255,21 Pressure tactics Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Powpref2 306 0-1585 1087,68 Pressure tactics Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Rolprefl 306 0-1585 1111,93 Expectations beyond 
audit 
Significant1y higher than 
midpoint 
Rolpref2 306 0-1585 1055,64 Non-audit issues Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Rolpref3 306 0-1585 830,52 Expectations audit 
service 
Not significantly higher 
than midooint 
Fleprefl 306 0-1585 1244,93 Modifications Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Flepref2 306 0-1585 1132,58 Renegotiable Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
FlepreD 306 0-1585 1131,99 Give and take Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Mutprefl 306 0-1585 970,39 Help my auditor Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Mutpref2 306 0-1585 1076,29 Costs and benefits Significantly higher than 
midpoint 
Relpref 306 0-1585 1108,40 
26 Thisis a reverse item. The score of274,46 represents a high preference for an arm's length relationship. This item is not 
~cludled ln thhe overall ReJallOnal Preference score. Il. was removed since il did nOI correlate positively with lhe overaIl score. 
e re IStit ere because the Item score IS Important for our discussion. 
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In general, our findings suggest that audit clients prefer a more Relational approach (RA) 
than a Transactional approach (TA) with their auditor. The Relational Preference average 
score (relpref), made up of 18 individual items (factors), is 1108,40 units, significantly 
higher than the scale midpoint (792,50). Similar results were found from auditor partners 
surveyed in Quebec for their relationship preferences. Auditors in Quebec invest in a 
Relationship approach with their clients and the importance of future research to investigate 
the client's preferences was stressed (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004; Pilote and Elbekkali, 
2004). The importance of knowing the client's relational preference is due to resource 
allocation, necessary for audit firms when developing and maintaining relationships with 
their customers (Elbekkali and Pilote, 2004; Pilote and Elbekkal i, 2004). The importance of 
matching suppliers' and buyers' marketing approaches is stressed in the marketing literature 
due to problems with mismatching (Pels et al., 2000). If service suppliers allocate resources 
towards a relational approach when the client prefers a transactional approach, the supplier 
wastes resources (misallocate resources). If, on the other hand, the supplier decides to not 
allocate resources towards a relational approach and decides to deal transactionally with their 
clients when the client prefers a relational approach, this will lead to client dissatisfaction: 
the client expects a relational approach with their supplier yet are only treated 
transactionally. Therefore, our research results could help audit firms with their customer 
relationship strategy. In addition, the survey questions we used to obtain the client's 
preference could be a tool for audit firms to use if they want to measure objectively their 
clients' relational preferences. The concept of a relationship is not easily measurable because 
it could be defined many different ways. The results of this research provide, by way of a 
multi-item measure, an objective definition of what constitutes a relationship preference 
from the perspective of the audit client. 
The foundation of our conceptual framework (Figure 6.1) is the auditor-client relationship as 
defined by audit standards (CleA, 2006). It is the presence of the 3rd party user which 
dictates the importance of the auditor and client to remain at a certain distance and to avoid 
familiarity (CICA, 2006), which we define as Arm's Length. This triadic relationship has 
given rise to theoretical models. Williamson (J975) argued that based on Transaction Cost 
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Analysis (TCA) and Opportunism the auditor is considered as an outsider and their motives 
are suspicious by the client; therefore, the auditor would received little cooperation from the 
client. In addition, the audit service is described as routine and benefits a 3rd party user and 
not the paying client; therefore, the client perceives the service as un important (Goldman and 
Barlev, 1976). In the marketing Iiterature when a service is perceived as routine and 
unimportant, the client will prefer a transactional approach with their service supplier (Berry, 
1995; Gronroos, 2000; Pels et al., 2000). However, in our conceptual framework, we argue 
that the audit service is important to the client and that they would prefer a relational 
approach. Our argument is based on agency models such as the Monitoring Hypothesis 
(Wallace, 1980) and the theory of added-value service (Beattie et al., 2000; Gronroos, 1997). 
Our results support our conceptual framework. The client prefers a relational approach with 
their auditor, indicating the importance of the audit service that benefits the client. 
To help better understand the general results of the Relational Preference single mean score 
(I108,40 units) we discuss the individual item (factor) results. Because each item (factor) 
represents an individual part of a Relationship, the individual item scores will give us more 
specific information regarding the audit client's relationship preference than just the overall 
average score and the dimensional scores. We do not present ail the 18 items but rather only 
those that are important in respect to our research objective and conceptual framework. 
Among the individual relational preference items that make up the 18 item single mean 
score, 15 are significantly higher than the midpoint, and 3 are above the midpoint but not 
significantJy (Focpref2, Focpref3, Rolpref3) (Table 6.1). The highest scores that strengthen 
the single mean score are 5 items that make up the Solidarity dimension, with scores that ail 
exceed 1200 units (Solprefl, 2, 4, 5, 6), aJong with one item in the Power dimension 
(Powprefl). Whereas, the lowest scores that weaken the single mean score are the items that 
make up the Focus dimension (Focpref2, 3) as weil as an item in the Role dimension 
(Rolpref3). These results are consistent with the analysis of the six dimensions in the 
previous chapter. The Sol idarity is the dimension with the highest score (over 1200 units) 
which strengthens the ReJational Preference single mean score (relpref). Whereas, focus is 
the dimension with the lowest score (under 900 units) which weakens the single mean score. 
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By relating our results to our literature review and conceptual framework, we further clarify 
our results. 
In a commercial reJationship, the exchange between two parties includes both service 
transactions as weil as relationships (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). The relationship Focus 
dimension has been conceptualized to determine if the relationship between a buyer and a 
seller is more important than the actual service transaction (Macneil, 1978; 1978). More 
precisely, in this study, we used three relationship Focus items (focprefl, focpref2 and 
focprefJ) to determine if the relationship with the auditor is perceived by the client as more 
important than the audit service. The results show that one of the three items was 
significantly higher than the midpoint (focprefl = 961,39), while the other two items were 
not (focpref2 = 836,47 and focprefJ = 807,01). 
In the 151 relationship Focus item (folprefl) we asked the respondent if their relationship with 
their auditor plays a more important raie than the audit service. The mean score for this item 
was significantly higher than the midpoint (focpref1=961,39) which indicates that for the 
audit client the relationship with their auditor plays a more important role than the audit 
service. However, the two other items in the relationship Focus dimension were not 
significantly greater than the midpoint (focpref2=836,47 and focprefJ=807,0 1). These two 
items measured the importance of the relationship if dissatisfied with the audit service 
(focprefl), or if the relationship did not facilitate the audit service (focpref2). Therefore, the 
overall results of the three reJationship Focus items are that the audit client prefers a 
relationship over the audit service but only to the extent that the relationship facilitates the 
service and that the service is satisfactory. 
These results are consistent with Service Marketing theory where service quality is a 
minimum expectation of a customer and is the starting point of a buyer-seller relationship 
(Gronroos, 2000). In a large survey of audit customers who defected, it was found that the 
main reason the clients Jeft the audit firms were due to relationship issues such as not being 
treated correctly (Dunn and Baker, 2003). However, it was also found that audit service 
quai ity was a basic expectation of the customer, referred to as a table stake (Dunn and Baker, 
2003). In other words, relationship gains cannot make up for service quality issues. In a 
survey of audit clients in the Netherlands, based on the Morgan and Hunt's (1994) 
137 
Commitment-Trust mode l, service quality led to the c1ient's willingness to continue with 
their audit firm (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). Therefore, the results of the relationship Focus 
dimension suggest the need for audit firms to invest in audit client relationships but not to 
expect to use the relationship to make up for poor service quality. In addition to the audit 
client's Relationship Focus, client cooperation is important. 
Cooperation between buyers and sellers has been referred to as a core value of Relationship 
Marketing (Gummesson, 2002; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). The client's desire to cooperate 
with their auditor is an important element in the audit process, primarily due to informatibn 
asymmetry in favor of the client: the client has information that the auditor requires to 
complete the audit (Ruypter and Wetzels, 1999; Kopp el al., 2003). Cooperation was 
measured with the item, solpref6, where we asked the audit client for their preference for a 
cooperative effort. We defined a cooperative effort as "wanting or willing to work together 
with others". The cooperation score (solpref6 = 1298,53) was significantly higher than the 
midpoint (relmid = 792,5) and significantly higher than the Relational Preference average 
single score (relpref = 1108,40) Ct = 12,561, P = 0,000). Similar research investigated the 
auditor's willingness to cooperate with their clients. Results showed that auditors had a high 
willingness to cooperate with their clients; however, when the audit partner was asked about 
their clients' willingness to cooperate, the partner perceived it as lower (Elbekkali and Pilote, 
2004; Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004). These authors requested further research to investigate the 
client's willingness to cooperate with their audit partner. In response to their request, our 
findings suggest that audit clients do prefer to cooperate highly with their auditor. Similarly, 
audit clients were surveyed to investigate what motivates them to continue their relationship 
with an audit firm and the findings showed a positive relationship between relationship 
commitment and cooperation as perceived by the audit client (Ruyter and Wetzels, 1999). In 
addition, in Marketing research, Morgan and Hunt (1994) showed a positive relationship 
between relationship commitment and cooperation. 
In our conceptual framework (Figure 6.1) we had predicted that the client's willingness to 
cooperate with their auditor would be high, since client cooperation would help the audit 
process. The client would want to facilitate the audit process because the client wants to 
provide accurate, low cost information to the principle (Agency Relationship). By 
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cooperating with the auditor, the client facilitates the audit process, which should help ta 
provide the necessary low cost and aceurate information to the third party user (princip le) 
Figure 6.1 ).The results of the present study are in agreement with the theoretical basis of our 
framework. 
Moreover, in our Conceptual model (Figure 6.1), we had predicted a client preference for a 
high level of Trust with their auditor. In accordance with our framework, our results show 
that clients prefer a high level of Trust with their auditor (solpref2 = 1389,26). This score 
was significantly higher than the scale midpoint and is the highest of the ail the 18 item 
scores. Similar to Cooperation, due ta information asymmetry, Trust between auditors and 
clients is important, for auditors to gain accurate information from audit clients (Kopp el al., 
2003). 
Similar to preferring Trust and Cooperation, the audit client wants Information from the 
auditor (so.1prefl = 1238,24), which includes non-audit issues (rolprefl = 1111,93 and 
rolpref2 = 1055,64). These results are consistent with audit client surveys showing audit 
clients' desire for an added-value audit, including compliance-related advice and 
management Jetter advice on procedures (Beattie el al., 2000). 
In traditional buyer-seller relationships, Relational Approaches (RA) between two parties, 
are also defined with high levels of Trust, Cooperation and Information sharing (as in our 
study). However, in traditional buyer-seller relationships, Relational Approaches (RA) are 
not defined with an Arm's Length approach (Gronnroos, 1994; 2000; Gummesson, 2002). 
It is the Arm's Length item (solprefJ) that differentiates the auditor-client relationship from 
the traditional buyer-seller relationship, as defined in our conceptuaJ framework. We defined 
the Arm's Length item (solprefJ) in our questionnaire as "relating in such a way as to avoid 
familiarity and prevent direct influence by any of the parties over the other or others." We 
had predicted that the client would show preference for an Arm's Length relationship with 
their auditor and our survey results confirm our prediction (solprefJ = 246,37). The solprefJ 
item was significantly lower than the scale midpoint, and which was not included in the 
overall mean score, as required for a summated scale (Hair el al., 2006). 
The reason for the Arm's Length requirement in the auditor-client relationship is primarily 
due ta the presence of a third party User (CICA 2006). The presence of the third party User 
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gives rise to the accountability to the third party and the necessity for the auditor and the 
client to remain at Arm's Length, to avoid familiarity (CICA 2006). The triadic relationship 
of the auditor, client, and third party User is defined in the Canadian Auditing Standards, and 
is the basis for our Conceptual Model (Figure 2.2). The traditional buyer-seller relationship, 
without the presence of a 3rd Party, does not include an Arm's Length requirement (Figure 
2.1). 
It is important for the client to recognize the importance of the auditor's requirement to 
remain at Arm's Length. In the audit literature there is concern that having a close 
relationship, where the auditor and client work together cooperatively and share information, 
impedes the auditor from remaining at Arm's Length: the auditor acquiesces to the demands 
of the client in fear of losing the client (Kleinman and Palmon, 2000). In addition, an overly 
trusting relationship has been suggested to threaten professional skepticism and 
independence (Kopp et al., 2003). Kleinman and Palmon (2000) recommend that both the 
auditor and the client be aware of the auditor's responsibilities (Klein man and Pal mon, 
2000). Our study confirms that the audit client is aware and prefers the auditor's 
responsibilities to remain at Arm's Length. Therefore, there should be less pressure from the 
client, since the Arm's Length regulation is understood and respected. Our results should 
help clarify sorne of the questions related to auditor independence. 
Other findings in our study relate to auditor-client negotiations. Gibbens et al. (2005), in a 
survey study, found that CFOs and audit partners prefer winning a negotiation, where the 
client uses pressure, and the negotiation with the audit firm ends with a distributive outcome 
(where the client wins and the auditor loses). These authors claim that their findings differ 
from the negotiation literature, where parties desire win-win outcomes. Our findings 
suggest that the client prefers not using pressure tactics to influence the auditor 
(powprefl = 1255,21), as well as preferring a cooperative (win-win) relationship 
(solpref6 = J298,53). Our findings are consistent with Seattie et al. (2000; 2004), where it 
was empirically found that audit clients desired a more cooperative (win-win) relationship, 
and our results contradict the conclusions of Gibbens et al., 2005. Also, our results meet the 
request for further evidence of the client's perspective on the auditor-client's negotiation, as 
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the negotiation between the auditor and the client has an impact on the financiaJ statements 
(Gibbens el al., 2001; Iyer and Rama, 2004). 
We also measured the flexibility of the customer. The results suggest that the client prefers 
being flexible and prefers a give and take strategy with their auditor (fleprefJ = 1131, 99). 
The findings are consistent with other auditor negotiations research that found that clients are 
more flexible than auditors are when faced with a conflict situation (Bame-Aldred and Kida 
2007). 
Theoretical models have presented the audit service as a routine, commodity 1ike service 
subject to the downward pressure of priees (Williamson, 1975). Models show that the audit 
service does not benefit the client; therefore, the audit is perceived as unimportant (Goldman 
and Barlev, 1974; Nichols and Priee, 1976). Therefore, given the commodity like service and 
un importance of the audit for the client, the client should prefer a more Transactional 
approach with their auditor (Pels el al., 2000). However, we based our hypothesis on the 
theory that showed the importance of the audit service for the client based on agency theory. 
The agency relationship explains that the agent (client) is the source of auditing and that the 
agent demands the audit to protect against lower wages and chooses the independent auditor 
to provide the assurance of accuracy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Wallace, 1980). 
Therefore, we argue that the client perceives the audit as an important, unique, and valued 
added service. Our findings support our argument that the client sees the auditor as a source 
of information (solprefl = 1238,24), and has expectations From auditors that go beyond the 
audit services (rolprefl=1111,93). 
Our results are consistent with Beattie el al. (2000) and EiJifsen el al. (200 J) who argue that 
the value of the auditor is the added-value service beyond the core audit service, which 
results in cooperative efforts from the customer. Beattie el al. (2000) found that clients 
desire, from their auditors, such services as guidance on accounting principles, advice on 
internaI controls, and genera1 business advice. 
Goldman and Barlev (1974) conceptualize the concept of the balance of power. Since the 
audit client does not perceive the audit as important, the power is in the hands of the client 
and therefore the auditor is dependent on the client. Re1ationship Marketing literature shows 
that power hurts relationship success between two parties, and only in the absence of power 
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can there be the presence of commitment and trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Similarly, our 
findings suggest that the audit client prefers not to use power tactics to influence the auditor. 
It has been theorized that the audit client possesses the power over the auditor because of the 
client's ability to hire and fire the auditor (Goldman and Barlev, 1974). This level of power 
which the client possesses is used to explain the auditor's inability to remain independent 
(Kleinman and Palmon, 2001). In contrast to this theory of power in the hands of the client, 
our results show, based on two items which measured the client's desire to exert power on 
the auditor, that the audit client does not prefer using power over the auditor 
(powprefl = 1255,21 and powpref2 = 1087,60). 
6.3 SECONDARY VARJABLE FfNDfNGS (HYPOTHESES 2, 3, 4) 
6.3.1 Risk Aversion (Hypothesis 2) 
Our second hypothesis is that clients that are more risk adverse would prefer a more RA. 
This hypothesis was based on the risk adverse client seeking out security by forming a close 
relationship with other parties. This hypothesis was not supported. The average audit client 
in our sample showed low risk aversion (risk = 624,98). The Risk aversion variable did not 
correlate with the single mean score of the Relational Preference. In addition, the risk 
aversion variable did not correlate with any of the 18 individual factors that make up the 
single mean relational score. 
Hypothesis 2 was based on studies in marketing that show risk perception affecting buying 
decisions (Bao et al., 2003; Shrimp and Barden, 1982). The greater the perceived risk, the 
greater will be the cJient's desire to seek security and engage in a RA with their supplier 
(Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995). Very Iittle research in accounting, to our knowledge, has 
attempted to measure the risk aversion of accounting managers in companies. However, 
some research has found that accounting managers with traits of high-risk aversion search 
out security and create greater budget slack (Waller, 1988; Young, 1985 cited by Blanchette, 
2001). 
Therefore, based on this research in marketing and accounting we predicted a positive 
relationship between the audit clients risk aversion and relational preference. We thought 
that clients with higher risk aversion would search out security by forming a more Relational 
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rather than Transactional approach with their clients. However, our prediction was not 
supported with our empirical evidence. 
To our knowledge, there is not enough empirical research in risk aversion and audit client 
behavior to help explain our results. However, we do offer the following possible 
explanation. The Relationship Marketing literature we cited did not measure the buyer's 
general assessment of risk, as we did, but rather the assessment of risk related to the actual 
purchase. Services that offer information, knowledge, and expertise, and which are 
heterogeneous with high switching costs are perceived as risky and should promote a more 
Relational Approach by buyers (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). Examples of high-risk services 
are Life Insurance services and Law services versus low risk services such as Cable 
television and Telephone services. Therefore, to compare our results to previous marketing 
literature results we could have measured the specifie perceived risk of the audit service 
instead of the client's general overall risk aversion. Future research should measure the 
audit's client specifie perception ofrisk in respect to the audit service. 
6.3.2 Ethics ofCare (Hypothesis 3) 
The results of the Ethics ofCare hypothesis are surprising. We hypothesized that the more an 
audit client showed a higher level of care the higher would be their preference for a RA. This 
hypothesis was not supported. The mean score for the audit client's Ethics of Care is 551,39 
on a scale of 0-1585. The level of 551 ,39 is significantly below the scale midpoint of 792.50. 
Therefore, the average audit client demonstrates Jow Ethics of Care, yet prefers a more RA 
(relpref:= 1108, 40). 
One possible explanation for the Ethics of Care low mean score could be our measurement 
method. Gi Iligan' s Ethics of Care model was operationalized using the Skoe's Ethic of Care 
Interview (ECI) (Skoe and Lippe, 2002). Similar to the Heinz dilemma, developed by 
Kholberg (Gilligan, 1983), the ECI consists of dilemmas that are administered using 
structured interviews. Since we used a mail questionnaire to collect our data, we had to find 
anothe.r way to measure the Ethics of Care variable. The onJy other study that we found to 
measure the Ethics of Care, with a self-administered method, appropriate for our study was a 
12 self-description item method by LiddeJ (1990). In the 12-item questionnaire, we are able 
to identify if clients showed more of a care preference or more of a justice approach. 
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Therefore, we had predicted that there would be a relationship between the level of care and 
the relational preference. 
We would have liked to use the ECI. We had originally developed our hypothesis based on 
the ECI. We conceptual ized our hypothesis based on the three levels of the ECI. As people 
move from Level 1 to Level 3 they move from little care for others (Level l) to focusing on 
others (Leve! 2) to finally focusing on cooperative relationships (Levet 3). We argued that 
moving from Level 1 to Level 3 is similar to moving from a transactional approach (TA) to a 
relational approach (RA). Not using the ECI could have weakened our measure of the Ethics 
of Care variable. Using the ECI would require conducting face to face interviews, which 
should be part of future research. 
However, when we look at the correlation between the individual !8 relational factors and 
the Ethics of Care variable, three of the 18 factors show significant correlations. The 
relational variables that were significant were focprefl, solpl"ef4 and solpref5. More 
precisely, focprefJ represents the audit client's preference for a relationship in respect to the 
audit service (focprefl). The solpref4 and solpref5 items relate to the audit client's 
preference for a tong-term venture (solpref4) and not a series of one-time dealings (solpref5). 
This is consistent with the Ethics of Care literature. Moral Reasoning, as defined by the 
Ethics of Care theory, is seeing a dilemma, not as a short-term problem, but rather a series of 
relationships that extends over time (Gilligan, 1993). Moreover, Reiter (1996; !997) has 
stressed the importance of using the care perspective rather than the justice model since the 
Ethics of Care perspective helps accountants view professional judgment as a set of 
embedded relationships rather than a set of independent, discrete dealings. Even though the 
overall relational score (relpref == 1108,40) does not significantly correlate with the Ethics of 
Care variable (care == 551,39), the 3 individua! relational factors that do correlate 
significantly with the Ethics of Care variable are consistent with prior literature on Moral 
Reasoning lIsing the Ethics of Care perspective. 
One of the results of the Ethics of Care analysis, as presented in our preliminary analysis, is 
that no differences were found for levels of Care when controlled for women (30,60%) and 
men (69,40%) in our sample. Our results contradict the findings of Gilligan (1993) who 
found that men are oriented towards autonomy and universal principles (Less Care and more 
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Justice); whereas, women are more focused on relationships (Care). Our results support other 
studies, which have shown no differences between men and women when using Gilligan's 
Ethics of Care theory (Reiter, 1996; Vikan et al., 2005). 
6.3.3 Locus of Control (Hypothesis 4) 
We hypothesized that audit clients who show more of an internai Locus of Control, would 
prefer a more RA with their auditors. Our correlation results did not show a significant result 
between the Locus of Control and the client's relationship preference; therefore, our 
Hypothesis 4 was not supported. We predicted a relationship between the client's Relational 
Preference and the client's level of Locus of Control based on Tsui and Gui (1996) who 
found that auditors with internai Locus of Control were more likely to cooperate and less 
likely to accommodate since they feel personally responsible. In addition, Soone et al. 
(] 999) showed that during repeated games, partici pants who showed more internai than 
external Locus of Control learn that cooperation is the winning strategy. 
However, our results did show that the single mean score for 306 respondents was 4,84 on a 
scale of 0-14. This single mean score is significantly below the scale midpoint (7) which 
represents an internai Locus of Control for our average respondent. 
There are alternative explanations in the literature that show externals more cooperative that 
internais. Wall (1977) cites Bobbitt (1967) who found, in Prisoner Dilemma games, that 
internais were more cooperative when playing competitive opponents. ln the same games, 
externals were more cooperative when playing cooperative opponents (Wall, 1977, citing 
Bobbitt, 1967). The explanation for these findings is that internaIs bargain more 
competitively when faced with cooperative opponents. Whereas, when faced with 
competitive opponents, internais cooperate to encourage the opponent to cooperate (Wall, 
1977). 
.Even though our Hypothesis 4 is not supported in respect to the correlation results, we can 
conclude that, on average, our respondents show a more internaI Locus of Control, which we 
had predicted. 
When we correlate the 18 ind ividual relational factors with the Locus of Control variable the 
only factor that is significantly correlated is fleprefl (r = 0,125; p = 0,028). This is a positive 
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relationship, but we had predicted a negative relationship. We predicted that clients who had 
an internai Locus of Control (low score) would prefer a more Relational Approach (high 
score). Flepref1 indicates the level of flexibility the client desires such as, if circumstance 
change, how easily can modifications be made to the agreement. Therefore, the results 
indicate that clients who have a more external Locus of Control would prefer flexibility with 
their auditor. Contrary to our prediction, one explanation could be externals rely more on 
others, rather than themselves (Boone et al., 1999). If circumstances change, externals could 
prefer that the auditor be willing to make modifications. 
6.4 PERSONAL AND CORPORATE FINDINGS 
6.4.1 Gender 
69,40 % of respondents were male versus 30,60% who were female. The Relational 
Preference was not significantly different for females versus males. Moreover, the secondary 
variables were not different when controlled for gender. Feminist theory has been used to 
justify that gender influences the type of relationship between two parties (Gilligan, 1993). 
However, the results of our study contradict Feminist theory and our results are consistent 
with other empirical results, which have noted no gender differences in relationship studies 
(Pratt et al., 2004; Reiter, 1996; Skoe et al., 1998) 
6.4.2 Audit Services 
The companies in our sample are ail private. For private companies, there are no regulatory 
requirements for an audit and the demand for audit is primarily a discretionary choice 
(Abdel-Khalik, 1993). In the absence of regulatory requirements and the higher fee for audit 
(high assurance) versus the fee for a review (medium assurance), there would have to be 
perceived value for an audit, by private companies. It has been argued that, in private 
companies, audited financial statements add value to companies by playing a role in the 
evaluation of managerial performance due to the lack of market measures of firm value 
(Chaney et al., 2004). Abdel-Khalik (1993) argues that private companies voluntarily import 
monitoring systems by hiring independent auditors that give owners assurance. Consistent 
with this research, which shows the value of audit for private firms, 90% of the private 
companies in our sample had audits (high assurance). 
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6.4.3 Time with audit firm 
The time that audit clients, in our sample, spend with their audit firm was long (11,27 years). 
The length of time spent with the firm had no relationship with the audit client's Relational 
preference. In the Relationship Marketing literature the time spent with a supplier is mostly 
measured in willingness to continue the relationship and not actual years (Rokkan et al., 
2003). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that in our study the time spent with the audit 
firm does not correlate with the c1ient's Relational preference. However, for our time 
variable, where we ask the audit client about their willingness to continue with their auditor, 
the result was highly Relational (solpref4 = 1231.44). Rokkan et al. (2003) empirically 
showed that when interactions between two parties included the willingness to continue 
together (measured in expected time horizon) the two parties demonstrated more long-term 
bonding and less opportunism. The willingness to continue is also referred to as an 
expectation of future interaction, demonstrated by the repeated games experiments based on 
the prisoner's dilemma theory (Rokkan et al., 2003). In repeated games, the player that does 
not cooperate with the other will be punished in future games due to reciprocity. Therefore, it 
is in the best interest for both parties to cooperate if they are will ing to continue together 
(Rokkan f;t al., 2003). Our results are consistent with the theory of repeated games, as the 
actual time is not related to the client's relational approach; whereas, the willingness to 
continue measured by the solpref4 variable was significantly relational. 
6.4.4 Type of Firm 
Big-4 auditors are hired in over 80% of publicly listed firms (Chaney et al., 2004). We 
wanted an equal representation of both Big-4 and non Big-4 auditors to identify possible 
differences in relationships (one of the reasons we set privately listed companies as a 
criterium). The results of our study produced an equal representation of both Big-4 and non 
Big-4 audit firms (43,90% of Big-4 firms and 56,10% non Big-4 firms). No relationship 
preference differences were highlighted for clients dealing with Big-4 auditors versus those 
that deal with non Big-4 firms. Clients preferred a relational approach with both Big-4 and 
non Big-4 firms. These results are consistent with Relationship Marketing theories, which 
explain how both smal.1 and large service finns can promote relational approaches with their 
customers. Some theory shows that small service firms are more customer-oriented than big 
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service firms because they are able to make decisions quickly and are closer to the market 
(Gronroos, 2003). However, other theory explains that bigger service firms have more 
resources than smaller firms enabling them to invest in relationships with their customers 
(Gronroos, 1994; Gummesson, 2002). Therefore, our results are consistent with results in the 
marketing 1iterature that shows that both large and small firms can be relational with their 
customers. 
7.1 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter presents a final discussion aJong with the study's 1imitations and our 
recommendation for future research. 
CONCLUSION 
The princip le objective of our study was to determine the audit client's relationship 
preference with their financial auditor. ResuJts of our study show that clients significantly 
prefer a Relational Approach (RA) rather than a Transactional Approach (TA) with their 
financial auditor. 
In respect to the 18 individual items and 6 dimensions, we found results that are more 
precise. The audit client's preference for Trust with their auditor, part of the Solidarity 
dimension, was the highest scoring item. Audit standards require auditors to be 
professionally sceptical regarding client management (CICA, 2006, 5090.08), but at the 
same time auditors need to trust the information that clients provide, due to information 
asymmetry in favour of the client (Kopp el al., 2003). The auditor is considered to be in 
constant conflict between having to exercice professional sceptisicm and at same time to not 
assume client dishonesty (CICA 2006 5090.08; Kopp el al., 2003). By knowing that the 
client has a very high preference for a trusting reJationship, couJd help the auditor manage 
their conflict between trust and professional scepticism. 
Along with Trust, Cooperation and Power (the restraint of Power to influence) are also 
among the highest individual scoring items. These results are consistent with an important 
Relationship Marketing buyer-seller theory: Morgan and Hunt's (1994) Commitment-Trust 
mode!. This model empirical shows the importance of Cooperation, Trust, and a restraint of 
Power to assure relationship success. 
Not only does the client respect the importance of a trusting relationship, they also respect 
the auditor's necessity to maintain the relationship at arm 's length. This finding lS an 
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important contribution in our study, both theoretically and practically. Practically, many of 
the pressures that infringe upon auditor independence have been the auditor acquiescence 
towards client demands. By clients demonstrating their preference to remain distant, shows 
the clients respect for auditors' ethical obligations. Audit Standard setters would be 
interested in knowing that clients respect auditors' ethical standards to remain distant. 
Theoretically, buyer-seller relationships in the Marketing literature have defined 
Transactional (TA) relationships as Arm Length relationships. Some researches have even 
argued that an important definition of transactional approach is remaining at arm's length; 
whereas, the relational approach (opposing end of the continuum) is defined as cooperative 
(Ferguson et al., 2005). No buyer-seller relationship, to our knowledge, is Relational (RA), 
.with the presence of cooperation, trust, and the willingness to continue, and at the same time 
conducted at arm's length. We provide an original relationship framework for the Marketing 
domain. Our new conceptual framework, which is a triadic relationship, shows a buyer-seller 
relationship with a third party influence. This third party influence creates a buyer-seller RA, 
with attributes such as cooperation, trust, lack of power, information sharing, willingness to 
continue, while at the same time remaining at arm's length. 
In addition, Power, exercised by clients, has been considered a factor in the threat to auditor 
independence. The use of Power by the client has also been blamed as a tactic used by 
clients to influence auditors, when negotiating over financiaJ statement issues. Our findings 
suggest that clients do not desire exercising power to influence the auditor. Our results are 
also consistent with Relationship Marketing studies that have shown that the use of power 
can have negative effects on buyer-seller relationships (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). 
Our secondary results do not show significant relationships between certain personal 
characteristics and the audit client's relational preferences as hypothesized. However, other 
relationships with our secondary variables show some interesting results. We had thought 
that clients that prefer a more RA would be more Risk Averse, as they would use the 
relationship to reduce uncertainty, as was argued in prior research. However, we did find that 
Risk Aversion was higher for employees that have spent more time in their employment or 
area of employment, which is consistent with past research. 
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7.2 
The Locus of Control variable did not significantly correlate with the client's relational 
preference, yet when grouped with the audit client's amount of experience, we found a 
significantly positive relationship with Risk aversion. Consistent with past research, the more 
clients show external Locus of Control, and the longer they have stayed in a position or area 
of work, the higher will be their level of Risk Aversion. 
Finally, clients that showed a higher level of ethics of care did not significantly prefer an RA 
with their auditor, as hypothesized. However, the ethics of care variable did show a small, 
but significant, relationship with two RA items: the preference for a relationship and the 
willingness to continue the relationship. 
LlMITATIONS OFTHE STUDY 
Our study has certain limitations. Firstly, we used a convenience sample for our survey, 
which is recommended for studies with pre-established criteria (Babbie et al., 2002). We 
used a list of English speaking, Canadian private companies with over 100 employees. This 
was the criteria necessary for us to answer our research question. Therefore, generalizing our 
results to explain the overall preferences of audit clients would have to be done with respect 
to our particular sample criteria. 
The definition of a relationship between two parties is a very large concept; there are many 
possible components of the definition. To operationalize our study we have borrowed a 
multi-item measurement instrument to define a client relationship as either more Relational 
(RA) or more Transactiona1 (TA). The items that make up our multi-item measure have been 
conceptually designed and empirically tested in various Relational Marketing articles, as we 
have discussed throughout this text (Fink et al., 2007; Kaufman and Dant, 1992; Macneil, 
1980; Rokkan et al., 2003). However, there are ether conceptual and empirica1 marketing 
studies that define re1ationships between buyers and sellers using other variables (Coviello et 
al., 1997; 2000; 2002; Gummesson, 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994). Even though there are 
various variables in the literature, we chose the ones that would best conceptually mode1 the 
auditor-client relationship; and we chose variables that would best he1p answer our research 
question. The studies from which we borrowed our measures are different industries and 
different respondent populations. This might explain why items in our results did not load 
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under the same dimensions as our borrowed research models. It would be important to 
replicate this research in the audit industry to see if the multi-item scales we used show 
similar results, which we discuss in the following section on future research. 
The multi-items used to measure the client's relational preference that we borrowed from the 
marketing studies mentioned above, had to be slightly modified following our two pre-tests. 
In our first test, we used 24 questions with the exact wording of our borrowed items. The 
pre-test candidates found sorne of the questions confusing and found our questionnaire too 
long. We were concerned about the clarity and length of the questionnaire, which has been 
shown to reduce response rates (Dillman, 2006). These relationship questions were being 
added to the Risk Aversion, Ethics of Care and Locus of Control questions and the 
questionnaire was very long. Therefore, we needed to modii'y and remove certain questions. 
Our second round of pre-tests showed these changes to have been successful. However, these 
modifications might have weakened the measure as originally conceptualized. Future 
research using the exact wording and the exact number of items for the Relational Preference 
multi-item measurement could be done to see ifthere are differences from our study. 
We argue that our 18 item single mean relational measure showed internai consistency 
(reliability) because the Cronbach Alpha of the measure was 0,7208, which exceeded 0,6000 
(Hair et al., 2006). However, in the Cronbach Alpha formula the number of items (N) is in 
the numerator. Therefore, a measure with a high number of items will produce a high 
Cronbach Alpha. This is another important reason to replicate this research in the audit 
industry to see if the results are similar; then we would have a true test of internai 
consistency. 
When sensitive questions are asked, there is always the risk of Social Desirability Bias 
(SDB). SDB is possible when a respondent wants to appear favoufable when asked a 
sensitive question (Bradburn et al., 2004). There is no empirical evidence to indicate that 
audit clients would prefer appearing more relational than more transactional. However, it 
could be argued that it is more fashionahle to appear relational than transactional given the 
relational definitions are more indicative ofa sociable person (Dwyer et al., 1987). SimilarJy, 
it could be argued that it was socially desirable for the respondents to say they desired an 
Arm's Length relationship because it is a popular topic in the accounting industry: that the 
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auditor and client need to remain independent and not too familiar (CrCA, 2006). However, 
we did take proven measures to reduce the risk of SDB (Dillman, 2006). We asked more than 
one question for a particular dimension (topic). We also sent the questionnaires by mail and 
assured the clients that their responses were confidential. Our survey method did not give us 
the name of the respondent and the respondent was made clear of the measure. 
Notwithstanding our efforts to reduce SDS there is no full proof method to do so. 
We asked respondents questions at one point in time. We know that relationships evolve 
with time (Dwyer et al., 1987); therefore, a longitudinal study would better capture the 
dynamics of an evolving relationship. We encourage a replicate study using a longitudinal 
approach, using different points in time. 
The resu lts of our second hypothesis (H2) using the secondary variable Risk Aversion was 
not supported and could have been due to measuring the respondents' general risk aversion 
instead of their perception of risk particular to the audit industry. We predicted that audit 
clients that showed higher risk aversion would show a higher preference for a relational 
approach with their auditors (RA). The theoretical justification for this predicted correlation 
was that audit clients that do not like risk (risk averse) would seek security by forming 
relationships with their auditor (Sheth and Pavatiyar, 1995). We still believe that clients that 
perceive the year-end financial audit as risky would prefer a Relational Approach with their 
auditor. Our measure of Risk Aversion was a general measure that had nothing to do with the 
audit service. So it is possible that respondents who scored low in risk aversion could still 
perceive the audit as risky. Future research shouJd ask respondents specifie risk questions in 
respect to their audit. 
Finally, we are limited by the constraints of a mail survey. Without being present to 
interview clients, we were unable to clarify uncertainties that participants might have had 
with the questions. In addition, a mail survey is limiting in terms of the depth of information 
that one receives. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
We asked respondents questions about their relationships with their auditors at one period in 
time. However, relationships have been conceptualized as moving through different stages 
7.3 
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that are different in short term and long-term periods (Dwyer el al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt 
1994). A longitudinal study should be performed which would ask respondents about their 
relationship with their auditor at different interval periods. This would allow to measure 
differences due to the evolution of the relationship. 
Given the various definitions and variables of relationships that exist in the Relationship 
Marketing literature it would important to replicate this research in the audit industry to see 
if the multi-item measures could give similar results. This replication study would also help 
us see if the measures that we borrowed from different industries are applicable in the audit 
industry. 
In addition, our study had certain criteria that restrict its generalizability. Our sample 
population included only English speaking private companies, outside of Quebec, with over 
100 employees. Another study should use the same measures but include French speaking 
Quebec companies with less than 100 employees to see if there are any significant cultural 
difference and differences in small companies. 
We addressed a possible issue of Reliability (Internai Consistency) of our Relationship 
Preference measurement. Our Cronbach Alpha was high mainly due to a high number (l 8) of 
items, which could have overstated the Reliability of our measure. This is another important 
reason to replicate our study in the audit industry. A repeated measurement, in a subsequent 
timeframe, is a good method to measure Internai Consistency (Hair el al., 2006). 
We would like to see correlation results with the risk assessment of the audit and the client's 
relational preference to see if audit clients would seek protection from risk by choosing a 
relational approach with their auditor. 
We discussed the results of audit partners' relational preference (Elbekklai and Pilote, 2004; 
Pilote and Elbekkali, 2004) and we have produced results for audit clients. It would be 
important to continue a study that would measure the relationship preferences between the 
auditor and the client but from the perspective of the third party user. In the case of private 
companies, the 3rct party user would most likely be the bank or other creditors. Since the 3rct 
party is the ultimate user of the audit, and who can influence regulations, it would be 
interesting to see if the 3rct party user wou Id prefer a transactional or relational approach 
between auditors and their clients. 
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Similarly, a dyadic study between the auditor and the client would be important to see if 
there wou Id be differences between auditor and client preferences, which could give rise to 
mismatches. Mismatches have been conceptualized in the Relationship Marketing literature 
(Pels et al., 2000). For example, if auditors were found to offer a relational service but 
customers only preferred a transactional approach then the audit firm would be wasting 
resources (Pels et al., 2000). If on the other hand, the audit firm is offering a transactional 
service and the client prefers a relational approach the audit firm would suffer from customer 
dissatisfaction (Pels et al., 2000). Therefore, by measuring the two party preferences these 
possible mismatches could be better managed. 
It would be a contribution to this study to pursue face-to-face qualitative interviews, in order 
to have the audit client define in their own words their relationship with their auditors. We 
would be able to see if relationship variables inductively created from these interviews match 
the variables in other buyer-seller marketing stud ies. 
APPENDIX A 
COVER LETTER 
November, 2008 
Dear Madam or Sir: 
1am writing to ask for your help in a survey study being conducted as a part of my PhD thesis. Vou 
have been selected to participate in this research because you are the individual in your organisation 
that is responsible for managing the relationship with your external auditor (hereafter referred to as 
auditor). Ifyou are not responsible for managing the relationship with your company's auditor would 
you kindly transfer this document to the individuaJ that has this responsibility. 
The objective of my research project is to determine the type of relationships that clients would like to 
have with their auditors. Also, 1am interested in knowing if certain personal characteristics of clients 
are related to relationship preferences with their auditors. 
This research is important as the results will help us better understand auditor-client relationships from 
your perspective: the client. Audit clients play a very important role in the overall audit service and 
very little is known about the client's relationship with their auditor. 
Your answers are completely confidential and will be released only as summaries in which no 
individual's answers can be identified. Our results will be shared with you, ifyou so desire, which 
should provide you with a more complete understanding of the overall relationship preferences of 
other audit clients. 
This survey is voluntary and there are no correct or incorrect answers; we are only interested in your 
perceptions. 
The questionnaire has been designed so that you can complete it quickly and easily. Vou need to only 
put Xs on a line or in a circle. A post-paid return envelope has been included for your convenience. 
Also, this study has been approved by the UQAM ethical sub-committee. Ifyou have any questions or 
comments about this study, 1would be happy to talk with you. Vou could cali me at 514 987 3000 
extension 2480. 
ThanJ< you very much for helping me with my study. 
Sincerely, 
Richard Fontaine CMA, MPA, PhD Candidate 
Professor, Accounting Dept. UQAM 
Joint PhD Program (UQAM, U of M, McGill, Concordia) 
Montréal, Québec 
514 987 3000 ext. 2480 
fonta ine.richard@uqam.ca 
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CMA Canada is sponsoring ML Richard Fontaine as a PhD candidate. This sponsorship is through the 
CMA Canada Doctoral Support Program. 
The CMA Canada Doctoral Support Program fosters the development of new PhDs who will heJp 
strengthen the field of Management Accounting through research and academic excelience. 
On behalf of CMA Canada, 1would encourage you to participate in Richard's research project. 
Sincerely, 
Richard Benn, FCMA 
Executive Vice President, 
Member Development 
The Society of Management Accountants 05 949-0888 of Canada 
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tel: 905949-4200 or 1800263 7622 fax: 9. 
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APPENDIX C 
RELATIONAL PREFERENCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS A-C OF THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
You will be asked to pJease place an X on the part of the line that best represents your opinion.
 
The following is an EXAMPLE:
 
Your X can be situated anywhere on the line provided.
 
The folJowing example provides different possible answers. 
EXAMPLE: 
Performing physical exercise is essential for good mental health. 
An answer of"mostly disagree" could be indicated as folJows: 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
x 
An anSwer of"slight agreement" could be indicated as follows: 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
x
 
158 
SECTION A: Relational Preferences 
PLEASE GIVE US YOUR OPINION CONCERNING YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR 
AUDITOR 
For the following 20 questions we are interested in your perceptions your preferred relationship with 
your auditor. 
There is no correct or no incorrect answer.
 
For each of the following 20 statements please put an X on the part of the line that best represents your
 
opinion.
 
Your X can be situated anywhere on the line provided. 
PLEASE BEGIN HERE 
1. The relationship with my auditor plays a more important role than the audit service. 
(By relationship with my auditor we mean any interactions with your auditor, including business 
and/or non-business dealings). 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
2. The relationship with my auditor is only important if 1am satisfied with the audit service. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
3. The relationship with my auditor is only important to the extent that it facilitates the audit service. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
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4. If my auditor has information which could help our organization in the production or distribution of 
our product or service, he or she provides that information. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
5. There is a very high level of trust between my auditor and me. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
6. The relation~hip with my auditor could be described as "arms length".
 
(arms length is defined as: relating in such a way as to avoidfamiliarity and prevent direct influence
 
by any ofthe parties over the other or others).
 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
7. The relationship with my auditor is a "Iong-term venture". 
(Iong-tenn is defined as: lasting or inlended 10 lasl for a long lime) 
TotalJy 
disagree 
o 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Totally 
agree 
100 
8. The relationship with my auditor is a series of one shot dealings. 
(one-shot is defined as: InformaI being the only one, nol part ofa series) 
Totally 
disagree 
o 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Totally 
agree 
100 
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9. The relationship with my auditor could be described as a "cooperative effort". 
(cooperative is defined as: Wanting or willing ta wark tagether with athers) 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
10. 1rarely use pressure tactics to influence my auditor.
 
(As an example, a client could inOuence their audit on issues regarding audit fees, financial statement
 
issues, etc.) 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
Il. We avoid putting pressure on our auditor in cases of conflicting interest, in order to preserve the 
overall atmosphere of the relationship. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
12. 1have expectations of my auditor that go beyond the aud it service.
 
(expectations that go beyond audit services could be non-audit business issues that are uncovered
 
during the audit, other non-billable consulting services or also any non-business issues)
 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
13. My relationship with my auditor also includes non-audit issues. 
(by non-audit issues we mean any issue, business or non-business, that is not a part of the audit 
service) 
Totally Neither agree TotaJly 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
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14. The only expectation 1 have concerning the behaviour of my auditor is that he or she provide the 
agreed upon audit service. 
(the agreed upon audit service means the quantity and quality of audit service for the agreed priee 
and timeframe.) 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
15. When circumstances change, my auditor and 1can easily make modifications to our agreement. 
(by agreementwe mean any predetermined terms agreed upon, either formally with an engagement 
letter, or an informaJ agreement understood by both parties) 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
16. The terms of the agreement with my auditor are not renegotiable under any circumstances. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
17. There is a give and take on specifies of the audit service ifbusiness conditions change. 
(examples of a give and take on specifies of the audit service could be related to audit service 
pricing or also related to financial statement issues). 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
18. 1do more to help my auditor than my auditor does to help me. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
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19. If costs and benefits are not evenly shared between my auditor and me, in a given time period, they 
balance out over time. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
20. 1monitor my auditor c10sely to ensure my auditor meets my expectations. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
APPENDIX D 
RISK AVERSION QUESTIONNAIRE 
For the following 3 sections, B-D, we wou Id like to better understand sorne of your personal 
characteristics. Our objective is to see if there is a relationship between these personal 
characteristics and the questions you answered in the previous section A. 
SECTION B: RISK AVERSION 
PLEASE OIVE US YOUR PERCEPTION TO THE FOLLOWINO STATEMENTS. 
For each of the following 8 statements please put an X on the part of the line that best represents 
your opinion. There is no correct or incorrect answer; we are interested in your perception. 
Your X can be situated anywhere on the line provided. 
PLEASE BEGIN HERE 
1. l am a person that generally avoids ail risk. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
2. People that want to succeed in their career need to take risks. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o IOO 
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3. 1always remain cautious, even if it means sometimes losing good opportunities. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
4. 1view the risk of a job as a situation to be avoided at ail costs. 
Totally Neither agree TotalJy 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
5. 1am not willing to take risks when choosing a job or a company to work for. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
6. 1prefer to remain on a job that has problems that 1know about rather than take risks of working at a 
new job that has unknown problems even if the new job offers greater rewards. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
7.1 prefer a low risk/high security job with a steady salary over ajob that offers high risks and high 
rewards. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o [00 
8. rbelieve that it is wise to have a career plan with little risk even if it is to the detriment of great 
success. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
APPENDIX E 
ETHICS OF CARE QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION C: ETHICS OF CARE 
PLEASE TELL US HOW THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DESCRIBE YOUR THOUGHTS 
AND FEELINGS. 
Please rate the following statements as to how closely they describe your thoughts and feelings. We are 
interested in your perceptions; there is no correct or incorrect answer. 
PLEASE BEGIN HERE 
1. When solving problems, relationships are more important than the rights of individuals. 
(By rights we mean principles (moral, legal, universal, etc.), whereas by relationships we mean the 
feelings and care of people) 
Totally 
disagree 
o 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
TotaJly 
agree 
100 
2.1 try to resolve problems in a way that does not violate the rights ofany of the people involved. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
3. In practically ail situations, 1make decisions based upon the principles and rules rather than upon 
who is involved. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
o 100 
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4. My decisions wouJd favour those 1care about more than those I do not know. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
5. When I make decisions, I tend to be more subjective than objective. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
6. In solving conflicts, 1try to be rational without much regard to feelings. 
Totally Neither agree TotalJy 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
7. I would not do anything to jeopardize my relationship with someone. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
8. In aIl situations, I am impartial and unattached when making decisions. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
9. In most situations, 1am impartial and unattached when making decisions. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
167 
la. In practically ail situations 1make decisions based upon who is involved rather than upon 
princip les or rules. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
11. 1would rather be known as someone who is always objective and just than someone who is 
sensitive to others' feelings. 
Totally Neither agree Totally 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
12. When 1make decisions ttend to be more concerned with how my decisions will affect others 
rather than whether 1am doing the "right" thing. 
Totally Neither agree TotalJy 
disagree nor disagree agree 
a 100 
APPENDIX F
 
LOCUS OF CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE
 
SECTION D: LOCUS OF CONTROL 
PLEASE TELL US WHAT YOU BELlEVE IS TRUE IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS. 
Next to each of the following 17 numbers there are two statements. For each number place an X 
in the circle next to the statement which you believe to be truer, despite what you may wish to 
be true. 
There is no correct or incorrect answer. Please answer all the questions. 
PLEASE BEGIN HERE 
1. C Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too harshly. 
OR 
C The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them. 
2. C The idea that employers are unfair to employees is nonsense. 
OR 
C Most employees don't realize the extent to which their evaluations are inf1uenced by 
happenings that have nothing to do with their work performance. 
3. C Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
OR 
C Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
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4. C 1have often found that what is going to happen, will happen. 
OR 
C Trusting to fate has never turned out as weil for me as making a decision to take a definite 
course of action. 
5. C ln the case of an individual who works conscientiously, there is rarely if ever such a thing as 
an unfair evaluation. 
OR 
C Many times evaluations tend to be so unrelated to realised work working conscientiously is 
often useless. 
6. C There are certain people who are just no good. 
OR 
C There is some good in everybody. 
7. C Becoming a success is a matter of hard work. Luck has Iittle or nothing to do with il. 
OR 
C Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time. 
8. C ln my case getting what 1want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
OR 
C Many times we might just as weil decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
9. C As far as world affairs are concerned, most ofus are the victims of forces we can neither 
understand, nor control. 
OR 
C By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control worJd events. 
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10. C Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidentaI 
happenings. 
OR 
C There really is no such thi~g as "luck." 
1l.C It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
OR 
C How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
12. C In the long J'un the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. 
OR 
C Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or aIl three. 
13. C One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
OR 
C Tt is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
14. C Sometimes 1can't understand how employers arrive at the evaJuations they give. 
OR 
C There is a direct relationship between how hard 1work and the evaluations 1get. 
15. C Many times 1feel that 1have little influence over the things that happen to me. 
OR 
C 1do not believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. 
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16. C What happens to me is my own doing. 
OR 
C Sometimes 1feel that 1don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking. 
17. C Most of the time 1can't understand why politicians behave the way they do. 
OR 
C ln the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as weil as on a 
locallevel. 
---
APPENDIX G 
PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
SECTION E: PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INFORMATION 
1. Gender:� Male Female 
2. Number ofyears of experience in your actual position:� _ 
3. Number ofyears ofexperience in your area ofwork:� _ 
4. Name ofyour present audit firm:� _ 
5. Length oftime you have been doing business with your audit firm: -'-- _ 
6. Indicate the services provided to your organization by your present audit firm: 
Audit services�
___Review Engagement� 
___Notice to Reader� 
7. Of the total an nua! fees paid to your audit firm, approximately, what percentage of the total payment 
(100%) is for: 
Audit or Review Engagement services� 
--_%� 
Other bi Ilable services� 
---_%� 
If applicable please specify the name of the other billable services:� 
THIS COMPLETES OUR SURVEY.� 
Thank vou verv much for vour collaboration!� 
APPENDIX H 
PHONE CONVERSATION 
Hello Mister (or Mrs) 
My Name is Richard Fontaine 
1am calling you to ask for a small favor. 1am conducting a research project to complete my
 
PhD thesis at the University of Québec in Montréal. T have sent you a questionnaire, and J
 
would appreciate your generous help if you could take few minutes to fil! it out.
 
J understand you must be very busy and your time is precious, but the questionnaire is
 
actually easy and quick to fill out.
 
Other Financial executives like you have participated in the survey and found it easy,
 
completing it in less than 30 minutes.
 
There are no open ended questions butjust Xs to put on a line. J have included a pre­

addressed and pre-paid return envelope for your convenience. 1actually think you might find
 
the questionnaire interesting.
 
The objective of the research to is to determine the type ofrelationship clients would like to
 
have with their auditor. The results ofthis research, which Jwould be happy to share with
 
you, should help auditors better service their clients and lower overall audit costs (this is true
 
by getting clients to cooperate they can get info easier, less work and less risk).
 
This research is sponsored by UQAM and CMA Canada.
 
1am depending on your generous help to so 1can complete my PhD thesis
 
Many thanks in advance.
 
1wish you a nice day.
 
APPENDIX 1 
RELATlüNAL PREFERENCE FRENQUENCIES 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Valid 559,44 1 ,3 ,3 ,3 
644,72 1 ,3 ,3 ,7 
658,33 1 ,3 ,3 1,0 
672,22 1 ,3 ,3 1,3 
745,83 1 ,3 ,3 1,6 
764,72 1 ,3 ,3 2,0 
765,00 1 ,3 ,3 2,3 
781,39 1 ,3 ,3 2,6 
798,06 1 ,3 ,3 2,9 
807,22 1 ,3 ,3 3,3 
808,89 1 ,3 ,3 3,6 
818,61 1 ,3 ,3 3,9 
822,22 1 ,3 ,3 4,2 
825,56 1 ,3 ,3 4,6 
834,17 1 ,3 ,3 4,9 
837,78 2 ,7 ,7 5,6 
852,22 1 ,3 ,3 5,9 
856,67 1 ,3 ,3 6,2 
865,28 1 ,3 ,3 6,5 
871, Il 1 ,3 ,3 6,9 
871,67 1 ,3 ,3 7,2 
875,00 1 ,3 ,3 7,5 
878,06 1 ,3 ,3 7,8 
878,33 1 ,3 ,3 8,2 
878,61 1 ,3 ,3 8,5 
878,89 1 ,3 ,3 8,8 
884,44 1 ,3 ,3 9,2 
891,67 1 ,3 ,3 9,5 
894,72 1 ,3 ,3 9,8 
898,61 1 ,3 ,3 10,1 
902,22 1 ,3 ,3 10,5 
904,72 1 ,3 ,3 10,8 
908,89 1 ,3 ,3 Il,1 
910,00 1 ,3 3 Il,4 
914,17 1 ,3 ,3 11,8 
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Frequency Percent Val id Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
919,17 1 ,3 ,3 12,1 
920,28 1 ,3 ,3 12,4 
926,67 1 ,3 ,3 12,7 
926,94 1 ,3 ,3 13,1 
936,11 1 ,3 ,3 13,4 
937,78 J ,3 ,3 13,7 
939,72 1 ,3 ,3 14,1 
942,22 1 ,3 ,3 14,4 
942,78 1 ,3 ,3 14,7 
944,72 1 ,3 ,3 15,0 
946,39 1 ,3 ,3 15,4 
948,61 1 ,3 ,3 15,7 
949,72 2 ,7 ,7 16,3 
951, Il 1 ,3 ,3 16,7 
951,67 1 ,3 ,3 17,0 
952,78 1 ,3 ,3 17,3 
953,06 1 ,3 ,3 17,6 
953,33 1 ,3 ,3 18,0 
955,56 1 ,3 ,3 18,3 
959,44 1 ,3 ,3 18,6 
961,11 1 ,3 ,3 19,0 
962,50 1 ,3 ,3 19,3 
965,00 2 ,7 ,7 19,9 
966,11 1 ,3 ,3 20,3 
968,33 1 ,3 ,3 20,6 
976,11 1 ,3 ,3 20,9 
977,50 1 ,3 ,3 21,2 
979,44 1 ,3 ,3 21,6 
983,06 1 ,3 ,3 21,9 
984,44 1 ,3 ,3 22,2 
991,94 1 ,3 ,3 22,5 
992,50 1 ,3 ,3 22,9 
992,78 1 ,3 ,3 23,2 
1004,17 1 ,3 ,3 23,5 
1005,83 l ,3 ,3 23,9 
1007,50 1 ,3 ,3 24,2 
1010,00 1 ,3 ,3 24,5 
1013,61 1 ,3 ,3 24,8 
1013,89 1 ,3 ,3 25,2 
1016,94 1 ,3 ,3 25,5 
1018,89 1 ,3 ,3 25,8 
1022,22 1 ,3 ,3 26,1 
1025,28 1 3 ,3 265 
1026, Il 1 ,3 ,3 26,8 
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Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
1029,17 1 ,3 ,3 27,1 
1030,28 1 ,3 ,3 27,5 
1034,72 1 ,3 ,3 27,8 
1036,67 1 ,3 ,3 28,1 
1037,22 1 ,3 ,3 28,4 
1037,50 1 ,3 ,3 28,8 
1039,44 1 ,3 ,3 29,1 
1041,94 1 ,3 ,3 29,4 
1042,22 1 ,3 ,3 29,7 
1044,44 1 ,3 ,3 30,1 
1045,56 1 ,3 ,3 30,4 
1046,67 1 ,3 ,3 30,7 
1047,22 1 ,3 ,3 31,0 
1048,06 1 ,3 ,3 31,4 
1048,61 1 ,3 ,3 31,7 
1050,00 1 ,3 ,3 32,0 
1051,39 1 ,3 ,3 32,4 
1052,22 2 ,7 ,7 33,0 
1053,61 1 ,3 ,3 33,3 
1053,89 1 ,3 ,3 33,7 
1055,56 1 ,3 ,3 34,0 
1057,78 1 ,3 ,3 34,3 
1058,61 1 ,3 ,3 34,6 
1058,89 2 ,7 ,7 35,3 
1062,22 1 ,3 ,3 35,6 
1066,39 1 ,3 ,3 35,9 
1068,33 1 ,3 ,3 36,3 
1068,61 1 ,3 ,3 36,6 
1071,67 1 ,3 ,3 36,9 
1073,06 1 ,3 ,3 37,3 
1075,28 1 ,3 ,3 37,6 
1075,83 1 ,3 ,3 37,9 
1076,94 1 ,3 ,3 38,2 
1078,06 1 ,3 ,3 38,6 
1078,61 2 ,7 ,7 39,2 
1078,89 1 ,3 ,3 39,5 
1079,17 1 ,3 ,3 39,9 
1080,28 1 ,3 ,3 40,2 
1083,61 1 ,3 ,3 40,5 
1086,94 2 ,7 ,7 41,2 
1089,17 1 ,3 ,3 41,5 
1090,00 1 ,3 ,3 41,8 
1090,28 1 ,3 ,3 42,2 
1090,56 1 ,3 ,3 42,5 
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Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
1092,78 2 ,7 ,7 43,1 
1094,72 1 ,3 ,3 43,5 
1097,78 1 ,3 ,3 43,8 
1098,33 1 ,3 ,3 44,1 
1098,61 1 ,3 ,3 44,4 
1100,83 1 ,3 ,3 44,8 
1101,11 1 ,3 ,3 45,1 
1101,94 1 ,3 ,3 45,4 
1104,17 1 ,3 ,3 45,8 
1105,56 1 ,3 ,3 46,1 
1106,11 1 ,3 ,3 46,4 
1108,89 1 ,3 ,3 46,7 
1112,50 2 ,7 ,7 47,4 
1112,78 1 ,3 ,3 47,7 
1113,61 1 ,3 ,3 48,0 
1114,44 1 ,3 ,3 48,4 
1115,56 1 ,:3 ,3 48,7 
1117,78 1 ,3 ,3 49,0 
1118,61 1 ,3 ,3 49,3 
1122,50 2 ,7 ,7 50,0 
1123,06 1 ,3 ,3 50,3 
1123,61 1 ,3 ,3 50,7 
1124,72 1 ,3 ,3 51,0 
1126,39 1 ,3 ,3 51,3 
1127,50 1 ,3 ,3 51,6 
1128,33 1 ,3 ,3 52,0 
1131,11 1 ,3 ,3 52,3 
1133,06 1 ,3 ,3 52,6 
1134,72 1 ,3 ,3 52,9 
1135,28 1 ,3 ,3 53,3 
1136,] 1 1 ,3 ,3 53,6 
1136,39 1 ,3 ,3 53,9 
1137,50 1 ,3 ,3 54,2 
1139,17 1 ,3 ,3 54,6 
] 139,72 2 ,7 ,7 55,2 
1140,00 1 ,3 ,3 55,6 
1143,61 1 ,3 ,3 55,9 
1144,44 1 ,3 ,3 56,2 
1145,28 1 ,3 ,3 56,5 
]149,44 ] ,3 ,3 56,9 
1150,00 1 ,3 ,3 57,2 
1151,39 1 ,3 ,3 57,5 
1151,94 1 ,3 ,3 578 
1152,22 1 ,3 ,3 58,2 
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Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
1153,06 2 ,7 ,7 58,8 
1156,11 1 ,3 ,3 59,2 
1156,39 1 ,3 ,3 59,5 
1158,33 1 ,3 ,3 59,8 
1158,6 ) 1 ,3 ,3 60,1 
1159,17 1 ,3 ,3 60,5 
1160,28 1 ,3 ,3 608 
1163,06 1 ,3 ,3 61,1 
1163,33 2 ,7 ,7 61,8 
1164,44 1 ,3 ,3 62,1 
1164,72 1 ,3 ,3 62,4 
1165,00 1 ,3 ,3 62,7 
1166, Il 1 ,3 ,3 63,1 
1166,39 2 ,7 ,7 63,7 
1168,89 2 ,7 ,7 64,4 
1169,17 1 ,3 ,3 64,7 
1170,83 1 ,3 ,3 65,0 
1171,39 2 ,7 ,7 65,7 
1173,06 1 ,3 ,3 66,0 
1174,17 1 ,3 ,3 66,3 
1176,94 1 3 ,3 66,7 
1177,22 1 ,3 ,3 67,0 
] 177,78 1 ,3 ,3 67,3 
1178,61 1 ,3 ,3 67,6 
1179,72 1 ,3 ,3 68,0 
1] 82,22 1 ,3 ,3 68,3 
1182,78 1 ,3 ,3 68,6 
1183,89 2 ,7 ,7 69,3 
1] 85,00 1 ,3 ,3 69,6 
1185,28 1 ,3 ,3 69,9 
1185,56 2 ,7 ,7 70,6 
1186,67 1 ,3 ,3 70,9 
1188,89 1 ,3 ,3 71,2 
1191, Il 1 ,3 ,3 71,6 
1194,44 1 ,3 ,3 71,9 
] 196,39 1 ,3 ,3 72,2 
1198,06 1 ,3 ,3 72,5 
1198,33 1 ,3 ,3 72,9 
1198,89 1 ,3 ,3 73,2 
] ]99,72 2 ,7 ,7 73,9 
1200,83 1 ,3 ,3 74,2 
1202,78 1 ,3 ,3 74,5 
1203,06 1 ,3 ,3 74,8 
1207,22 1 ,3 ,3 75,2 
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Frequency Percent Val id Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
1210,00 1 ,3 ,3 75,5 
1210,83 1 ,3 ,3 75,8 
1216,39 1 ,3 ,3 76,1 
1216,94 1 ,3 ,3 76,5 
1217,78 1 ,3 ,3 76,8 
1219,72 2 ,7 ,7 77,5 
1225,83 1 ,3 ,3 77,8 
1229,17 1 ,3 ,3 78,1 
1231,67 1 ,3 ,3 78,4 
1232,50 1 ,3 ,3 78,8 
1235,28 1 ,3 ,3 79,1 
1236,67 1 ,3 ,3 79,4 
1239,44 1 ,3 ,3 79,7 
1240,00 1 ,3 ,3 80,1 
1240,28 1 ,3 ,3 80,4 
1240,83 1 ,3 ,3 80,7 
1242,78 1 ,3 ,3 81,0 
1243,89 1 ,3 ,3 81,4 
1244,17 1 ,3 ,3 81,7 
1245,28 2 ,7 ,7 82,4 
1245,56 1 ,3 ,3 82,7 
1246,39 1 ,3 ,3 83,0 
1248,06 1 ,3 ,3 83,3 
1254,17 1 ,3 ,3 83,7 
1259,44 1 ,3 ,3 84,0 
1260,56 1 ,3 ,3 84,3 
1261,67 1 ,3 ,3 84,6 
1264,44 1 ,3 ,3 85,0 
1268,61 1 ,3 ,3 85,3 
1272,78 1 ,3 ,3 85,6 
1273,33 1 ,3 ,3 85,9 
1284,72 1 ,3 ,3 86,3 
1290,28 1 ,3 ,3 86,6 
1291,94 1 ,3 ,3 86,9 
1292,22 1 ,3 ,3 87,3 
1293,89 1 ,3 ,3 87,6 
1294,44 1 ,3 ,3 87,9 
1295,28 1 ,3 ,3 88,2 
1298,06 1 ,3 ,3 88,6 
1299,72 1 ,3 ,3 88,9 
1300,56 1 ,3 ,3 89,2 
1300,83 1 ,3 ,3 89,5 
1301 67 1 ,3 ,3 89,9 
1302,50 2 ,7 ,7 90,5 
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Frequency 
1308,06 1 
1308,33 1 
1312,22 1 
1313,61 1 
1313,89 1 
1314,44 1 
1316,94 1 
1328,61 1 
1330,56 1 
1335,00 1 
1336,39 1 
1340,28 1 
1346,39 1 
1347,78 1 
1348,33 1 
1349,72 1 
1352,22 1 
1355,83 1 
1363,33 1 
1370,56 1 
1371,94 1 
1385,28 1 
1395,83 1 
1396,11 1 
1406,94 1 
1411,94 1 
1469,44 1 
1472,50 1 
1553,61 1 
Total 306 
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APPENDIX J 
scon 
Bonjour Richard, 
Malheureusement nous n'avons pas d'indicateur pour identifier les compagnies privées et 
celles inscrites à la bourse. 
Si de plus amples informations sont nécessaires, n'hésite pas à communiquer avec 
moi (cell car je suis en salon d'exposition à Montréal 647-207-8931). 
John La Battaglia 
Account Manager / Chargé de Comptes 
E-Business Group 
12 Concorde Place, Suite 800 
Toronto, ON M3C 4J2 
Tel: 416-510-6843 Fax: 416-510-6870 
Toll Free: 1-800-408-9431 Ext.29 
E-mail/Courriel:jlabattaglia@scottsdirectories.com 
WEB: www.scottsdirectories.com 
APPENDIX K 
DUNN AND BRADSTREET 
Richard, 
Looks like we finally got each other's emaiJ addresses! 
Two things to clarify: First, the lists come with one top level decision makers when you 
purchase a marketing liste could be the president, owner, etc.) --- Deeper more specific 
decision makers are only available on our online databases. 
Second, email address are not available for any contacts in our database due to privacy and 
spamming laws that have been passed. 
The only other thing 1 need from you is to see if there are any industries you would like to 
include or disclude for the criteria. 1 have attached an SIC code table. 
The cost for the 1000 names would be $321. It will give you Name of the Company, 
Address, Phone Number, Mailing 
Address, Top Level Contact, and SIC code. 
Any other questions give me a calI. Thanks. 
A.l. Burman 
Business Information Consultant 
Hoover's Online ---- DNB Canada 
5770 Hurontario Street -11 th Floor 
Mississauga, ON L5R 3G5 
Phone:905-568-5929 
Toii free: 1-877-520-7804 ext. 5929 
Fax: 905-568-6279 
www.hoovers.com 
www.dnb.com 
Now available at Hoover's: 
Access Hoover's Salesforce.com integration! Please contact me for details. 
APPENDIX L 
PROFILE CANADA 
Profile Canada Custom List 
Dear Richard, 
Based on your criteria.... 
Headquarters 
Private Companies 
English Speaking 
100+ Employees 
We found 1,560 Companies. 
The cost of an Exportable Excel File would be $624.00 
Regards, 
Niall 
Niall Mac Mahon 
Account Executive 
Owen-Media Partners Inc. 
PH. (905) 569-2243 x 235 1FX. (905) 593-8325 
TF PH. 1-877-463-6284 x 2351 TF FX. 1-866-605-7333 
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